College of the Holy Cross

A firm can hire either Type A workers (LA) or Type B workers (LB ) at their respective
market wages wA and wB . Additionally, the firm prefers Type A workers such that its utility
function can be written as: V = f (LA, LB ) − wALA − wB LB − dLB where d > 0 is the
discrimination coefficient that describes the amount of disutility the firm gets from hiring a
Type B worker.
a. Imagine that the firm faces a production function f (LA, LB ) = 2LA + 2LB and market
wages wA = 25 and wB = 15. If d = 0 how many of each type of worker would the
firm hire to make 100 units of output? What would be the total cost of making those
100 units

Suppose that the demand for basketball tickets by alumnae and the general public at Holy Cross games is: Q = 10,000 - 500P.

The marginal cost of providing a ticket is zero. (You may assume MC = 0 for all of the remaining problems.)

If Holy Cross is a profit maximizer, what price will they set for general public tickets if they use the DCU Center which holds 13,000 fans? How many tickets will they sell and how much profit will they make?

If Holy Cross is a profit maximizer, what price will they set for general public tickets if instead they use the Hart Center which holds only 3,600 fans? How many tickets will they sell and how much profit will they make?

Suppose the demand for basketball tickets by students at Holy Cross is Q = 20,000 - 2,000P. What price will Holy Cross charge students if they use the DCU Center? How many tickets will they sell and how much profit will they make?

Using the demands from parts a. and c., what prices and quantities will Holy Cross set for the general public and students if they use the DCU Center assuming the university wants to maximize profits and wants to sell tickets to both groups of fans? How much profit will Holy Cross make? This one is tricky. See if you can work it out. (Hint: economists think at the margin...) What kind of price discrimination is this known as?

Suppose that the demand for basketball tickets by alumnae and the general public at Holy Cross games is: Q = 10,000 - 500P.

The marginal cost of providing a ticket is zero. (You may assume MC = 0 for all of the remaining problems.)

If Holy Cross is a profit maximizer, what price will they set for general public tickets if they use the DCU Center which holds 13,000 fans? How many tickets will they sell and how much profit will they make?

Suppose that the demand for basketball tickets by alumnae and the general public at Holy Cross games is: Q = 10,000 - 500P.

The marginal cost of providing a ticket is zero. (You may assume MC = 0 for all of the remaining problems.)

If Holy Cross is a profit maximizer, what price will they set for general public tickets if they use the DCU Center which holds 13,000 fans? How many tickets will they sell and how much profit will they make?

If Holy Cross is a profit maximizer, what price will they set for general public tickets if instead they use the Hart Center which holds only 3,600 fans? How many tickets will they sell and how much profit will they make?

What are the legal questions raised by the case of DeShaney v Winnebago County Department of Social Services
?

The table shows that the mean hours worked daily before the pandemic is 5.08 and the mean
hours worked daily after the pandemic is 7.04. The standard deviation in the sample from
before the pandemic is 2.03 and the standard deviation after the pandemic started was 2.75.
For the sake of the problem set, let’s assume the sample size for both periods is 35 workers.
a. What is the p-value for this test? Using α = 0.05, do you reject or fail to reject the
null hypothesis.