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MR - Criminal Law revision notes
Criminal Law (LW2220)
University of Leicester
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UNIT 2: Mens Rea State of mind required by the definition of the offence charged Some offences do not require MR as strict liability Strict liability: not serious offences S CDA 1971: “intending to destroy or damage any such property’ Conceptions of responsibility Capacity conception Person must both understand the nature of her actions, know the relevant circumstances and be aware of possible consequences and have genuine opportunity to otherwise than she does, exercise control over actions by means of choice Character conception Ascriptions of responsibility are based on judgements about the character of the agent: actions hold a person fully responsible are those in which her usual character is centrally expressed R v Kingston (Barry) 1995 o Involuntary intoxication o D was paedophile: wished he wasn’t, had engaged in unlawful conduct and had tried to resist urges o Third parties drugged the drunk of K and left him alone with a child, which he then committed unlawful assault of the child o His argument was he would not have done that had he not been drugged- was the third parties’ actions o HoL: upheld conviction as he had the MR: knew what he was doing at the time- could have stopped himself and yet didn’t; was punished for his flawed character Cognitive MR Blameworthiness requires intention or foresight on the part of the D (subjective recklessness) Requires and assessment as to what is going on in D’s mind at the time of the offence Flaw: how can you know what is going on in someone’s mind? Jury must draw inferences from facts DPP v Smith 1961 o Police asked D to pull over; police officer walking alongside the car and then D sped away- police officer managed to cling onto side of the car o D driving erratically, V ran over by another vehicle after letting go; did not intend to kill them o Find him liable for murder as the reasonable man would have realised their actions o HoL: assuming that D is accountable for his actions, and is capable of performing intent, the only question is whether a responsible man would contemplate a similar act
Controversial: if found someone liable for murder- did not require cognitive MR- turned into an objective test Normative MR Blameworthiness extends beyond the cognitive states of mind Misra 2004: requirement for GN provides the necessary element of culpability of manslaughter Allows for an objective assessment of blameworthiness Criminal Justice Act 1967, S. A court or jury in determining whether a person has committed an offence: o Shall not be bound in law to infer that he intended or foresaw a result of his actions by reason only of its being a natural and probable consequence of these actions o But shall decide whether he did intend or foresee that result by reference to all the evidence, drawing such inferences from the evidence as appear proper in the circumstances 2 concepts of intention
- Direct intention A consequence is intended if it is the aim or objective of the actor Duff’s test of failure: result forms part of the D’s reason for acting
- Oblique intention A consequence is intended when it is the aim or objective of the actor, or is foreseen as a virtual, practical, or moral certainty as a by-product of the actor’s aim Hyam v DPP 1975 o D burnt down house of her rival in love; killed her children o Judge directed the jury to convict the D of murder if she knew that it was highly probable that her act would cause death or serious bodily harm; jury convicted her o Decision was criticised: confusion cleared in Woollin where held that the right test was whether there was foresight of a ‘virtual certainty’ that a voluntary act will cause death or serious harm R v Moloney 1985 o D (M) and his stepfather, H, were engaging in drunken discussion regarding their marksmanship; had a loaded shotgun: M challenged H to a quick draw contest pointing gun at H o M accidentally shot H causing his death: defence M countered that he did not aim the gun, but merely pulled the trigger o HoL allowed appeal on grounds that true defence was never stated- did not realise where the gun was pointing and neither desired nor foresaw what would occur; convicted of manslaughter
be ‘virtually certain’ to result from his voluntary act: Lord Steyn, definitional interpretation Matthews and Alleyne 2003 Ds threw V into river who drowned and died Ds argued although they knew the V could not swim, they did not intend for the V to die Judge gave direction to jury that it must find Ds guilty of murder if they found that they had foresight that the V was ‘virtually certain’ to die or suffer serious harm Conviction safe o CoA preferred the evidential interpretation; where result is foreseen as virtually certain, this evidence entitling a jury to find intention allows for moral elbow room Re A (Conjoined Twins) 2000 Parents of conjoined twins appealed against decision to allow an operation to surgically separate them which would result in death of M M had severe brain abnormalities, no lungs, was supplied blood from sister, J First instance: judge held allowing the operation was best interests of both children; J normal life, M no further suffering Was basing off of Airedale NHS Trust v Bland case; where declared acceptable to remove life support Parents appealed on basis would not be best interests of both children M’s death would be foreseen as inevitable consequence of operation to save J Held that: o Looking at welfare of children: judge had erred in suggesting separation would be of benefit to both children as all life has equal value; M’s life as valuable as J’s, operation would not be in her best interest o Court required to balance interests of the children against one another; balance in favour of J o Operation would not constitute murder as 3 elements required to raise defence of necessity were present:
- Act was required to avoid irreplaceable evil
- Steps went no more than was reasonably necessary required to achieve this and
- The evil caused was not disproportionate to the evil avoided Outcome: 20 hour long operation- J survived operation and M died Criminal Damage Act 1971 S(1) A person who without lawful excuse destroys or damages any property belonging to another intending to destroy or damage any
such property or being reckless as to whether any such property would be destroyed or damaged shall be guilty of an offence Reckless Subjective: Cunningham 1957
- Did D foresee the possibility of the consequence occurring
- Was it unjustifiable or unreasonable to take the risk? (objective test) Cunningham 1957 D broke into house, messed with gas meter thinking there was money inside Broken gas meter by hands of D caused gas to escape, seeped into adjoining house- neighbour was poisoned by the gas D was charged with unlawfully and maliciously endangering life contrary to OAPA1861, S. Malice: whether the D had either actual intent to cause harm or was reckless as to the possibility of causing foreseeable harm Caldwell 1982 Objective test for recklessness, where Ds characteristics, including mental state is not to be considered D drunkenly set fire to a hotel Pled guilty to S(1) CDA 1971 for reckless arson D contested charge under S(2) of the act for reckless endangerment on the basis that he was so drunk that the risk of others being in the hotel did not cross his mind Held: D was guilty under S(2) of the 1971 Act Recklessness includes both: o ‘Deciding to ignore a risk of harmful consequences resulting from one’s acts that one has recognised as existing’ o And ‘failing to give any thought to whether or not there is any such risk in circumstances where, if any thought were given to the matter, it would be obvious that there was’ Not be accused of being reckless if: o ‘The risk of the harmful consequences was so slight that the ordinary prudent individual upon due consideration of the risk would not be deterred from treating it as negligible’ Intoxication is no defence o DPP v Majewski 1977: ‘self-induced intoxication is no defence to a crime in which recklessness is enough to constitute the necessary MR’ Classification of specific and basic intent offences is irrelevant where being reckless as to whether a particular harmful consequence will result from one’s act is a sufficient alternative MR A person is charged with an offence under S(1) CDA 1971 if they are ‘reckless as to whether any such property would be destroyed or damaged if:
Foetus not a human being in legal terms Thabo Meli 1954 Ds struck V overhead intending to kill; dropped him over a cliff where he died from exposure Ds argued that he did not intend to kill at time of death, as thought V already dead Held: impossible to divide up one series of acts; Ds liable for murder Church 1966: V+ Church had argument; C knocked V out, panicked assuming she was dead and dumped her in the river Jury could convict of murder if they regarded Ds behaviour from the moment he first struck V to the moment he threw her in the river as a series of acts designed to cause her death or GBH Le Brun 1992: D liable for manslaughter as chain of causation not broken between original assault and death Fagan v MPC 1969: D unknowingly drove onto PC’s foot, refused to move car off it; court interpreted it as continuous- MR could be superimposed on existing AR Intoxication Basic rule: ‘drunken intent is still intent’: Sheehan and Moore 1975 Intoxication as a defence: no MR Intoxication as a doctrine of inculpation: prior fault Majewski 1977 D assaulted police officers whilst intoxicated; D was charged with assault occasioning actual bodily harm S OAPA Held: ‘drunken intent is still intent’ Voluntary intoxication is a defence only to crimes of specific intent, it is no defence even if it did cause D to lack MR in crimes of basic intent “If a man of his own volition takes a substance which causes him to cast off the restraints of reason and conscience, no wrong is done to him by holding him answerable criminally for any injury he may do while in that condition. His course of conduct in reducing himself by drugs and drink to that condition in my view supplies the evidence of MR, of guilty mind certainly sufficient for crimes of basic intent. It is a reckless course of conduct and recklessness is enough to constitute the necessary MR in assault cases.” o Doctrine of prior fault explains lack of defence in crimes of basic intent Specific Intent
Murder S OAPA- causing GBH with intent Theft Robbery Burglary Most attempts Basic Intent Manslaughter Rape S OAPA- maliciously inflicting GBH S OAPA- assault occasioning ABH Common assault Criminal damage Prior fault intoxication
- D must be involuntarily intoxicated D having knowingly ingested a ‘dangerous’ intoxicant in the sense that is commonly known to lead to unpredictability or aggression Does not apply where intoxication is voluntary If intoxication is involuntary, normal rules of MR apply (Kingston)
- Offence must be one of the basic intent, not specific intent
- D lacks MR at time of the offence because of the intoxication Ie. must establish D had capacity to form MR but for the intoxication (Richardson and Irwin) R v Richardson and Irwin 1999 D+V were friends, had been drinking, involving themselves in horseplay Ds decide to drop V over 10ft balcony causing him injury Judge directed that if a reasonable, sober man would have foreseen some harm then they were guilty: they were convicted of GBH Conviction quashed o To be guilty of crime with MR of recklessness while intoxicated, risk of harm must be foreseeable to the D when sober, not just foreseeable to a reasonable person when sober If above rules apply, D will be guilty of the crime of basic intent even though D does not have the required MR Where the crime is one of specific intent, D will not be liable without MR; but D may instead be liable for lesser crime of basic intent
MR - Criminal Law revision notes
Module: Criminal Law (LW2220)
University: University of Leicester
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