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Masiya v Director OF Public Prosecutions, Pretoria AND Another ( Centre FOR Applied Legal Studies AND Another, Amici Curiae) 2007 (2) SACR 435 (CC)
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Constitutional Library, Juta's/Constitutional Court Cases/South African Criminal Law Reports/2007/MASIYA v DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS, PRETORIA
AND ANOTHER (CENTRE FOR APPLIED LEGAL STUDIES AND ANOTHER, AMICI CURIAE) 2007 (2) SACR 435 (CC)
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MASIYA v DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS, PRETORIA AND ANOTHER (CENTRE FOR APPLIED LEGAL STUDIES AND ANOTHER, AMICI
CURIAE)2007 (2) SACR 435 (CC) A
2007 (2) SACR p
Citation 2007 (2) SACR 435 (CC)
Case No CCT 54/
Court Constitutional Court
Judge Langa CJ, Moseneke DCJ, Kondile J, Madala J, Mokgoro J, Nkabinde J, O'Regan J, Sachs J, Van Der
Westhuizen J, Yacoob J and Van Heerden AJ
Heard November 9, 2006
Judgment May 10, 2007
Counsel P J J de Jager and J Bauer for the applicant, instructed by the Legal Aid Board
H M Meintjies and S Bakua for the first respondent
N Cassim SC (with S M Lebala and P T Bezuidenhout) for the second respondent
B
Flynote : Sleutelwoorde
Rape What constitutes Commonlaw definition of Extended to include C nonconsensual anal penetration of woman Pending Sexual
Offences Bill not thwarting broadening of definition since such extension clearly in public interest and delay causing injustice for survivors of non
consensual anal penetration.
Rape What constitutes Commonlaw definition of Whether to be extended D to include nonconsensual anal penetration of man Facts not
requiring Court to consider matter Not unconstitutional to have genderspe cific definition of rape.
Court Magistrates' court Powers of Not empowered to vary elements of crimes in light of Constitution No constitutional or legislative
mandate E for referral from magistrate's court to High Court for development of common law in line with Constitution Magistrate's court
nonetheless bound to give effect to constitutional rights and ensure criminal trials conducted in accordance with Constitution.
Fundamental rights Right to a fair trial Prospectivity Exclusively F prospective development of common law appropriate only in exceptional
cases Extension of common law definition of rape to include nonco nsensual intentional penetration of penis into female anus Convicting
accused of offence when conduct not constituting particular offence at time of commission unfair and violating s 35(3)(1) of Constitution
Extended definition to apply only prospectively. G
2007 (2) SACR p
Headnote : Kopnota
The applicant had been convicted in the regional magistrate's court of the rape A of a nineyearold girl for wrongfully and unlawfully having
anal sexual intercourse with her, without her consent. The regional court had found that the commonlaw definition of rape was unconstitu tional
and had extended it to include acts of nonconsensual sexual penetra tion of the male penis into the anus of another person. The High Court had
endorsed the attitude taken by the magistrate's court, and the matter came before the B Constitutional Court for confirmation under s 172(2)
(a) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
1. Extending the definition of rape to include anal penetration of female
Held, that the current commonlaw definition of rape was not unconstitution al insofar as it criminalised conduct that was clearly morally and
socially C unacceptable. The definition did, however, need to be appropriately adapted because it fell short of the spirit, purport and objects of
the Bill of Rights. (Paragraphs [27], [32] and [70] at 450c, 452g and 464 d e)
Held, further, that nonconsensual anal penetration of women and yo ung girls constituted a form of violence against them equal in intensity and
impact to nonconsensual vaginal penetration. Extending the definition of r ape to D include penetration of a female's anus would protect the
dignity of survivors, especially young girls unable to differentiate between the different types of penetration, and increase the extent to which
the traditionally most vulnerable and disadvantaged group in society (women and young girls) would be protected by and benefit from the law.
(Paragraphs [37] [39] at 454f 455d.) E
Held, further, that the fact that the 2003 Bill on Sexual Offences (Bill B50 2003) was currently before Parliament could not thwart the
extension of the definition or cause the Court to delay, defer or refuse to deal with the extension. The facts before the Court demanded the
extension and it was clearly in the public interest. Any further delay to the extension of the F definition would constitute an injustice upon the
survivors of nonconsensual anal penetration. (Paragraph [44] at 4 56h 457b.)
Held, accordingly, that the commonlaw definition of rape should be extended to include acts of nonconsensual, intentional penetration of a
penis into a female's anus. (Paragraphs [45] and [74] at 457d and 465e.)
2. Prospective development of the common law G
Held, that it was possible, when the interests of justice required it, for the Courts to develop the common law prospectively only, but this would
only be appropriate in rare cases. (Paragraphs [49] and [51] at 458b 459a.)
Held, further, that if the definition of rape were to be extended retrospectively it would offend the principle of legality. Fairness to the accused
required that H the extension of the definition of rape not be applied to him but only to cases arising after this judgment had been handed
down. It would be unfair to convict an accused of an offence in circumstances where the conduct in question did not constitute the offence at
the time of the commission. For the applicant to be convicted of rape would be in violation of his right in s 35(3)(l) of the Constitution.
(Paragraphs [51], [56] and [57] at 458f g I and 461c f.)
Held, accordingly, that the development of the commonlaw definition was applica ble only to conduct that took place after the date of this
judgment. (Paragraph [74] at 465e f.) The conviction of the applicant of rape was set aside and replaced with a conviction of indecent
assault; the case was remitted to the magistrates' court for sentencing. J
2007 (2) SACR p
3. Extending the definition of rape to include anal penetration of male A
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(Paragraphs [51], [56] and [57] at 458f g I and 461c f.)
Held, accordingly, that the development of the commonlaw definition was applica ble only to conduct that took place after the date of this
judgment. (Paragraph [74] at 465e f.) The conviction of the applicant of rape was set aside and replaced with a conviction of indecent
assault; the case was remitted to the magistrates' court for sentencing. J
2007 (2) SACR p
3. Extending the definition of rape to include anal penetration of male A
Held, that the facts did not require the Court to consider whether or not the commonlaw definition of rape should be extended to include the
nonconsensual penetration by a penis of a male anus. (Paragraph [29] at 451d e.)
Held, further that it was not unconstitutional to have a definition of rape that was genderspecific. (Paragraph [30] at 451f g.) B
Held, accordingly that the Court could not confirm the High Court's declaration of invalidity to the extent that it was based on conclusions
relating to the genderneutral nature of rape, an issue that had not arisen on the facts of this case. (Paragraphs [59], [61] and [62] at 461h
and 462b c.)
In a separate minority judgment, Langa CJ (Sachs J concurring) held that C development of the commonlaw definition of rape should be taken
further to include the anal rape of men.
4. Powers of magistrates' courts
Held, that s 173 of the Constitution explicitly empowered only the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal and the High Courts to
develop the common law. Magistrates' courts were excluded. Moreover, s 110 of the D Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944 prohibited
magistrates from pronouncing on the validity of any law, which attenuated the duty of magistrates' courts to develop the common law.
Magistrates' courts were, however, bound to give effect to constitutional rights and to ensure that criminal trials were conducted in accordance
with the Constitution, particularly the fair trial rights of the accused. (Paragraphs [66] [68] at 463a f.) E
Held, further, that there did not seem to be any constitutional or legislative mandate for the referral to the High Court for confirmation of all
cases in which a magistrate saw fit to develop the common law in line with the Constitution. (Paragraph [69] at 464b c.)
Held, accordingly, that magistrates were not empowered to vary the elements of crimes in the light of the Constitution. (Paragraph [69] at
464c.) F
Cases Considered
Annotations
Reported cases
Southern African cases
Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund 1998 (4) SA 753 (CC) G (1998 (10) BCLR 1207): applied
Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another (Centre for Applied Legal Studies Intervening) 2002 (1) SACR 79 (CC) (2001 (4) SA
938; 2001 (10) BCLR 995): dicta in paras [36] and [81] applied
Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others; Shalabi and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others; Thomas and Another v
H Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC) (2000 (8) BCLR 837): applied
Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) (1996 (5) BCLR 658): dicta in paras [61] and [65] applied
Ex parte Minister of Safety and Security and Others: In re S v Walters and Another 2002 (2) SACR 105 (CC) (2002 (4) SA 613; 2002 (7) BCLR I
663): applied
Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) (1996 (1) BCLR 1): dictum in para [183]
applied
Fourie and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2003 (5) SA 301 (CC) (2003 (10) BCLR 1092): applied. J
2007 (2) SACR p
Ingledew v Financial Services Board: In re Financial Services Board v Van der A Merwe and Another 2003 (4) SA 584 (CC) (2003 (8) BCLR 825):
applied
J and Another v Director General, Department of Home Affairs, and Others 2003 (5) SA 621 (CC) (2003 (5) BCLR 463): referred to
Mabaso v Law Society, Northern Provinces, and Another 2005 (2) SA 117 (CC) (2005 (2) BCLR 129): distinguished
Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another (Doctors for Life B International and Others as Amici Curiae); Lesbian and Gay
Equality Project and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) (2006 (3) BCLR 355): referred to
Minister of Home Affairs v National Institute for Crime Prevention and the Reintegration of Offenders (NICRO) and Others 2005 (3) SA 280 (CC)
C (2004 (5) BCLR 445): referred to
Mohlomi v Minister of Defence 1997 (1) SA 124 (CC) (1996 (12) BCLR 1559): distinguished
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others 1998 (2) SACR 556 (CC) (1999 (1) SA 6; 1998 (12)
BCLR 1517): distinguished D
National Police Service Union and Others v Minister of Safety and Security and Others 2000 (4) SA 1110 (CC) (2001 (8) BCLR 775): applied
R v K 1958 (3) SA 420 (A): applied
R v Mosago and Another 1935 AD 32: applied
S v Baloyi (Minister of Justice and Another Intervening) 2000 (1) SACR 81 (CC) (2000 (2) SA 425; 2000 (1) BCLR 86): applied E
S v Bhulwana, S v Gwadiso 1995 (2) SACR 748 (CC) (1996 (1) SA 388; 1995 (12) BCLR 1579): referred to
S v Boesak 2001 (1) SACR 1 (CC) (2001 (1) SA 912; 2001 (1) BCLR 36): applied
S v Chapman 1997 (2) SACR 3 (A) (1997 (3) SA 341): applied F
S v Jackson 1998 (1) SACR 470 (SCA) (1998 (2) SA 984; 1998 (4) BCLR 424; [1998] 2 All SA 267): referred to
S v Jordan and Others (Sex Workers Education and Advocacy Task Force and Others as Amici Curiae) 2002 (2) SACR 499 (CC) (2002 (6) SA
642; 2002 (11) BCLR 1117): dictum in para [45] applied
S v M (2) 1990 (1) SACR 456 (N): referred to G
S v Masiya (Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development Intervening) 2006 (2) SACR 357 (T) (2006 (11) BCLR 1377): overruled
S v Mhlungu and Others 1995 (2) SACR 277 (CC) (1995 (3) SA 867; 1995 (7) BCLR 793): referred to
S v Ncanywa 1992 (1) SACR 209 (Ck) (1992 (2) SA 182): applied and qualified H
S v Pieters 1987 (3) SA 717 (A): referred to
S v Thebus and Another 2003 (2) SACR 319 (CC) (2003 (6) SA 505; 2003 (10) BCLR 1100): applied
S v Zuma 2006 (2) SACR 191 (W) (2006 (7) BCLR 790): qualified
Shinga v The State and Another (Society of Advocates, Pietermaritzburg Bar, as Amicus Curiae); O'Connell and Others v The State 2007 (2)
SACR 28 (CC) (2007 (4) SA 611; 2007 (5) BCLR 474): referred to I
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(the Act) and their relevant Schedules are inconsistent with the Constitution to the extent that they are genderspecific.
2007 (2) SACR p
NKABINDE J
[4] The applicant, Mr Masiya, is an awaitingsentence prisoner. The firs t A respondent is the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). The second
respondent is the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development (Minister). She has been joined as a party to the proceedings by reason of
her being the national executive authority responsible for the administration of justice. The first and second amici curiae, the Centre for B
Applied Legal Studies and Tshwaranang Legal Advocacy Centre (amici), respectively, have been admitted to assist the Court.
Background
[5] The facts appear from the judgment of the High Court. I restate only C the relevant facts to make the discussion in this judgment
comprehensible.
[6] Mr Masiya, 44 years of age, was initially brought before the district court at Sabie on a charge of rape. The State alleged that on or about
16 March 2004 at or near Sabie he wrongfully and unlawfully had sexual D intercourse with a nineyearold girl (the complainant), without her
consent. The case was transferred to the regional court at Graskop where he was tried on that charge. At the trial Mr Masiya, represented by
an attorney from the Nelspruit Justice Centre, pleaded not guilty. He elected to remain silent and did not advance a statement explaining his
plea. The evidence established that the complainant was penetrated anally. E
[7] Mr Masiya neither gave evidence nor called witnesses to testify. The State applied that he be convicted of indecent assault, a competent
verdict on a charge of rape. The defence contended that if Mr Masiya were to be found guilty he should be convicted of indecent assault. F
[8] The regional court, of its own accord, considered whether the common law needed to be developed. The defence contended that
magistrates' courts do not have the power to pronounce on the constitutionality of a rule of the common law. The regional court remarked that
the court, 'albeit a creature of statute, has jurisdiction in terms of the Constitution to G judge the constitutionality of a legal principle under
common law and, if necessary to develop the principle so that it conforms with the constitutional values enshrined in our Constitution'. The
court remarked that there is nothing in the Constitution or other legislation that precludes it from enquiring into or ruling on the constitutionality
of a rule of the common law and developing it where necessary. It pointed out that ss 8(3) and H
2007 (2) SACR p
NKABINDE J
39(2) of the Constitution speak, respectively, of 'a court' and 'every court, A tribunal or forum'.
[9] The regional court remarked further that
'(I)n terms of the existing commonlaw definitions of crime, the n onconsensual anal penetration of a girl (or a boy) amounts only to the (lesser) commonlaw
crime of indecent assault, and not rape, because only nonconse nsual B vaginal sexual intercourse is regarded as rape. One's initial feelings of righteousness
would, however, immediately rebel against such thought. Why must the unconsensual sexual penetration of a girl (or a boy) per anum be regarded as less
injurious, less humiliating and less serious than the unconsensual sexual penetration of a girl per vaginam? The distinction appears on face value to be irrational
and totally senseless, because the anal orifice is no less private, no C less subject to injury and abuse, and its sexual penetration no less humiliating than the
vaginal orifice. It therefore appears that the common law definition o f rape is not only archaic, but irrational and amounts to arbitrary discrimination with
reference to which kind of sexual penetration is to be regarded as the most serious, and then only in respect of women.' D
(Footnote omitted.)
[10] The regional court held that the definition should be developed to promote constitutional objectives, and that courts may develop the
current definition of rape given Parliament's lengthy delay in promulgating the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Amendment Bill of 2003 (the E
2003 Bill) so as to afford society the full protection of the Constitution. The Court held that although the development would impact on Mr
Masiya's fair trial rights in terms of s 35(3)(n) of the Constitution those fair trial rights could be limited on the basis that:
(a) Nonconsensual anal penetration already constitutes an offence , F namely indecent assault, and is manifestly immoral and unjust;
(b) retroactive punishment could have been foreseen by Mr Masiya;
(c) such development will be consistent with foreign law;
(d) the rights of society are weightier than those of Mr Masiya not to be convicted of and sentenced to a more serious offence;
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose sought to be achieved G by the extension of the definition of rape would have been for
2007 (2) SACR p
NKABINDE J
Parliament to address the lacuna with an appropriate law, but A Parliament has dragged its feet; and
(f) the developed definition would become law of general application if endorsed by the High Court upon referral.
[11] The regional court thus extended the definition of rape to include 'acts of nonconsensual sexual penetration of the male sexual o rgan into
B the vagina or anus of another person'. It expressly refrained from ruling on whether nonconsensual or al penetration should constitute the
crime of rape as that was not an issue in the proceedings. Having convicted Mr Masiya of rape in terms of the extended definition, the regional
court stopped the proceedings and committed him to the High Court in terms of s 52 of the Act for the purpose of sentence. C
2007 (2) SACR p
NKABINDE J
[12] Section 52(1)(b)(i) of the Act enjoins the regional court, when A finding an accused guilty of certain serious crimes, including rape where
the victim is under the age of 16 years, to refer the matter to the High Court having jurisdiction for purposes of confirmation of conviction
and sentencing. The High Court had to consider whether, on the facts of the case, the conviction of rape should be upheld and, given its
inherent B powers and obligations regarding the development of the common law, whether the commonlaw definition of rape should be
developed. The matter was postponed for further evidence by the High Court in terms of s 52(3)(d) of the Act.
[13] All the parties agreed that the complainant's mother, who had C refused to testify before the regional court and to whom the first report
had been made, should testify about the report and confirm the complainant's age. It was also agreed that certain medical experts, the police
who took the complainant's statement and the complainant herself, should testify. All these witnesses did testify. The evidence is summarised in
the judgment of the High Court. Accordingly, it is not D
2007 (2) SACR p
NKABINDE J
necessary to repeat it. It suffices to state that the High Court was satisfied A that Mr Masiya had anally penetrated the complainant. It made
the order which is the subjectmatter of these confirmation and appeal proceedings.
[14] The High Court, relying on certain provisions of the Constitution ss 8(1), 39(2), 10, 170, 172(1) and (2)(a) as well as s
173 B of the Constitution with reference to the power of the magistrates' c ourts to pronounce on the constitutionality of the common law,
remarked:
'(I)t would appear that magistrates' courts are not explicitly excluded from enquiring into the validity of the common law: a magistrate's court is bound by C the
Constitution to apply the Bill of Rights and must interpret all laws in a manner promoting the Bill of Rights. It must in a similar fashion apply the common law but,
in this latter instance, may also [make an enquiry] into the constitutional validity of any rule of common law. If, in so doing, the effect is invalidity of a common
law rule or principle, then it must allow for the competent authority to correct the defect, which will be the High Court, having D inherent power to develop the
common law to bring it in line with the constitutional imperatives and so to correct the defect.'
[15] Regarding the need to extend the definition of rape, the High Court found that indecent assault attracts more lenient sentences than rape.
This distinction in sentencing, the Court said, results in 'inadequate E protection and discriminatory sentencing'. On the question of legality
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'(I)t would appear that magistrates' courts are not explicitly excluded from enquiring into the validity of the common law: a magistrate's court is bound by C the
Constitution to apply the Bill of Rights and must interpret all laws in a manner promoting the Bill of Rights. It must in a similar fashion apply the common law but,
in this latter instance, may also [make an enquiry] into the constitutional validity of any rule of common law. If, in so doing, the effect is invalidity of a common
law rule or principle, then it must allow for the competent authority to correct the defect, which will be the High Court, having D inherent power to develop the
common law to bring it in line with the constitutional imperatives and so to correct the defect.'
[15] Regarding the need to extend the definition of rape, the High Court found that indecent assault attracts more lenient sentences than rape.
This distinction in sentencing, the Court said, results in 'inadequate E protection and discriminatory sentencing'. On the question of legality
the Court held that the principles are not applicable and need not be considered as an obstacle to the extension of the definition of rape since
no new crime is created. As a prelude to the order set out in para [2] above, the High Court said F
2007 (2) SACR p
NKABINDE J
'The unlawful deed the accused committed is simply given another name.... A The accused knew very well that he was acting unlawfully. It has never been a
requirement that an accused should know, at the time of the commission of an unlawful deed, whether it is a common law or statutory offence, or what the
legal/official terminology is in naming it.'
The Court then referred the declaration of invalidity set out in para [3] B of the order to this Court for confirmation. The imposition of sentence
was postponed pending the determination of the matter.
Jurisdictional matter
[16] Section 172(2)(a) requires this Court to consider applications for C confirmation of declarations of invalidity by the High Court. A
declaration of constitutional invalidity raises a constitutional matter which in the ordinary course must be considered by this Court. In this case,
as indicated earlier, the High Court made an order of constitutional invalidity which must be considered by this Court. That declaration was
dependent on the question whether the common law had been correctly D developed by the High Court. It follows therefore that this Court has
to consider both the confirmation proceedings and whether to grant leave to appeal on the other issues.
[17] The amici, however, contended that the application for leave to appeal should be dismissed on the basis that it would not be in the E
interests of justice to grant leave without this Court having first had the benefit of the views of the Supreme Court of Appeal on the question of
the development of the common law. Ordinarily, constitutional matters involving the development of the common law should first be taken to the
Supreme Court of Appeal before they reach this Court because of the F breadth of its jurisdiction and its expertise in the common law. During
argument the amici acknowledged that it would be impractical to require Mr Masiya to prosecute his appeal first in the Supreme Court of
Appeal while the confirmation proceedings have to be considered by this Court. G
[18] The issues raised in this matter involve the protection of the rights to dignity, equality, freedom and security of the person, and
2007 (2) SACR p
NKABINDE J
children's rights as well as Mr Masiya's fair trial rights. As will appear A later in this judgment, the case raises constitutional issues of
considerable public importance. Prospects of success, albeit not decisive in every case, are an important factor to be considered. I conclude
therefore that it is in the interests of justice for the application for leave to appeal to be granted. B
Issues
[19] The primary questions to be considered relate to:
(a) Whether the current definition of rape is inconsistent with the Constitution and whether the definition needs to be developed; C
(b) whether Mr Masiya is liable to be convicted in terms of the developed definition;
(c) whether the declaration of invalidity of the relevant statutory provisions should be confirmed;
(d) whether the merits of the criminal conviction should be dealt with D by this Court; and
(e) appropriate relief.
Constitutionality of the definition
[20] It is useful to examine the historical perspective of the criminalisation of rape so as to determine its developmental direction. The word E
rape originates from the Latin words raptus, rapio, and rapina respectively meaning 'tearing off, rending away, carrying off, a bduction, rape,
plundering'; 'to seize, snatch, tear away, to plunder a place, to hurry. F
2007 (2) SACR p
NKABINDE J
along a person or thing'; and 'robbery, pillage, booty plunder'. As A such, raptus in Roman law was generally understood as an offence
consisting of the violent 'carrying away' of women and is better translated as 'abduction'. The crime of rape in Roman law was based on a
prohibition of unchaste behaviour. Punishment for nonconsensual sexual intercourse protected the interests of the society in penalising B
unchaste behaviour, rather than the interests of the survivor.
[21] In this period, patriarchal societies criminalised rape to protect property rights of men over women. The patriarchal structure of families
subjected women entirely to the guardianship of their husbands and gave men a civil right not only over their spouses' property, but also C over
their persons. RomanDutch law placed force at the centre of the definition with the co ncomitant requirement of 'hue and cry' to indicate a
woman's lack of consent. Submission to intercourse through fear, duress, fraud or deceit as well as intercourse with an unconscious or
mentally impaired woman did not constitute rape but a lesser offence of D stuprum.
[22] In English law the focus originally was on the use of force to overcome a woman's resistance. By the mideighteenth century fo rce was no
longer required for the conduct to constitute rape and the scope of the definition was increased to include cases of fraud or deception. E This
latter definition was adopted in South Africa.
[23] In indigenous law rape was restrictively defined. Generally, the law stresses the responsibility of a group rather than of the individual. F
2007 (2) SACR p
NKABINDE J
For instance in Pedi law, in rape cases women must be assisted by their A fathers or husbands and compensation accrues not to the survivor
but to her household under the guardianship of the husband or the father. The law excluded cases of sodomy and marital rape. In some
communities intercourse with a prepubescent girlchild was also excluded fr om the definition. These acts often merely constituted assault or
'unnatural B sexuality'.
[24] It is evident from the history of the law of rape that the object of the criminalisation of rape was to protect the economic interests of the
father, husband or guardian of the female survivor of rape, to perpetuate C stereotypes, male dominance and power and to refer to females as
objects.
[25] With the advent of our constitutional dispensation based on democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom, the social
foundation of these rules has disappeared. Although the great majority of D females, for the most part in rural South Africa, remain trapped in
cultural patterns of sexbased hierarchy, there is and has been a gradual movement towards recognition of a female as the survivor of rape
rather than other antiquated interests or societal morals being at the core of the definition. The focus is on the breach of 'a more specific
right such as E the right to bodily integrity' and security of the person and the right to be protected from degradation and abuse. The crime
of rape should therefore be seen in that context.
The current law of rape F
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Iacobucci J in R v Salituro:
'Judges can and should adapt the common law to reflect the changing social, moral and economic fabric of the country. Judges should not be quick to perpetuate
rules whose social foundation has long since disappeared. Nonetheless B there are significant constraints on the power of the Judiciary to change the law.... In
a constitutional democracy such as ours it is the Legislature and not the courts which has the major responsibility for law reform.... The Judiciary should
confine itself to those incremental changes which are necessary to keep the common law in step with the dynamic and evolving fabric of our society.' C
The Court, however, said that 'courts must remain vigilant and should not hesitate to ensure that the common law is developed to reflect the
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights... whether or not the parties in any particular case request the Court to develop the common
law under s 39(2)'. Where there is deviation from the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights, courts are obliged to develop the D
common law by removing the deviation.
[34] The High Court emphasised the alleged inequality and discrimination engendered by the definition and the resultant inadequate and
discriminatory sentences. In oral argument counsel for Mr Masiya E argued against the development only if the developed definition of rape
were to apply to him. The DPP and amici substantially supported the judgment of the High Court and argued that the definition perpetuates
gender inequality and promotes discrimination. The DPP further contended that the definition perpetuates leniency in sentencing. F
[35] The Minister opposed the development. She relied on the decision of this Court in S v Mhlungu and Others that the Regional Court
should have decided the guilt or otherwise of Mr Masiya on the facts and without considering the constitutional issue of developing the
definition of rape. That might well have been the proper way to deal with the matter. However, the failure to do so is, in the circumstances of
this case, G of no consequence. When the matter was referred to the High Court in terms of s 52 of the Act, that Court had to determine
whether the conviction was in accordance with justice before considering an appropriate sentence. The Court called for further evidence and
confirmed the H
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conviction. Strictly speaking, it is that finding, among others, and not the A finding by the regional court, against which leave to appeal is
sought.
[36] The amici, likewise, contended that apart from the gendered nature of the origins of the definition, the elements of the crime of rape
perpetuate gender stereotypes and discrimination because they are suggestive of the fact that only males can commit the crime and only B
females can be raped. They argued that once it is recognised that the primary motive for rape is not sexual lust but the desire to gain power or
control over another person, with sex being the violent means by which the power is exercised, the rationale for maintaining the gender
distinction falls away. That might be so. However, for the reasons given above, C it would not be appropriate for this Court to engage with
these questions. In this respect there are three important considerations that favour restraint on the part of this Court. The first is that what is
at issue is extending the definition of crime, something a Court should do only in exceptional circumstances. The second is that the
development would entail statutory amendments and necessitate law reform. The third is D that, historically, rape has been and continues to be
a crime of which females are its systematic target. It is the most reprehensible form of sexual assault constituting as it does a humiliating,
degrading and brutal invasion of the dignity and the person of the survivor. It is not simply an act of sexual gratification, but one of physical
domination. It is an E extreme and flagrant form of manifesting male supremacy over females.
[37] The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women specifically enjoins member States to pursue policies to eliminate violence
against women. Nonconsensual anal penetration of women and young girls such as the complainant in this case constitutes a form F of
violence against them equal in intensity and impact to that of nonconse nsual vaginal penetration. The object of the criminalisation of this act
is to protect the dignity, sexual autonomy and privacy of women and young girls as being generally the most vulnerable group in line with the
values enshrined in the Bill of Rights a cornerstone of our demo cracy. G
[38] The extended definition would protect the dignity of survivors, especially young girls who may not be able to differentiate between the
different types of penetration. The evidence of Dr Grabe, an expert H
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witness who testified in the High Court, that the complainant referred to A a 'hole' thinking that the anus is the only place she experiences as a
'hole', clearly illustrates this point. Women and girls would be afforded increased protection by the extended definition. One of the social
contexts of rape is the alarming high incidences of HIVinfection. An al penetration also results in the spread of HIV. B
[39] The consequences caused by nonconsensual anal penetration might be different to those caused by nonconsensual penetration of the
vagina but the trauma associated with the former is just as humiliating, degrading and physically hurtful as that associated with the latter. The
C inclusion of penetration of the anus of a female by a penis in the definition will increase the extent to which the traditionally vulnerable and
disadvantaged group will be protected by and benefit from the law. Adopting this approach would therefore harmonise the common law with the
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. D
[40] One of the important considerations arising out of the question whether to develop the current definition relates to the appropriate weight
that ought to be given to the 2003 Bill which is a work in progress. E
The 2003 Bill
[41] The definition of rape has been subject to law reform initiatives in many other Commonwealth countries, such as the United Kingdom,
Canada and Australia. In South Africa the reform started in 1996 when the South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC) F
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conducted an investigation into sexual offences relating to children. A That report was followed by a request from the Minister that the
Commission investigate sexual offences more broadly. The first draft of the 2003 Bill was tabled before Parliament in 2003. This Bill was
revised and tabled for the second time before Parliament in October 2006 (revised Bill). The definition of rape proposed by the SALRC B
replaces the concept of sexual intercourse penetration of a va gina by a penis with that of sexual penetration which includes penetration of
both the vagina and the anus by the penis. Clause 2(1) of the 2003 Bill defines rape as follows:
'A person who unlawfully and intentionally commits an act which causes C penetration to any extent whatsoever by the genital organs of that person into or
beyond the anus or genital organs of another person, or any act which causes penetration to any extent whatsoever by the genital organs of another person into
or beyond the anus or genital organs of the person committing the act, is guilty of the offence of rape.'
The approach in the 2003 Bill was not followed in the 2006 revised Bill. D In the 2003 Bill two broad categories are proposed: rape and sexual
assault, each with its own definition. In the revised Bill rape is defined in clause 3 as follows: '(a)ny person (A) who unlawfully and intentionally
commits an act of sexual penetration with a complainant (B), without the consent of B, is guilty of the offence of rape'.
[42] Chapters 1 and 2 of the revised Bill are of particular significance. E Chapter 1 contains definitions of 'sexual penetration' and 'sexual
violation' and ch 2 is headed 'Sexual Offences'. Chapter 2 deals in part 1 with rape and the competent verdict for compelled rape and in part 2
with sexual assault and compelled sexual assault. The revised Bill adopts a genderneutral approach to both offences. F
[43] Having had the benefit of the drafts, the report by the SALRC and the public comments such as those by the Women's Legal Centre, this
Court has noted the concerns expressed by the broader community in the course of the law reform process and the developmental perspective
of the Legislature regarding sexual offences. At the hearing a concern G was raised with counsel for the Minister regarding the delay in the
promulgation of the 2003 Bill. Counsel was, however, unable to explain to the Court the reason for that delay.
[44] The prevalence of sexual violence in our society is deeply troubling. The extension of the definition of rape to include anal penetration will
H not only yield advantages to the survivor but will also express the abhorrence with which our society regards these pervasive but outrageous
acts. This Court, while not unmindful of the fact that the 2003 Bill is before Parliament, cannot delay, defer or refuse to deal with an extension
of the definition when the facts before it demand such an I
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promulgation of the 2003 Bill. Counsel was, however, unable to explain to the Court the reason for that delay.
[44] The prevalence of sexual violence in our society is deeply troubling. The extension of the definition of rape to include anal penetration will
H not only yield advantages to the survivor but will also express the abhorrence with which our society regards these pervasive but outrageous
acts. This Court, while not unmindful of the fact that the 2003 Bill is before Parliament, cannot delay, defer or refuse to deal with an extension
of the definition when the facts before it demand such an I
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extension and when it is clearly in the public interest to do so. Any A further delay in or suspension of the extension of the current definition will
constitute an injustice upon survivors of nonconsensual anal pen etration such as the nineyearold complainant in this case. That res ult
cannot and should not be countenanced. The fact that the 2003 Bill is before Parliament, as the Minister contended, should not thwart B the
extension of the current definition of rape in these exceptional circumstances and when the interests of justice so demand.
[45] I conclude, therefore, that the extension of the commonlaw definition of rape to include nonconsensual anal penetration of fem ales will
be in the interests of justice and will have, as its aim, the proper C realisation by the public of the principles, ideals and values underlying the
Constitution. Accepting that the element of unlawfulness is based essentially on the absence of consent, the definition should therefore be
extended to include intentional penetration of the female anus by a penis without consent. D
[46] The question of extending the definition so as to include acts of nonconsensual anal penetration of a penis into the anus of a ma le person
is left open for future consideration where the facts might call for its resolution. The question then remains whether the extended definition
should apply to Mr Masiya. E
Retrospective application of the definition
[47] Essentially, the question is whether the conviction of rape is in accordance with justice even though the definition of rape did not include
nonconsensual anal penetration at the time the crime was F committed. The High Court held that the principle of legality has no application in
this case since no new crime is created. It held that Mr Masiya knew he was acting unlawfully when he assaulted the complainant and that it
has never been a requirement that an accused person should know, at the time of the commission of the crime, whether it is a commonlaw or
statutory crime or what its legal definition is. Mr Masiya G contended that the extended definition should not apply to him as the application
would constitute a violation of his rights in terms of s 35(3)(l) of the Constitution.
[48] The ordinary principle of common law is that when a rule is developed it applies to all cases, not only those which arise after the H
judgment in which the law has been developed has been handed down. As Kentridge AJ observed in Du Plessis:
'In our Courts a judgment which brings about a radical alteration in the common law as previously understood proceeds upon the legal fiction that the new rule
has not been made by the Court but merely ''found'', as if it had always I been inherent in the law. Nor do our Courts distinguish between cases which have
arisen before, and those which arise after, the new rule has been announced. For this reason it is sometimes said that ''Judgema de law'' is retrospective in its
2007 (2) SACR p
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operation. In all this our Courts have followed the practice of the English A Courts.... (I)t may nonetheless be said that there is no rule of positive law which
would forbid our Supreme Court from departing from that practice.'
[49] Indeed, as Kentridge AJ pointed out, members of the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords in the United Kingdom have accepted that it
may be appropriate when the interests of justice require for a new B rule of law developed by the courts to operate prospectively only.
[50] R v Governor of Brockhill Prison, Ex parte Evans was a matter involving the unlawful detention of a prisoner. The governor had
sentenced the prisoner on the basis of an interpretation of a statute which had originally been supported by the courts but which had
subsequently C been held to be wrong. It was clear that the governor was blameless but the sentence raised questions as to whether the new
interpretation of the statute should apply prospectively only. The majority of the Law Lords held that on the facts of that case it was not
appropriate for the interpretation to apply prospectively only, but all also accepted that the D development of a rule might in appropriate
circumstances apply prospectively. Lord Slynn of Hadley reasoned that 'there may be decisions in which it would be desirable, and in no way
unjust, that the effect of judicial rulings should be prospective or limited to certain claimants'.
[51] Under our constitutional order, of course, the remedy of prospective E overruling of a law that is inconsistent with the Constitution is
permitted by the terms of s 172(1)(b) of the Constitution. In this case we are not dealing with the Court's remedial powers under s 172 as no
order of constitutional invalidity has been made. The question is whether when developing the common law it is possible to do so prospectively
only. In my view, it is. In this case, if the definition of rape were to be developed F retrospectively it would offend the constitutional principle of
legality as I have demonstrated above. On the other hand, if we were to accept that the principle of legality is a bar to the development of the
common law, the Courts could never develop the common law of crimes at all. In my view, such a conclusion would undermine the principles of
our Constitution G which require the courts to ensure that the common law is infused with the spirit, purport and objects of the Constitution.
The impasse can be avoided by accepting that in these circumstances it is appropriate to develop the law prospectively only. I accept that it is
only in rare cases that it will be appropriate to develop the common law with prospective effect only, as the Law Lords suggested in the
Brockhill Prison decision H (supra). However, in my view this is one of those cases where fairness to
2007 (2) SACR p
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an accused requires that the development not apply to him, but only to A those cases which arise after judgment in this matter has been
handed down.
[52] One of the central tenets underlying the commonlaw understanding o f legality is that of foreseeability that the rules of criminal law are
clear and precise so that an individual may easily behave in a manner that B avoids committing crimes. In this regard, the amici referred to
the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in SW v United Kingdom, where the Court held that:
'However clearly drafted a legal provision may be, in any system of law, including criminal law, there is an inevitable element of judicial interpretation. C There
will always be a need for elucidation of doubtful points and for adaptation to changing circumstances... provided that the resultant development is consistent
with the essence of the offence and could reasonably be foreseen.'
The Court used the element of foreseeability and art 17 of the Convention, which is intended to exclude the abuse of any specific D rights
safeguarded by the Convention for any of the purposes set out in the article, to find that the accused's conviction of the rape of his wife was
not an infringement of the principle of legality as contained in art 7(1) of the Convention. The Court, in coming to their decision, emphasised
the distinction between reinterpretation and clarification of the common law and the creation of a new commonlaw offence. It E
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appears that the Court found the surprise element entailed by the A retroactive application of the common law to be an unacceptable feature
in this case.
[53] The European Commission of Human Rights, in CR v United Kingdom, relied heavily on the submission that there was ambiguity as to
whether the marital immunity of rape was law and said B
'In the present case, the trial judge, when rejecting the applicant's submission that marital immunity applied, doubted the extent to which it could ever have been
permissible under the common law for a husband to beat his wife into having sexual intercourse with him.
... C
(T)he Commission considers that by November 1989 there was significant doubt as to the validity of the alleged marital immunity for rape. As stated by the Court
of Appeal in the applicant's case, lip service had been paid to the alleged general rule while the courts at the same time increased the number of exceptions.
That there was uncertainty as to the width of the exceptions is apparent from the Law Commission Working Paper examining the question. D
...
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Courts. However, s 173 explicitly empowers only the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal and the High Courts to develop the
common law, taking into account interests of justice. The magistrates' courts are excluded. B
[67] The powers of the magistrates' courts are regulated by the Magistrates' Courts Act, 1944. Section 110 of this Act prevents
magistrates from pronouncing on the validity of any law. It provides as follows:
'(1) A court shall not be competent to pronounce on the validity of any law or C conduct of the President.
(2) If in any proceedings before a court it is alleged that
(a) any law or any conduct of the President is invalid on the ground of its inconsistency with a provision of the Constitution; or
(b) any law is invalid on any ground other than its constitutionality,
the court shall decide the matter on the assumption that such law or conduct is valid: D provided that the party which alleges that a law or conduct of the
President is invalid, may adduce evidence regarding the invalidity of the law or conduct in question.'
(Emphasis added.) E
[68] The wording of s 110 shows that the magistrates' courts are under an attenuated duty in relation to the development of the common law.
They are, however, bound to give effect to the constitutional rights as all other courts are bound to do in terms of s 8(1) of the Constitution.
Magistrates presiding over criminal trials must, for instance, ensure that the proceedings are conducted in conformity with the Constitution, F
particularly the fairtrial rights of the accused.
[69] Although magistrates' courts are at the heart of the application of the common law on a daily basis and, in most instances, courts of first
instance in criminal cases, there are legitimate reasons why they are not included under s 173 and why their powers are attenuated.
Magistrates G are constrained in their ability to develop crimes at common law by virtue of the doctrine of precedent. Their pronouncements on
the validity of commonlaw criminal principles would create a fragmented an d possibly incoherent legal order. An effective operation of the H
2007 (2) SACR p
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development of commonlaw criminal principles depends on the maintenance A of a unified and coherent legal system, a system maintained
through the recognised doctrine of stare decisis which is aimed at avoiding uncertainty and confusion, protecting vested rights and
legitimate expectations of individuals, and upholding the dignity of the judicial system. Moreover, and contrary to the view held by the B
magistrate in his judgment, there does not seem to be any constitutional or legislative mandate for all cases in which a magistrate might see
fit to develop the common law in line with the Constitution to be referred to higher courts for confirmation. Such a referral might mitigate the
disadvantageous factors discussed above. The suggestion by the C High Court that magistrates are empowered to vary the elements of crimes
in the light of the Constitution was, to my mind, incorrect.
Relief
[70] Section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution confers a discretion on this Court to make any order that is just and equitable. Having found that
the D commonlaw definition of rape is not constitutionally invalid but merely falls short of the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights,
the declaration of invalidity of the definition of rape should therefore be set aside and replaced with an appropriate order. As set out earlier, the
development is limited to an inclusion of nonconsensual penetration of E the male penis into the anus of a female person in the definition.
For the reasons set out above, I decline to confirm the declaration of constitutional invalidity of the statutory provisions and the relevant
Schedules of the Act and the CPA. The declaration of invalidity should therefore be set aside. It follows that the orders in paras [3] and [4] of
the High Court order should also be set aside. F
[71] Having found that the developed definition cannot apply to Mr Masiya, it cannot therefore, on the facts before us, be said that his
conviction is in accordance with justice. The conviction of rape should, on the facts, be replaced with a conviction of indecent assault. The
order of the High Court in para [5] cannot therefore stand. The appeal against G the conviction of rape should therefore be upheld.
[72] Having substituted the conviction of rape with that of indecent assault, it is necessary to remit the matter to the regional court to impose
appropriate punishment. It needs be said that the offence of indecent H assault is egregious. Mr Masiya assaulted a nineyearold child. The
offence arouses public indignation. The regional court is obliged, when considering an appropriate punishment, to apply its mind to the nature
2007 (2) SACR p
LANGA CJ
and gravity of the offence of which Mr Masiya has been convicted and A not merely look at the legal definition thereof. The fact that he has
been convicted of indecent assault does not automatically mean that the sentence to be imposed upon him should be more lenient than if he
had been convicted of rape.
[73] The assistance the Court has received from all counsel in this matter B is appreciated.
Order
[74] In the result, the following order is made:
1. The application for leave to appeal against the declarations of C invalidity and the order and judgment of the High Court confirming the
conviction of Mr Masiya of rape is granted.
2. The application for leave to appeal against the conviction on the merits is dismissed.
3. The order of the High Court is set aside in its entirety. D
4. The order of the regional court referring the criminal proceedings to the High Court for purposes of sentence in terms of s 52(1)(b)(i) of the
Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997, is set aside.
5. The commonlaw definition of rape is extended to include acts of nonconsensual penetration of a penis into the anus of a female. E
6. The development of the common law referred to in para 5 above shall be applicable only to conduct which takes place after the date of
judgment in this matter.
7. The conviction of Mr Masiya by the regional court of rape is set aside and replaced with a conviction of indecent assault.
8. The case is remitted to the regional court for Mr Masiya to be F sentenced in the light of this judgment.
Moseneke DCJ, Kondile J, Madala J, Mokgoro J, O'Regan J, Van der Westhuizen J, Yacoob J and Van Heerden AJ concurred. G
Judgment
Langa CJ:
Introduction
[75] I have had the opportunity of reading and reflecting on the H judgment of Nkabinde J. I agree with her that the definition falls short of the
spirit, purport and objects enshrined in the Bill of Rights. I associate myself particularly with her eloquent exposition of the patriarchal origin of
the definition as well as for placing it in the particular context of South Africa today. I also agree with her findings on legality and the role of the
magistrates' courts. However, I believe that the development she proposes I must be taken further so that it includes the anal rape of men.
[76] Before I address that point, I would like to add that, while there is force to Nkabinde J's view that the definition of rape does not directly
violate the Constitution, I prefer not to express an opinion on the matter, as, on the approach I take, it is unnecessary to do so. J
2007 (2) SACR p
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What is wrong with the common law A
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[76] Before I address that point, I would like to add that, while there is force to Nkabinde J's view that the definition of rape does not directly
violate the Constitution, I prefer not to express an opinion on the matter, as, on the approach I take, it is unnecessary to do so. J
2007 (2) SACR p
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What is wrong with the common law A
[77] In order to determine how the common law should be developed, it is necessary to determine precisely what is wrong with the current
position. To my mind the problem is not about males and females; it is about altering our understanding of why rape is prohibited. There are two
elements to this: first that rape is about dignity and power B and second, that anal rape is equivalent to vaginal rape.
[78] As expressed in the judgment of Nkabinde J, the historical reason why rape was criminalised was to protect the proprietary rights of men in
women. However, over the years the courts have gradually focused less on the proprietary interests and more on the sexual nature of the
crime. C Today rape is recognised as being less about sex and more about the expression of power through degradation and the concurrent
violation of the victim's dignity, bodily integrity and privacy. In the words of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda the 'essence of rape
is not the particular details of the body parts and objects involved, but rather D the aggression that is expressed in a sexual manner under
conditions of coercion'.
[79] Coupled with this approach to rape is the recognition that anal penetration is as severe an attack on a person's dignity, bodily integrity and
privacy as vaginal penetration. There is a line of case law that E equates 'the gross humiliation and indignity' of anal rape and vaginal rape.
To use the words of Nkabinde J:
'It can hardly be said that nonconsensual anal penetration of males is less degrading, humiliating and traumatic and, to borrow the phrase by Brownmiller, ''a
lesser violation of the personal private inner space, a lesser injury to mind, F spirit and sense of self''.'
(Footnote omitted.)
[80] Nkabinde J's decision to extend the definition of rape is based on precisely these two imperatives. My only point of disagreement is that I
find that the inescapable conclusion of these imperatives is that the anal G penetration of a male should be treated in the same manner as that
of a female. In my view, to do otherwise fails to give full effect to the constitutional values of dignity, equality and freedom: dignity through
recognition of a violation; equality through equal recognition of that violation; and freedom as rape negates not only dignity, but
bodilyautonomy. All these concerns apply equally to men and women and H necessitate a definition that is genderneutral concerning victims.
2007 (2) SACR p
LANGA CJ
[81] Nkabinde J gives three reasons why this Court should not extend A the definition to male survivors in this particular case. First, courts
should be wary to extend the reach of crimes. Second, women remain the primary victims of rape which entails that rape remains, and must be
identified as, an exercise of male supremacy. Third, she holds that this Court should restrict itself to the facts before it, namely the anal B
penetration of a female. To tread beyond this would exceed the Judiciary's limited constitutional role. While there is much to be said for these
concerns, I remain unconvinced that in this case such restraint is warranted.
Extending the reach of crimes C
[82] As was noted in S v Jordan, courts should not lightly criminalise conduct that was not previously criminal. But, as is clear from the
majority's extension of the definition to female anal penetration, that concern should not prevent courts from giving effect to the rights and
values of the Constitution. The only difference between my judgment D and that of the majority is what those rights and values demand.
[83] In addition, this is not truly an extension. Nonconsensual anal penetration of men already constitutes the criminal offence of indecent
assault. There is no question, as there may have been in Jordan (supra), of criminalisation or decriminalisation; the act was already, and will E
remain criminalised. This judgment simply recategorises it.
Women as the primary target of rape
[84] Women have always been and remain the primary target of rape. That is not a fact that this Court can or should ignore. Nor can we deny
F that male domination of women is an underlying cause of rape. But to my mind that does not mean that men must be excluded from the
definition. Firstly, as was noted above, this case goes to the very reason for the existence of rape as a crime. To the extent that Nkabinde J
concludes that the 'object of the criminalisation of [rape] is to protect the dignity, sexual autonomy and privacy of women and young girls as
being G generally the most vulnerable group', I part ways. To my mind the criminalisation of rape is about protecting the 'dignity, sexual
autonomy and privacy' of all people, irrespective of their sex or gender. When considering the boundaries of the definition of rape, the ICTY held
that '(t)he essence of the whole corpus of... human rights law lies in the H protection of the human dignity of every person, whatever his or
her gender.' I agree.
[85] Secondly, there is no reason to believe that including men in the definition will in any way decrease the protection afforded to women. I
2007 (2) SACR p
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ANDANOTHER(CENTREFORAPPLIEDLEGALSTUDIESANDANOTHER,AMICICURIAE)2007(2)SACR435(CC)
URL:
http://jutastat.juta.co.za/nxt/gateway.dll/conl/9511/9512/9548/9552?f=templates$fn=default.htm
MASIYAvDIRECTOROFPUBLICPROSECUTIONS,PRETORIAANDANOTHER(CENTREFORAPPLIEDLEGALSTUDIESANDANOTHER,AMICI
CURIAE)2007(2)SACR435(CC)A
2007(2)SACRp435
Citation 2007(2)SACR435(CC)
CaseNo CCT54/06
Court ConstitutionalCourt
Judge LangaCJ,MosenekeDCJ,KondileJ,MadalaJ,MokgoroJ,NkabindeJ,O'ReganJ,SachsJ,VanDer
WesthuizenJ,YacoobJandVanHeerdenAJ
Heard November9,2006
Judgment May10,2007
Counsel PJJdeJagerandJBauerfortheapplicant,instructedbytheLegalAidBoard
HMMeintjiesandSBakuaforthefirstrespondent
NCassimSC(withSMLebalaandPTBezuidenhout)forthesecondrespondent
B
Flynote:Sleutelwoorde
RapeWhatconstitutesCommonlawdefinitionofExtendedtoinclude CnonconsensualanalpenetrationofwomanPendingSexual
OffencesBillnotthwartingbroadeningofdefinitionsincesuchextensionclearlyinpublicinterestanddelaycausinginjusticeforsurvivorsofnon
consensualanalpenetration.
RapeWhatconstitutesCommonlawdefinitionofWhethertobeextendedDtoincludenonconsensualanalpenetrationofmanFactsnot
requiringCourttoconsidermatterNotunconstitutionaltohavegenderspecificdefinitionofrape.
CourtMagistrates'courtPowersofNotempoweredtovaryelementsofcrimesinlightofConstitutionNoconstitutionalorlegislative
mandateEforreferralfrommagistrate'scourttoHighCourtfordevelopmentofcommonlawinlinewithConstitutionMagistrate'scourt
nonethelessboundtogiveeffecttoconstitutionalrightsandensurecriminaltrialsconductedinaccordancewithConstitution.
FundamentalrightsRighttoafairtrialProspectivityExclusivelyFprospectivedevelopmentofcommonlawappropriateonlyinexceptional
casesExtensionofcommonlawdefinitionofrapetoincludenonconsensualintentionalpenetrationofpenisintofemaleanusConvicting
accusedofoffencewhenconductnotconstitutingparticularoffenceattimeofcommissionunfairandviolatings35(3)(1)ofConstitution
Extendeddefinitiontoapplyonlyprospectively.G
2007(2)SACRp436
Headnote:Kopnota
Theapplicanthadbeenconvictedintheregionalmagistrate'scourtoftherapeAofanineyearoldgirlforwrongfullyandunlawfullyhaving
analsexualintercoursewithher,withoutherconsent.Theregionalcourthadfoundthatthecommonlawdefinitionofrapewasunconstitutional
andhadextendedittoincludeactsofnonconsensualsexualpenetrationofthemalepenisintotheanusofanotherperson.TheHighCourthad
endorsedtheattitudetakenbythemagistrate'scourt,andthemattercamebeforetheBConstitutionalCourtforconfirmationunders172(2)
(a)oftheConstitutionoftheRepublicofSouthAfrica,1996.
1.Extendingthedefinitionofrapetoincludeanalpenetrationoffemale
Held,thatthecurrentcommonlawdefinitionofrapewasnotunconstitutionalinsofarasitcriminalisedconductthatwasclearlymorallyand
sociallyCunacceptable.Thedefinitiondid,however,needtobeappropriatelyadaptedbecauseitfellshortofthespirit,purportandobjectsof
theBillofRights.(Paragraphs[27],[32]and[70]at450c,452gand464de)
Held,further,thatnonconsensualanalpenetrationofwomenandyounggirlsconstitutedaformofviolenceagainstthemequalinintensityand
impacttononconsensualvaginalpenetration.ExtendingthedefinitionofrapetoDincludepenetrationofafemale'sanuswouldprotectthe
dignityofsurvivors,especiallyyounggirlsunabletodifferentiatebetweenthedifferenttypesofpenetration,andincreasetheextenttowhich
thetraditionallymostvulnerableanddisadvantagedgroupinsociety(womenandyounggirls)wouldbeprotectedbyandbenefitfromthelaw.
(Paragraphs[37][39]at454f455d.)E
Held,further,thatthefactthatthe2003BillonSexualOffences(BillB502003)wascurrentlybeforeParliamentcouldnotthwartthe
extensionofthedefinitionorcausetheCourttodelay,deferorrefusetodealwiththeextension.ThefactsbeforetheCourtdemandedthe
extensionanditwasclearlyinthepublicinterest.AnyfurtherdelaytotheextensionoftheFdefinitionwouldconstituteaninjusticeuponthe
survivorsofnonconsensualanalpenetration.(Paragraph[44]at456h457b.)
Held,accordingly,thatthecommonlawdefinitionofrapeshouldbeextendedtoincludeactsofnonconsensual,intentionalpenetrationofa
penisintoafemale'sanus.(Paragraphs[45]and[74]at457dand465e.)
2.ProspectivedevelopmentofthecommonlawG
Held,thatitwaspossible,whentheinterestsofjusticerequiredit,fortheCourtstodevelopthecommonlawprospectivelyonly,butthiswould
onlybeappropriateinrarecases.(Paragraphs[49]and[51]at458b459a.)
Held,further,thatifthedefinitionofrapeweretobeextendedretrospectivelyitwouldoffendtheprincipleoflegality.Fairnesstotheaccused
requiredthatHtheextensionofthedefinitionofrapenotbeappliedtohimbutonlytocasesarisingafterthisjudgmenthadbeenhanded
down.Itwouldbeunfairtoconvictanaccusedofanoffenceincircumstanceswheretheconductinquestiondidnotconstitutetheoffenceat
thetimeofthecommission.Fortheapplicanttobeconvictedofrapewouldbeinviolationofhisrightins35(3)(l)oftheConstitution.
(Paragraphs[51],[56]and[57]at458fgIand461cf.)
Held,accordingly,thatthedevelopmentofthecommonlawdefinitionwasapplicableonlytoconductthattookplaceafterthedateofthis
judgment.(Paragraph[74]at465ef.)Theconvictionoftheapplicantofrapewassetasideandreplacedwithaconvictionofindecent
assault;thecasewasremittedtothemagistrates'courtforsentencing.J
2007(2)SACRp437
3.ExtendingthedefinitionofrapetoincludeanalpenetrationofmaleA
Held,thatthefactsdidnotrequiretheCourttoconsiderwhetherornotthecommonlawdefinitionofrapeshouldbeextendedtoincludethe
nonconsensualpenetrationbyapenisofamaleanus.(Paragraph[29]at451de.)
Held,furtherthatitwasnotunconstitutionaltohaveadefinitionofrapethatwasgenderspecific.(Paragraph[30]at451fg.)B
Held,accordinglythattheCourtcouldnotconfirmtheHighCourt'sdeclarationofinvaliditytotheextentthatitwasbasedonconclusions
relatingtothegenderneutralnatureofrape,anissuethathadnotarisenonthefactsofthiscase.(Paragraphs[59],[61]and[62]at461h
and462bc.)
Inaseparateminorityjudgment,LangaCJ(SachsJconcurring)heldthatCdevelopmentofthecommonlawdefinitionofrapeshouldbetaken
furthertoincludetheanalrapeofmen.
4.Powersofmagistrates'courts
Held,thats173oftheConstitutionexplicitlyempoweredonlytheConstitutionalCourt,theSupremeCourtofAppealandtheHighCourtsto
developthecommonlaw.Magistrates'courtswereexcluded.Moreover,s110oftheDMagistrates'CourtsAct32of1944prohibited
magistratesfrompronouncingonthevalidityofanylaw,whichattenuatedthedutyofmagistrates'courtstodevelopthecommonlaw.
Magistrates'courtswere,however,boundtogiveeffecttoconstitutionalrightsandtoensurethatcriminaltrialswereconductedinaccordance
withtheConstitution,particularlythefairtrialrightsoftheaccused.(Paragraphs[66][68]at463af.)E
Held,further,thattheredidnotseemtobeanyconstitutionalorlegislativemandateforthereferraltotheHighCourtforconfirmationofall
casesinwhichamagistratesawfittodevelopthecommonlawinlinewiththeConstitution.(Paragraph[69]at464bc.)
Held,accordingly,thatmagistrateswerenotempoweredtovarytheelementsofcrimesinthelightoftheConstitution.(Paragraph[69]at
464c.)F
CasesConsidered
Annotations
Reportedcases
SouthernAfricancases
AmodvMultilateralMotorVehicleAccidentsFund1998(4)SA753(CC)G(1998(10)BCLR1207):applied
CarmichelevMinisterofSafetyandSecurityandAnother(CentreforAppliedLegalStudiesIntervening)2002(1)SACR79(CC)(2001(4)SA
938;2001(10)BCLR995):dictainparas[36]and[81]applied
DawoodandAnothervMinisterofHomeAffairsandOthers;ShalabiandAnothervMinisterofHomeAffairsandOthers;ThomasandAnotherv
HMinisterofHomeAffairsandOthers2000(3)SA936(CC)(2000(8)BCLR837):applied
DuPlessisandOthersvDeKlerkandAnother1996(3)SA850(CC)(1996(5)BCLR658):dictainparas[61]and[65]applied
ExparteMinisterofSafetyandSecurityandOthers:InreSvWaltersandAnother2002(2)SACR105(CC)(2002(4)SA613;2002(7)BCLRI
663):applied
FerreiravLevinNOandOthers;VryenhoekandOthersvPowellNOandOthers1996(1)SA984(CC)(1996(1)BCLR1):dictuminpara[183]
applied
FourieandAnothervMinisterofHomeAffairsandAnother2003(5)SA301(CC)(2003(10)BCLR1092):applied.J
2007(2)SACRp438
IngledewvFinancialServicesBoard:InreFinancialServicesBoardvVander AMerweandAnother2003(4)SA584(CC)(2003(8)BCLR825):
applied
JandAnothervDirectorGeneral,DepartmentofHomeAffairs,andOthers2003(5)SA621(CC)(2003(5)BCLR463):referredto
MabasovLawSociety,NorthernProvinces,andAnother2005(2)SA117(CC)(2005(2)BCLR129):distinguished
MinisterofHomeAffairsandAnothervFourieandAnother(DoctorsforLife BInternationalandOthersasAmiciCuriae);LesbianandGay
EqualityProjectandOthersvMinisterofHomeAffairsandOthers2006(1)SA524(CC)(2006(3)BCLR355):referredto
MinisterofHomeAffairsvNationalInstituteforCrimePreventionandtheReintegrationofOffenders(NICRO)andOthers2005(3)SA280(CC)
C(2004(5)BCLR445):referredto
MohlomivMinisterofDefence1997(1)SA124(CC)(1996(12)BCLR1559):distinguished
NationalCoalitionforGayandLesbianEqualityandAnothervMinisterofJusticeandOthers1998(2)SACR556(CC)(1999(1)SA6;1998(12)
BCLR1517):distinguishedD
NationalPoliceServiceUnionandOthersvMinisterofSafetyandSecurityandOthers2000(4)SA1110(CC)(2001(8)BCLR775):applied
RvK1958(3)SA420(A):applied
RvMosagoandAnother1935AD32:applied
SvBaloyi(MinisterofJusticeandAnotherIntervening)2000(1)SACR81(CC)(2000(2)SA425;2000(1)BCLR86):appliedE
SvBhulwana,SvGwadiso1995(2)SACR748(CC)(1996(1)SA388;1995(12)BCLR1579):referredto
SvBoesak2001(1)SACR1(CC)(2001(1)SA912;2001(1)BCLR36):applied
SvChapman1997(2)SACR3(A)(1997(3)SA341):appliedF
SvJackson1998(1)SACR470(SCA)(1998(2)SA984;1998(4)BCLR424;[1998]2AllSA267):referredto
SvJordanandOthers(SexWorkersEducationandAdvocacyTaskForceandOthersasAmiciCuriae)2002(2)SACR499(CC)(2002(6)SA
642;2002(11)BCLR1117):dictuminpara[45]applied
SvM(2)1990(1)SACR456(N):referredtoG
SvMasiya(MinisterofJusticeandConstitutionalDevelopmentIntervening)2006(2)SACR357(T)(2006(11)BCLR1377):overruled
SvMhlunguandOthers1995(2)SACR277(CC)(1995(3)SA867;1995(7)BCLR793):referredto
SvNcanywa1992(1)SACR209(Ck)(1992(2)SA182):appliedandqualifiedH
SvPieters1987(3)SA717(A):referredto
SvThebusandAnother2003(2)SACR319(CC)(2003(6)SA505;2003(10)BCLR1100):applied
SvZuma2006(2)SACR191(W)(2006(7)BCLR790):qualified
ShingavTheStateandAnother(SocietyofAdvocates,PietermaritzburgBar,asAmicusCuriae);O'ConnellandOthersvTheState2007(2)
SACR28(CC)(2007(4)SA611;2007(5)BCLR474):referredtoI
VanderMerwevRoadAccidentFundandAnother(Women'sLegalCentreTrustasAmicusCuriae)2006(4)SA230(CC)(2006(6)BCLR682):
referredto
VeldmanvDirectorofPublicProsecutions,WitwatersrandLocalDivision2006(2)SACR319(CC)(2007(3)SA210):applied.J
2007(2)SACRp439
NKABINDEJ
ForeigncasesA
JonesvSecretaryofStateforSocialServices;HudsonvSecretaryofStateforSocialServices[1972]AC944(HL):referredto
ProsecutorvAntoFurundzija(1999)38ILM317:referredto
ProsecutorvJeanPaulAkayesu(1998)37ILM1401:referredto
RvChase[1987]2SCR293:referredtoB
RvGovernorofBrockhillPrison,ExparteEvans(No2)[2001]2AC19(HL(E)):applied
RvSalituro(1992)8CRR(2d)173([1991]3SCR654):applied
RoyalBankofScotlandplcvEtridge(No2)[2002]2AC773(HL(E)):referredto
SWvUnitedKingdom;CRvUnitedKingdom(1995)21EHRR363:applied.C
Unreportedcases
SouthernAfricancases
DirectorofPublicProsecutionsvTshabalala(TPDcaseNoA1955/04,7February2005):referredto.D
Foreigncases
ProsecutorvAlfredMusema(ICTR9613A,27January2000):referredto
ProsecutorvDragoljubKunaracRadomirKovacandZoranVukovic(IT9623andIT9623/1A(12June2002)):referredto
ProsecutorvLaurentSemanza(ICTR9720T,15May2003):referredto.E
StatutesConsidered
Statutes
TheConstitutionoftheRepublicofSouthAfrica,1996,ss35(3)(l),172(2)(a)and173:seeJuta'sStatutesofSouthAfrica2006/7vol5at126
and147.
TheMagistrates'CourtsAct32of1944,s110:seeJuta'sStatutesofSouthAfrica2006/7vol1at152.F
CaseInformation
Confirmationproceedingsintermsofs172(2)(a)oftheConstitutionoftheRepublicofSouthAfricaAct,1996andapplicationforleaveto
appealandappealagainstadecisionintheTransvaalProvincialDivision(RanchodAJ).ThefactsappearfromthejudgmentofNkabindeJ.G
PJJdeJagerandJBauerfortheapplicant,instructedbytheLegalAidBoard.
HMMeintjiesandSBakuaforthefirstrespondent.
NCassimSC(withSMLebalaandPTBezuidenhout)forthesecondrespondent.H
KPillayfortheAmiciCuriae,instructedbytheLegalResourcesCentre.
Curadvvult.
Postea(May10).I
Judgment
NkabindeJ:
[1]Thiscaseisabouttheconstitutionalvalidityofthecommonlawdefinitionofrapetotheextentthatitexcludesanalpenetrationandis
genderspecific.Thecaseconcernsthemannerinwhichthedefinitionofrapehasbeenunderstood,developedandinterpretedinSouth
African.J
2007(2)SACRp440
NKABINDEJ
law.Thedefinitionhasbeendebatedbythecourts,LegislatureandcivilAsocietyovertheyears.Essentially,thismattercomesbeforethis
Courtontwobases.First,confirmationproceedingsintermsofs172(2) (a)oftheConstitutionoftheRepublicofSouthAfrica,1996.Second,
anapplicationforleavetoappeal againstthewholeofthejudgmentandorderofthePretoriaHighCourt inwhichthatCourtconfirmedthe
Bapplicant'sconvictionbytheregionalcourt.
[2]Thefulltermsoftheorderagainstwhichleavetoappealissoughtreadasfollows:
'1.Thecommonlawdefinitionofrapeisdeclaredtobeunconstitutionalasitcurrentlystands,forthereasonsgivenbythelearnedmagistrateinhisC
judgmentandforthefurtherreasonssetoutinthisjudgment.
2.Thedefinitionofrapeisextendedtoincludeactsofnonconsensualsexualpenetrationofthemalepenisintothevaginaoranusofanotherperson.
3.TheprovisionsofAct105of1997 anditsschedulesandss261(1)(e)and(f)and(2)(c)oftheCriminalProcedureAct51of1977andtheschedulesto
thelatterActrelatingtobailprovisionsaredeclaredtobeinvalidandareDinconsistentwiththeConstitutiontotheextentthattheyaregenderspecific.
4.Wheretheprovisionsreferredtoin(3)abovearegenderspecifictherebeareadinginof''person''whereverreferenceismadetoaspecificgender.
5.Theproceedingsinthecourtaquoaredeterminedtobeinaccordancewithjusticeintermsoftheprovisionsofs52ofAct105of1997.
6.SentencingoftheaccusedispostponeduntiltheConstitutionalCourthasEmadeadeterminationontheorderofConstitutionalinvalidityreferredtoin(3)
ofthisorder.'
[3]Asapparentfromparas(1)and(3)oftheorder,thedeclarationsofinvalidityrelatetowhetherthedefinitionofrapeisconstitutionally
invalidandwhetherthespecifiedprovisionsoftheCriminalProcedureActof1977(theCPA) andoftheCriminalLawAmendmentActFof1997
(theAct) andtheirrelevantSchedulesareinconsistentwiththeConstitutiontotheextentthattheyaregenderspecific.
2007(2)SACRp441
NKABINDEJ
[4]Theapplicant,MrMasiya,isanawaitingsentenceprisoner.ThefirstArespondentistheDirectorofPublicProsecutions(DPP).Thesecond
respondentistheMinisterofJusticeandConstitutionalDevelopment(Minister).Shehasbeenjoinedasapartytotheproceedingsbyreasonof
herbeingthenationalexecutiveauthorityresponsiblefortheadministrationofjustice.Thefirstandsecondamicicuriae,theCentreforB
AppliedLegalStudiesandTshwaranangLegalAdvocacyCentre(amici),respectively,havebeenadmittedtoassisttheCourt.
Background
[5]ThefactsappearfromthejudgmentoftheHighCourt.IrestateonlyCtherelevantfactstomakethediscussioninthisjudgment
comprehensible.
[6]MrMasiya,44yearsofage,wasinitiallybroughtbeforethedistrictcourtatSabieonachargeofrape.TheStateallegedthatonorabout
16March2004atornearSabiehewrongfullyandunlawfullyhadsexualDintercoursewithanineyearoldgirl(thecomplainant),withouther
consent.ThecasewastransferredtotheregionalcourtatGraskopwherehewastriedonthatcharge.AtthetrialMrMasiya,representedby
anattorneyfromtheNelspruitJusticeCentre,pleadednotguilty.Heelectedtoremainsilentanddidnotadvanceastatementexplaininghis
plea.Theevidenceestablishedthatthecomplainantwaspenetratedanally.E
[7]MrMasiyaneithergaveevidencenorcalledwitnessestotestify.TheStateappliedthathebeconvictedofindecentassault,acompetent
verdictonachargeofrape. ThedefencecontendedthatifMrMasiyaweretobefoundguiltyheshouldbeconvictedofindecentassault.F
[8]Theregionalcourt,ofitsownaccord,consideredwhetherthecommonlawneededtobedeveloped.Thedefencecontendedthat
magistrates'courtsdonothavethepowertopronounceontheconstitutionalityofaruleofthecommonlaw.Theregionalcourtremarkedthat
thecourt,'albeitacreatureofstatute,hasjurisdictionintermsoftheConstitutiontoGjudgetheconstitutionalityofalegalprincipleunder
commonlawand,ifnecessarytodeveloptheprinciplesothatitconformswiththeconstitutionalvaluesenshrinedinourConstitution'. The
courtremarkedthatthereisnothingintheConstitutionorotherlegislationthatprecludesitfromenquiringintoorrulingontheconstitutionality
ofaruleofthecommonlawanddevelopingitwherenecessary.Itpointedoutthatss8(3) andH
2007(2)SACRp442
NKABINDEJ
39(2) oftheConstitutionspeak,respectively,of'acourt'and'everycourt,Atribunalorforum'.
[9]Theregionalcourtremarkedfurtherthat
'(I)ntermsoftheexistingcommonlawdefinitionsofcrime,thenonconsensualanalpenetrationofagirl(oraboy)amountsonlytothe(lesser)commonlaw
crimeofindecentassault,andnotrape,becauseonlynonconsensualBvaginalsexualintercourseisregardedasrape.One'sinitialfeelingsofrighteousness
would,however,immediatelyrebelagainstsuchthought.Whymusttheunconsensualsexualpenetrationofagirl(oraboy)peranumberegardedasless
injurious,lesshumiliatingandlessseriousthantheunconsensualsexualpenetrationofagirlpervaginam?Thedistinctionappearsonfacevaluetobeirrational
andtotallysenseless,becausetheanalorificeisnolessprivate,noClesssubjecttoinjuryandabuse,anditssexualpenetrationnolesshumiliatingthanthe
vaginalorifice.Itthereforeappearsthatthecommonlawdefinitionofrapeisnotonlyarchaic,butirrationalandamountstoarbitrarydiscriminationwith
referencetowhichkindofsexualpenetrationistoberegardedasthemostserious,andthenonlyinrespectofwomen.' D
(Footnoteomitted.)
[10]Theregionalcourtheldthatthedefinitionshouldbedevelopedtopromoteconstitutionalobjectives,andthatcourtsmaydevelopthe
currentdefinitionofrapegivenParliament'slengthydelayinpromulgatingtheCriminalLaw(SexualOffences)AmendmentBillof2003(theE
2003Bill) soastoaffordsocietythefullprotectionoftheConstitution.TheCourtheldthatalthoughthedevelopmentwouldimpactonMr
Masiya'sfairtrialrightsintermsofs35(3)(n) oftheConstitutionthosefairtrialrightscouldbelimitedonthebasisthat:
(a)Nonconsensualanalpenetrationalreadyconstitutesanoffence,Fnamelyindecentassault,andismanifestlyimmoralandunjust;
(b)retroactivepunishmentcouldhavebeenforeseenbyMrMasiya;
(c)suchdevelopmentwillbeconsistentwithforeignlaw;
(d)therightsofsocietyareweightierthanthoseofMrMasiyanottobeconvictedofandsentencedtoamoreseriousoffence;
(e)lessrestrictivemeanstoachievethepurposesoughttobeachievedGbytheextensionofthedefinitionofrapewouldhavebeenfor
2007(2)SACRp443
NKABINDEJ
Parliamenttoaddressthelacunawithanappropriatelaw,butAParliamenthasdraggeditsfeet;and
(f)thedevelopeddefinitionwouldbecomelawofgeneralapplicationifendorsedbytheHighCourtuponreferral.
[11]Theregionalcourtthusextendedthedefinitionofrapetoinclude'actsofnonconsensualsexualpenetrationofthemalesexualorganinto
Bthevaginaoranusofanotherperson'. Itexpresslyrefrainedfromrulingonwhethernonconsensualoralpenetrationshouldconstitutethe
crimeofrapeasthatwasnotanissueintheproceedings.HavingconvictedMrMasiyaofrapeintermsoftheextendeddefinition,theregional
courtstoppedtheproceedingsandcommittedhimtotheHighCourtintermsofs52 oftheActforthepurposeofsentence.C
2007(2)SACRp444
NKABINDEJ
[12]Section52(1)(b)(i)oftheActenjoinstheregionalcourt,whenAfindinganaccusedguiltyofcertainseriouscrimes,includingrapewhere
thevictimisundertheageof16years, toreferthemattertotheHighCourthavingjurisdictionforpurposesofconfirmationofconviction
andsentencing.TheHighCourthadtoconsiderwhether,onthefactsofthecase,theconvictionofrapeshouldbeupheldand,givenits
inherentBpowersandobligationsregardingthedevelopmentofthecommonlaw,whetherthecommonlawdefinitionofrapeshouldbe
developed. ThematterwaspostponedforfurtherevidencebytheHighCourtintermsofs52(3)(d)oftheAct.
[13]Allthepartiesagreedthatthecomplainant'smother,whohadCrefusedtotestifybeforetheregionalcourtandtowhomthefirstreport
hadbeenmade,shouldtestifyaboutthereportandconfirmthecomplainant'sage.Itwasalsoagreedthatcertainmedicalexperts,thepolice
whotookthecomplainant'sstatementandthecomplainantherself,shouldtestify.Allthesewitnessesdidtestify.Theevidenceissummarisedin
thejudgmentoftheHighCourt.Accordingly,itisnotD
2007(2)SACRp445
NKABINDEJ
necessarytorepeatit.ItsufficestostatethattheHighCourtwassatisfiedAthatMrMasiyahadanallypenetratedthecomplainant.Itmade
theorderwhichisthesubjectmatteroftheseconfirmationandappealproceedings.
[14]TheHighCourt,relyingoncertainprovisionsoftheConstitutionss8(1), 39(2), 10, 170, 172(1) and(2)(a) aswellass
173 BoftheConstitutionwithreferencetothepowerofthemagistrates'courtstopronounceontheconstitutionalityofthecommonlaw,
remarked:
'(I)twouldappearthatmagistrates'courtsarenotexplicitlyexcludedfromenquiringintothevalidityofthecommonlaw:amagistrate'scourtisboundbyCthe
ConstitutiontoapplytheBillofRightsandmustinterpretalllawsinamannerpromotingtheBillofRights.Itmustinasimilarfashionapplythecommonlawbut,
inthislatterinstance,mayalso[makeanenquiry]intotheconstitutionalvalidityofanyruleofcommonlaw.If,insodoing,theeffectisinvalidityofacommon
lawruleorprinciple,thenitmustallowforthecompetentauthoritytocorrectthedefect,whichwillbetheHighCourt,havingDinherentpowertodevelopthe
commonlawtobringitinlinewiththeconstitutionalimperativesandsotocorrectthedefect.'
[15]Regardingtheneedtoextendthedefinitionofrape,theHighCourtfoundthatindecentassaultattractsmorelenientsentencesthanrape.
Thisdistinctioninsentencing,theCourtsaid,resultsin'inadequateEprotectionanddiscriminatorysentencing'. Onthequestionoflegality
theCourtheldthattheprinciplesarenotapplicableandneednotbeconsideredasanobstacletotheextensionofthedefinitionofrapesince
nonewcrimeiscreated.Asapreludetotheordersetoutinpara[2]above,theHighCourtsaidF
2007(2)SACRp446
NKABINDEJ
'Theunlawfuldeedtheaccusedcommittedissimplygivenanothername....ATheaccusedknewverywellthathewasactingunlawfully.Ithasneverbeena
requirementthatanaccusedshouldknow,atthetimeofthecommissionofanunlawfuldeed,whetheritisacommonlaworstatutoryoffence,orwhatthe
legal/officialterminologyisinnamingit.'
TheCourtthenreferredthedeclarationofinvaliditysetoutinpara[3]BoftheordertothisCourtforconfirmation.Theimpositionofsentence
waspostponedpendingthedeterminationofthematter.
Jurisdictionalmatter
[16]Section172(2)(a)requiresthisCourttoconsiderapplicationsforCconfirmationofdeclarationsofinvaliditybytheHighCourt. A
declarationofconstitutionalinvalidityraisesaconstitutionalmatterwhichintheordinarycoursemustbeconsideredbythisCourt.Inthiscase,
asindicatedearlier,theHighCourtmadeanorderofconstitutionalinvaliditywhichmustbeconsideredbythisCourt.Thatdeclarationwas
dependentonthequestionwhetherthecommonlawhadbeencorrectlyDdevelopedbytheHighCourt.ItfollowsthereforethatthisCourthas
toconsiderboththeconfirmationproceedingsandwhethertograntleavetoappealontheotherissues.
[17]Theamici,however,contendedthattheapplicationforleavetoappealshouldbedismissedonthebasisthatitwouldnotbeintheE
interestsofjusticetograntleavewithoutthisCourthavingfirsthadthebenefitoftheviewsoftheSupremeCourtofAppealonthequestionof
thedevelopmentofthecommonlaw.Ordinarily,constitutionalmattersinvolvingthedevelopmentofthecommonlawshouldfirstbetakentothe
SupremeCourtofAppealbeforetheyreachthisCourtbecauseoftheFbreadthofitsjurisdictionanditsexpertiseinthecommonlaw. During
argumenttheamiciacknowledgedthatitwouldbeimpracticaltorequireMrMasiyatoprosecutehisappealfirstintheSupremeCourtof
Appeal whiletheconfirmationproceedingshavetobeconsideredbythisCourt.G
[18]Theissuesraisedinthismatterinvolvetheprotectionoftherightstodignity, equality, freedomandsecurityoftheperson, and
2007(2)SACRp447
NKABINDEJ
children'srights aswellasMrMasiya'sfairtrialrights. AswillappearAlaterinthisjudgment,thecaseraisesconstitutionalissuesof
considerablepublicimportance.Prospectsofsuccess,albeitnotdecisiveineverycase,areanimportantfactortobeconsidered. Iconclude
thereforethatitisintheinterestsofjusticefortheapplicationforleavetoappealtobegranted.B
Issues
[19]Theprimaryquestionstobeconsideredrelateto:
(a)WhetherthecurrentdefinitionofrapeisinconsistentwiththeConstitutionandwhetherthedefinitionneedstobedeveloped;C
(b)whetherMrMasiyaisliabletobeconvictedintermsofthedevelopeddefinition;
(c)whetherthedeclarationofinvalidityoftherelevantstatutoryprovisionsshouldbeconfirmed;
(d)whetherthemeritsofthecriminalconvictionshouldbedealtwithDbythisCourt;and
(e)appropriaterelief.
Constitutionalityofthedefinition
[20]Itisusefultoexaminethehistoricalperspectiveofthecriminalisationofrapesoastodetermineitsdevelopmentaldirection.ThewordE
rapeoriginatesfromtheLatinwordsraptus,rapio,andrapinarespectivelymeaning'tearingoff,rendingaway,carryingoff,abduction,rape,
plundering';'toseize,snatch,tearaway,toplunderaplace,tohurry.F
2007(2)SACRp448
NKABINDEJ
alongapersonorthing';and'robbery,pillage,bootyplunder'. AsAsuch,raptus inRomanlawwasgenerallyunderstoodasanoffence
consistingoftheviolent'carryingaway'ofwomenandisbettertranslatedas'abduction'. ThecrimeofrapeinRomanlawwasbasedona
prohibitionofunchastebehaviour.PunishmentfornonconsensualsexualintercourseprotectedtheinterestsofthesocietyinpenalisingB
unchastebehaviour,ratherthantheinterestsofthesurvivor.
[21]Inthisperiod,patriarchalsocietiescriminalisedrapetoprotectpropertyrightsofmenoverwomen. Thepatriarchalstructureoffamilies
subjectedwomenentirelytotheguardianshipoftheirhusbandsandgavemenacivilrightnotonlyovertheirspouses'property,butalsoCover
theirpersons. RomanDutchlawplacedforceatthecentreofthedefinitionwiththeconcomitantrequirementof'hueandcry'toindicatea
woman'slackofconsent. Submissiontointercoursethroughfear,duress,fraudordeceitaswellasintercoursewithanunconsciousor
mentallyimpairedwomandidnotconstituterapebutalesseroffenceofDstuprum.
[22]InEnglishlawthefocusoriginallywasontheuseofforcetoovercomeawoman'sresistance.Bythemideighteenthcenturyforcewasno
longerrequiredfortheconducttoconstituterapeandthescopeofthedefinitionwasincreasedtoincludecasesoffraudordeception.EThis
latterdefinitionwasadoptedinSouthAfrica.
[23]Inindigenouslaw rapewasrestrictivelydefined.Generally,thelawstressestheresponsibilityofagroupratherthanoftheindividual.F
2007(2)SACRp449
NKABINDEJ
ForinstanceinPedilaw,inrapecaseswomenmustbeassistedbytheirAfathersorhusbandsandcompensationaccruesnottothesurvivor
buttoherhouseholdundertheguardianshipofthehusbandorthefather. Thelawexcludedcasesofsodomyandmaritalrape.Insome
communitiesintercoursewithaprepubescentgirlchildwasalsoexcludedfromthedefinition.Theseactsoftenmerelyconstitutedassaultor
'unnaturalBsexuality'.
[24]Itisevidentfromthehistoryofthelawofrapethattheobjectofthecriminalisationofrapewastoprotecttheeconomicinterestsofthe
father,husbandorguardianofthefemalesurvivorofrape,toperpetuateCstereotypes,maledominanceandpowerandtorefertofemalesas
objects.
[25]Withtheadventofourconstitutionaldispensationbasedondemocraticvaluesofhumandignity,equalityandfreedom,thesocial
foundationoftheseruleshasdisappeared.AlthoughthegreatmajorityofDfemales,forthemostpartinruralSouthAfrica,remaintrappedin
culturalpatternsofsexbasedhierarchy,thereisandhasbeenagradualmovementtowardsrecognitionofafemaleasthesurvivorofrape
ratherthanotherantiquatedinterestsorsocietalmoralsbeingatthecoreofthedefinition. Thefocusisonthebreachof'amorespecific
rightsuchasEtherighttobodilyintegrity' andsecurityofthepersonandtherighttobeprotectedfromdegradationandabuse.Thecrime
ofrapeshouldthereforebeseeninthatcontext.
ThecurrentlawofrapeF
[26]Inourlaw,rapeisunderstoodasthenonconsensualpenetrationofavaginabyapenis.Thegenerallyaccepteddefinitionofrape,
accordingtoHeathJinNcanywa,is'the(a)intentional(b)unlawful(c)sexualintercoursewithawoman(d)withoutherconsent'.HeathJ
remarkedthat'(t)heelementofunlawfulnessisbasedessentiallyontheabsenceofG
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consent'. ThefourelementsinthedefinitionofrapewereechoedbyAVanderMerweJinSvZuma,inwhichtheabsenceofmensrea
wasrelevant. BurchellandMiltonstatethatthedefinitionofrapeis'theintentionalunlawfulsexualintercoursewithawomanwithouther
consent'. Snymanprefersthisdefinition:'RapeconsistsinamalehavingunlawfulandintentionalsexualintercoursewithafemalewithoutB
herconsent.' Bothshareanunderstandingof'sexualintercourse'asthe'penetrationofthewoman'svaginabythemalepenis'.
[27]Thedefinitionspresupposenonconsensualsexualpenetrationofavaginabyapenis.Thedefinitionofrapeisnotunconstitutionalinsofar
Casitcriminalisesconductthatisclearlymorallyandsociallyunacceptable.Inthisregarditisdifferentfromthecommonlawcrimeofsodomy
whichwasdeclaredunconstitutionalbythisCourt becauseitsubjectedpeopletocriminalpenaltiesforconductwhichcouldnotconstitutea
crimeinourconstitutionalorder.ThereisnothinginthecurrentDdefinitionofrapetosuggestthatitisfatallyflawedinasimilarmanner.The
currentdefinitionofrapecriminalisesunacceptablesocialconductthatisinviolationofconstitutionalrights.Itensuresthattheconstitutional
righttobefreefromallformsofviolence,whetherpublicorprivate, aswellastherighttodignity andequality areprotected.
InvalidatingthedefinitionbecauseitisunderinclusiveistothrowtheEbabyoutwiththebathwater.Whatisrequiredthenisforthedefinition
tobeextendedinsteadofbeingeliminatedsoastopromotethespirit,purportandobjectsoftheBillofRights.
[28]MoreoverthecurrentlawofrapehasbeenaffectedbystatutoryFdevelopmentsinrecentdecades.In1993therulethatahusbandcould
notrapehiswife,thesocalledmaritalrapeexemption,wasabolished; andthepresumptionthataboyisincapableofcommittingrapewas
abolishedin1987. TherehavealsobeenchangestothelawofevidenceG
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relatingtosexualoffences. Thesechangesreflectoursociety'schangingAunderstandingofrape.Dueinnosmallparttotheworkof
women'srightsactivists,thereiswideracceptancethatrapeiscriminalbecauseitaffectsthedignityandpersonalintegrityofwomen.The
evolutionofourunderstandingofrapehasgonehandinhandwithwomen'sagitationfortherecognitionoftheirlegalpersonhoodandrightto
equalprotection.BTothisend,womeninSouthAfricaandtherestoftheworldhavemobilisedagainstthepatriarchalassumptionthat
underlaythetraditionaldefinitionofrape.Theyhavefocusedattentionontheuniqueviolencevisiteduponwomen.Muchofthisactivism
focusedoncreatingsupportsystemsforwomen,suchasrapecrisiscentresandabuseCshelters;andalsoontheprocesswherebyrapeis
investigatedandprosecuted.Itisnowwidelyacceptedthatsexualviolenceandrapenotonlyoffendtheprivacyanddignityofwomenbutalso
reflecttheunequalpowerrelationsbetweenmenandwomeninoursociety.
[29]ThefactsofthepresentcasedealwithpenetrationoftheanusofaDyounggirl.Theissuebeforeustheniswhetherthecurrent
definitionofrapeneedstobedevelopedtoincludeanalpenetrationwithinitsscope.Thefactsdonotrequireustoconsiderwhetherornotthe
definitionshouldbeextendedtoincludenonconsensualpenetrationofthemaleanusbyapenis.Strongargumentswerepresentedtoustothe
effectthatEgenderspecificityinrelationtorapereflectedpatriarchalstereotypesinconsistentwiththeConstitution.ThisCourt has
stressedthatitisnotdesirablethatacaseshouldbedealtwithonthebasisofwhatthefactsmightberatherthanwhattheyare.
[30]ItcanhardlybesaidthatnonconsensualanalpenetrationofmalesFislessdegrading,humiliatingandtraumaticand,toborrowthe
phrasebyBrownmiller,'alesserviolationofthepersonalprivateinnerspace,alesserinjurytomind,spiritandsenseofself'. Thatthisisso
doesnotmeanthatitisunconstitutionaltohaveadefinitionofrapewhichisgenderspecific.Focusingonanalpenetrationoffemalesshould
notbeseenasbeingdisrespectfultomalebodilyintegrityorinsensitivetothetraumaGsufferedbymalevictimsofanalviolation,especially
boysoftheageofthecomplainantinthiscase.Extendingthedefinitiontoincludenonconsensualpenetrationoftheanusofthemalebya
penismayneedtobedoneinacasewherethefactsrequiresuchadevelopment.Itneedstobesaidthatitisnotconstitutionally
impermissibletodevelopthecommonHlawofrapeinthisincrementalway.ThisCourthasstatedthatinaconstitutionaldemocracysuchas
ourstheLegislatureandnotthe
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CourtshasthemajorresponsibilityforlawreformandthedelicateAbalancebetweenCourts'functionsandpowersontheonehandandthose
oftheLegislatureontheothershouldberecognisedandrespected. TheterrainsofthecourtsandLegislature,ChaskalsonPsaidinFerreira
vLevinNOandOthers;VryenhoekandOthersvPowellNOandOthers,shouldbekeptseparateeventhoughtheymayoverlap.TheBissue
ofmalerapeisthereforeamatterthatwillnodoubtbedealtwithinanappropriatefashioneitherbytheLegislatureortheCourtswhenthe
circumstancesmakeitappropriateandnecessarytodoso.
[31]TheconstitutionalroleoftheCourtsinthedevelopmentofthecommonlawmustbedistinguishedfromtheirotherroleinconsideringC
whetherlegislativeprovisionsareconsistentwiththeConstitution. Thelatterroleisoneofchecksandbalancesonthepowerprovidedforin
ourConstitution,wherebycourtsareempoweredtoensurethatlegislativeprovisionsareconstitutionallycompliant.Thedevelopmentofthe
commonlawontheotherhandisapowerthathasalwaysvestedinDourCourts.Itisexercisedinanincrementalfashionasthefactsofeach
caserequire.Thisincrementalmannerhasnotchanged,buttheConstitutionins39(2)providesaparamountsubstantiveconsiderationrelevant
todeterminingwhetherthecommonlawrequiresdevelopmentinanyparticularcase.Thisdoesnotdetractfromtheconstitutionalrecognition,
asindicatedabove,thatitistheLegislaturethathasEthemajorresponsibilityforlawreform.Courtsmustbeastutetoavoidtheappropriation
oftheLegislature'sroleinlawreformwhendevelopingthecommonlaw.ThegreaterpowergiventotheCourtstotestlegislationagainstthe
Constitutionshouldnotencouragethemtoadoptamethodofcommonlawdevelopmentwhichisclosertocodificationthanincremental,F
factdrivendevelopment.
[32]Accordingly,IconcludethatthedefinitionisnotinconsistentwiththeConstitutionbutneedstobeadaptedappropriately.Thequestion
remainswhetherthefactsofthiscaserequirethatthedefinitionbedevelopedsoastoincludeanalpenetrationofafemale.G
Developmentofthecommonlaw
[33]ThequestionofdevelopmentofthecommonlawwascomprehensivelydiscussedbyAckermannandGoldstoneJJinCarmichele inwhich
thedutyofCourtsthatisderivedfromss7,8(1),39(2)and173HoftheConstitutionwasstressed.TheCourtsoundedaremindertoJudges
whendevelopingthecommonlawto'bemindfulofthefactthat.
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themajorengineforlawreformshouldbetheLegislatureandnottheAJudiciary.' TheCourtrepeatedwithapprovaltheremarksof
IacobucciJinRvSalituro:
'Judgescanandshouldadaptthecommonlawtoreflectthechangingsocial,moralandeconomicfabricofthecountry.Judgesshouldnotbequicktoperpetuate
ruleswhosesocialfoundationhaslongsincedisappeared.NonethelessBtherearesignificantconstraintsonthepoweroftheJudiciarytochangethelaw....In
aconstitutionaldemocracysuchasoursitistheLegislatureandnotthecourtswhichhasthemajorresponsibilityforlawreform....TheJudiciaryshould
confineitselftothoseincrementalchangeswhicharenecessarytokeepthecommonlawinstepwiththedynamicandevolvingfabricofoursociety.' C
TheCourt,however,saidthat'courtsmustremainvigilantandshouldnothesitatetoensurethatthecommonlawisdevelopedtoreflectthe
spirit,purportandobjectsoftheBillofRights...whetherornotthepartiesinanyparticularcaserequesttheCourttodevelopthecommon
lawunders39(2)'. Wherethereisdeviationfromthespirit,purportandobjectsoftheBillofRights,courtsareobligedtodeveloptheD
commonlawbyremovingthedeviation.
[34]TheHighCourtemphasisedtheallegedinequalityanddiscriminationengenderedbythedefinitionandtheresultantinadequateand
discriminatorysentences. InoralargumentcounselforMrMasiyaEarguedagainstthedevelopmentonlyifthedevelopeddefinitionofrape
weretoapplytohim.TheDPPandamicisubstantiallysupportedthejudgmentoftheHighCourtandarguedthatthedefinitionperpetuates
genderinequalityandpromotesdiscrimination.TheDPPfurthercontendedthatthedefinitionperpetuatesleniencyinsentencing.F
[35]TheMinisteropposedthedevelopment.ShereliedonthedecisionofthisCourtinSvMhlunguandOthers thattheRegionalCourt
shouldhavedecidedtheguiltorotherwiseofMrMasiyaonthefactsandwithoutconsideringtheconstitutionalissueofdevelopingthe
definitionofrape.Thatmightwellhavebeentheproperwaytodealwiththematter.However,thefailuretodosois,inthecircumstancesof
thiscase,Gofnoconsequence.WhenthematterwasreferredtotheHighCourtintermsofs52oftheAct,thatCourthadtodetermine
whethertheconvictionwasinaccordancewithjusticebeforeconsideringanappropriatesentence.TheCourtcalledforfurtherevidenceand
confirmedtheH
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conviction.Strictlyspeaking,itisthatfinding,amongothers,andnottheAfindingbytheregionalcourt,againstwhichleavetoappealis
sought.
[36]Theamici,likewise,contendedthatapartfromthegenderednatureoftheoriginsofthedefinition,theelementsofthecrimeofrape
perpetuategenderstereotypesanddiscriminationbecausetheyaresuggestiveofthefactthatonlymalescancommitthecrimeandonlyB
femalescanberaped.Theyarguedthatonceitisrecognisedthattheprimarymotiveforrapeisnotsexuallustbutthedesiretogainpoweror
controloveranotherperson,withsexbeingtheviolentmeansbywhichthepowerisexercised,therationaleformaintainingthegender
distinctionfallsaway.Thatmightbeso.However,forthereasonsgivenabove,CitwouldnotbeappropriateforthisCourttoengagewith
thesequestions.InthisrespecttherearethreeimportantconsiderationsthatfavourrestraintonthepartofthisCourt.Thefirstisthatwhatis
atissueisextendingthedefinitionofcrime,somethingaCourtshoulddoonlyinexceptionalcircumstances. Thesecondisthatthe
developmentwouldentailstatutoryamendmentsandnecessitatelawreform.ThethirdisDthat,historically,rapehasbeenandcontinuestobe
acrimeofwhichfemalesareitssystematictarget.Itisthemostreprehensibleformofsexualassaultconstitutingasitdoesahumiliating,
degradingandbrutalinvasionofthedignityandthepersonofthesurvivor. Itisnotsimplyanactofsexualgratification,butoneofphysical
domination.ItisanEextremeandflagrantformofmanifestingmalesupremacyoverfemales.
[37]TheDeclarationontheEliminationofViolenceagainstWomen specificallyenjoinsmemberStatestopursuepoliciestoeliminateviolence
againstwomen.NonconsensualanalpenetrationofwomenandyounggirlssuchasthecomplainantinthiscaseconstitutesaformFof
violenceagainstthemequalinintensityandimpacttothatofnonconsensualvaginalpenetration.Theobjectofthecriminalisationofthisact
istoprotectthedignity,sexualautonomyandprivacyofwomenandyounggirlsasbeinggenerallythemostvulnerablegroupinlinewiththe
valuesenshrinedintheBillofRightsacornerstoneofourdemocracy.G
[38]Theextendeddefinitionwouldprotectthedignityofsurvivors,especiallyyounggirlswhomaynotbeabletodifferentiatebetweenthe
differenttypesofpenetration.TheevidenceofDrGrabe,anexpertH
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witnesswhotestifiedintheHighCourt,thatthecomplainantreferredtoAa'hole'thinkingthattheanusistheonlyplacesheexperiencesasa
'hole',clearlyillustratesthispoint.Womenandgirlswouldbeaffordedincreasedprotectionbytheextendeddefinition.Oneofthesocial
contextsofrapeisthealarminghighincidencesofHIVinfection.AnalpenetrationalsoresultsinthespreadofHIV.B
[39]Theconsequencescausedbynonconsensualanalpenetrationmightbedifferenttothosecausedbynonconsensualpenetrationofthe
vaginabutthetraumaassociatedwiththeformerisjustashumiliating,degradingandphysicallyhurtfulasthatassociatedwiththelatter.The
Cinclusionofpenetrationoftheanusofafemalebyapenisinthedefinitionwillincreasetheextenttowhichthetraditionallyvulnerableand
disadvantagedgroupwillbeprotectedbyandbenefitfromthelaw.Adoptingthisapproachwouldthereforeharmonisethecommonlawwiththe
spirit,purportandobjectsoftheBillofRights.D
[40]Oneoftheimportantconsiderationsarisingoutofthequestionwhethertodevelopthecurrentdefinitionrelatestotheappropriateweight
thatoughttobegiventothe2003Bill whichisaworkinprogress.E
The2003Bill
[41]ThedefinitionofrapehasbeensubjecttolawreforminitiativesinmanyotherCommonwealthcountries,suchastheUnitedKingdom,
CanadaandAustralia. InSouthAfricathereformstartedin1996whentheSouthAfricanLawReformCommission(SALRC) F
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conductedaninvestigationintosexualoffencesrelatingtochildren. AThatreportwasfollowedbyarequestfromtheMinisterthatthe
Commissioninvestigatesexualoffencesmorebroadly.Thefirstdraftofthe2003BillwastabledbeforeParliamentin2003. ThisBillwas
revisedandtabledforthesecondtimebeforeParliamentinOctober2006(revisedBill). ThedefinitionofrapeproposedbytheSALRCB
replacestheconceptofsexualintercoursepenetrationofavaginabyapeniswiththatofsexualpenetrationwhichincludespenetrationof
boththevaginaandtheanusbythepenis.Clause2(1)ofthe2003Billdefinesrapeasfollows:
'ApersonwhounlawfullyandintentionallycommitsanactwhichcausesCpenetrationtoanyextentwhatsoeverbythegenitalorgansofthatpersonintoor
beyondtheanusorgenitalorgansofanotherperson,oranyactwhichcausespenetrationtoanyextentwhatsoeverbythegenitalorgansofanotherpersoninto
orbeyondtheanusorgenitalorgansofthepersoncommittingtheact,isguiltyoftheoffenceofrape.'
Theapproachinthe2003Billwasnotfollowedinthe2006revisedBill.DInthe2003Billtwobroadcategoriesareproposed:rapeandsexual
assault,eachwithitsowndefinition.IntherevisedBillrapeisdefinedinclause3asfollows:'(a)nyperson(A)whounlawfullyandintentionally
commitsanactofsexualpenetrationwithacomplainant(B),withouttheconsentofB,isguiltyoftheoffenceofrape'.
[42]Chapters1and2oftherevisedBillareofparticularsignificance.EChapter1containsdefinitionsof'sexualpenetration'and'sexual
violation'andch2isheaded'SexualOffences'.Chapter2dealsinpart1withrapeandthecompetentverdictforcompelledrapeandinpart2
withsexualassaultandcompelledsexualassault.TherevisedBilladoptsagenderneutralapproachtobothoffences.F
[43]Havinghadthebenefitofthedrafts,thereportbytheSALRCandthepubliccommentssuchasthosebytheWomen'sLegalCentre,this
Courthasnotedtheconcernsexpressedbythebroadercommunityinthecourseofthelawreformprocessandthedevelopmentalperspective
oftheLegislatureregardingsexualoffences.AtthehearingaconcernGwasraisedwithcounselfortheMinisterregardingthedelayinthe
promulgationofthe2003Bill.Counselwas,however,unabletoexplaintotheCourtthereasonforthatdelay.
[44]Theprevalenceofsexualviolenceinoursocietyisdeeplytroubling.Theextensionofthedefinitionofrapetoincludeanalpenetrationwill
Hnotonlyyieldadvantagestothesurvivorbutwillalsoexpresstheabhorrencewithwhichoursocietyregardsthesepervasivebutoutrageous
acts.ThisCourt,whilenotunmindfulofthefactthatthe2003BillisbeforeParliament,cannotdelay,deferorrefusetodealwithanextension
ofthedefinitionwhenthefactsbeforeitdemandsuchanI
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extensionandwhenitisclearlyinthepublicinteresttodoso.AnyAfurtherdelayinorsuspensionoftheextensionofthecurrentdefinitionwill
constituteaninjusticeuponsurvivorsofnonconsensualanalpenetrationsuchasthenineyearoldcomplainantinthiscase.Thatresult
cannotandshouldnotbecountenanced.Thefactthatthe2003BillisbeforeParliament,astheMinistercontended,shouldnotthwartBthe
extensionofthecurrentdefinitionofrapeintheseexceptionalcircumstancesandwhentheinterestsofjusticesodemand.
[45]Iconclude,therefore,thattheextensionofthecommonlawdefinitionofrapetoincludenonconsensualanalpenetrationoffemaleswill
beintheinterestsofjusticeandwillhave,asitsaim,theproperCrealisationbythepublicoftheprinciples,idealsandvaluesunderlyingthe
Constitution.Acceptingthattheelementofunlawfulnessisbasedessentiallyontheabsenceofconsent, thedefinitionshouldthereforebe
extendedtoincludeintentionalpenetrationofthefemaleanusbyapeniswithoutconsent.D
[46]Thequestionofextendingthedefinitionsoastoincludeactsofnonconsensualanalpenetrationofapenisintotheanusofamaleperson
isleftopenforfutureconsiderationwherethefactsmightcallforitsresolution.Thequestionthenremainswhethertheextendeddefinition
shouldapplytoMrMasiya.E
Retrospectiveapplicationofthedefinition
[47]Essentially,thequestioniswhethertheconvictionofrapeisinaccordancewithjusticeeventhoughthedefinitionofrapedidnotinclude
nonconsensualanalpenetrationatthetimethecrimewasFcommitted.TheHighCourtheldthattheprincipleoflegalityhasnoapplicationin
thiscasesincenonewcrimeiscreated.ItheldthatMrMasiyaknewhewasactingunlawfullywhenheassaultedthecomplainantandthatit
hasneverbeenarequirementthatanaccusedpersonshouldknow,atthetimeofthecommissionofthecrime,whetheritisacommonlawor
statutorycrimeorwhatitslegaldefinitionis.MrMasiyaGcontendedthattheextendeddefinitionshouldnotapplytohimastheapplication
wouldconstituteaviolationofhisrightsintermsofs35(3)(l)oftheConstitution.
[48]Theordinaryprincipleofcommonlawisthatwhenaruleisdevelopeditappliestoallcases,notonlythosewhichariseaftertheH
judgmentinwhichthelawhasbeendevelopedhasbeenhandeddown.AsKentridgeAJobservedinDuPlessis:
'InourCourtsajudgmentwhichbringsaboutaradicalalterationinthecommonlawaspreviouslyunderstoodproceedsuponthelegalfictionthatthenewrule
hasnotbeenmadebytheCourtbutmerely''found'',asifithadalwaysIbeeninherentinthelaw.NordoourCourtsdistinguishbetweencaseswhichhave
arisenbefore,andthosewhichariseafter,thenewrulehasbeenannounced.Forthisreasonitissometimessaidthat''Judgemadelaw''isretrospectiveinits
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operation.InallthisourCourtshavefollowedthepracticeoftheEnglishACourts....(I)tmaynonethelessbesaidthatthereisnoruleofpositivelawwhich
wouldforbidourSupremeCourtfromdepartingfromthatpractice.'
[49]Indeed,asKentridgeAJpointedout,membersoftheJudicialCommitteeoftheHouseofLordsintheUnitedKingdomhaveacceptedthatit
maybeappropriatewhentheinterestsofjusticerequireforanewBruleoflawdevelopedbythecourtstooperateprospectivelyonly.
[50]RvGovernorofBrockhillPrison,ExparteEvans wasamatterinvolvingtheunlawfuldetentionofaprisoner.Thegovernorhad
sentencedtheprisoneronthebasisofaninterpretationofastatutewhichhadoriginallybeensupportedbythecourtsbutwhichhad
subsequentlyCbeenheldtobewrong.Itwasclearthatthegovernorwasblamelessbutthesentenceraisedquestionsastowhetherthenew
interpretationofthestatuteshouldapplyprospectivelyonly.ThemajorityoftheLawLordsheldthatonthefactsofthatcaseitwasnot
appropriatefortheinterpretationtoapplyprospectivelyonly,butallalsoacceptedthattheDdevelopmentofarulemightinappropriate
circumstancesapplyprospectively.LordSlynnofHadleyreasonedthat'theremaybedecisionsinwhichitwouldbedesirable,andinnoway
unjust,thattheeffectofjudicialrulingsshouldbeprospectiveorlimitedtocertainclaimants'.
[51]Underourconstitutionalorder,ofcourse,theremedyofprospectiveEoverrulingofalawthatisinconsistentwiththeConstitutionis
permittedbythetermsofs172(1)(b)oftheConstitution. InthiscasewearenotdealingwiththeCourt'sremedialpowersunders172asno
orderofconstitutionalinvalidityhasbeenmade.Thequestioniswhetherwhendevelopingthecommonlawitispossibletodosoprospectively
only.Inmyview,itis.Inthiscase,ifthedefinitionofrapeweretobedevelopedFretrospectivelyitwouldoffendtheconstitutionalprincipleof
legalityasIhavedemonstratedabove.Ontheotherhand,ifweweretoacceptthattheprincipleoflegalityisabartothedevelopmentofthe
commonlaw,theCourtscouldneverdevelopthecommonlawofcrimesatall.Inmyview,suchaconclusionwouldunderminetheprinciplesof
ourConstitutionGwhichrequirethecourtstoensurethatthecommonlawisinfusedwiththespirit,purportandobjectsoftheConstitution.
Theimpassecanbeavoidedbyacceptingthatinthesecircumstancesitisappropriatetodevelopthelawprospectivelyonly.Iacceptthatitis
onlyinrarecasesthatitwillbeappropriatetodevelopthecommonlawwithprospectiveeffectonly,astheLawLordssuggestedinthe
BrockhillPrisondecisionH(supra).However,inmyviewthisisoneofthosecaseswherefairnessto
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anaccusedrequiresthatthedevelopmentnotapplytohim,butonlytoAthosecaseswhichariseafterjudgmentinthismatterhasbeen
handeddown.
[52]Oneofthecentraltenetsunderlyingthecommonlawunderstandingoflegalityisthatofforeseeabilitythattherulesofcriminallaware
clearandprecisesothatanindividualmayeasilybehaveinamannerthatBavoidscommittingcrimes. Inthisregard,theamicireferredto
thedecisionoftheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsinSWvUnitedKingdom,wheretheCourtheldthat:
'Howeverclearlydraftedalegalprovisionmaybe,inanysystemoflaw,includingcriminallaw,thereisaninevitableelementofjudicialinterpretation.CThere
willalwaysbeaneedforelucidationofdoubtfulpointsandforadaptationtochangingcircumstances...providedthattheresultantdevelopmentisconsistent
withtheessenceoftheoffenceandcouldreasonablybeforeseen.'
TheCourtusedtheelementofforeseeabilityandart17oftheConvention, whichisintendedtoexcludetheabuseofanyspecificDrights
safeguardedbytheConventionforanyofthepurposessetoutinthearticle,tofindthattheaccused'sconvictionoftherapeofhiswifewas
notaninfringementoftheprincipleoflegalityascontainedinart7(1)oftheConvention. TheCourt,incomingtotheirdecision,emphasised
thedistinctionbetweenreinterpretationandclarificationofthecommonlawandthecreationofanewcommonlawoffence.ItE
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appearsthattheCourtfoundthesurpriseelemententailedbytheAretroactiveapplicationofthecommonlawtobeanunacceptablefeature
inthiscase.
[53]TheEuropeanCommissionofHumanRights,inCRvUnitedKingdom,reliedheavilyonthesubmissionthattherewasambiguityasto
whetherthemaritalimmunityofrapewaslawandsaidB
'Inthepresentcase,thetrialjudge,whenrejectingtheapplicant'ssubmissionthatmaritalimmunityapplied,doubtedtheextenttowhichitcouldeverhavebeen
permissibleunderthecommonlawforahusbandtobeathiswifeintohavingsexualintercoursewithhim.
...C
(T)heCommissionconsidersthatbyNovember1989therewassignificantdoubtastothevalidityoftheallegedmaritalimmunityforrape.AsstatedbytheCourt
ofAppealintheapplicant'scase,lipservicehadbeenpaidtotheallegedgeneralrulewhilethecourtsatthesametimeincreasedthenumberofexceptions.
ThattherewasuncertaintyastothewidthoftheexceptionsisapparentfromtheLawCommissionWorkingPaperexaminingthequestion.D
...
Whiletherewasnoexpressauthorityforthepropositionthatanimpliedagreementofseparationbetweenhusbandorwifeorunilateralwithdrawalofconsentby
thewifewouldbringacaseoutsidethemaritalimmunity,theCommissiontakestheviewthatinthepresentcasewheretheapplicant'swifehadwithdrawnfrom
cohabitationandtherewasdefactoseparationwiththeEexpressedintentionofbothtoseekadivorce,therewasabasisonwhichitcouldbeanticipatedthat
thecourtscouldholdthatthenotionalconsentofthewifewasnolongertobeimplied....(T)heCommissionconsidersthatthisadaptationintheapplicationof
theoffenceofrapewasreasonablyforeseeabletoanapplicantwithappropriatelegaladvice.' F
[54]Section35(3)(l) oftheConstitutionconfirmsalongstandingprincipleofthecommonlawthatprovidesthataccusedpersonsmaynot
beconvictedofoffenceswheretheconductforwhichtheyarechargeddidnotconstituteanoffenceatthetimeitwascommitted.Although
atfirstblushthisprovisionmightnotseemtobeimplicatedbyfindingMrMasiyaguiltyofrapeinthiscase,becausetheacthecommitteddidG
constituteanoffencebothundernationallawandinternationallawatthetimehecommittedit,inmyview,thejurisprudenceofthisCourt
wouldsuggestotherwise.
[55]InthefirstcaseinwhichtheCourtaddresseds35(3)(l)anditscounterpartinrespectofsentence,s35(3)(n),VeldmanvDirectorof H
PublicProsecutions,WitwatersrandLocalDivision theCourtheldthattheprincipleoflegalityiscentraltotheruleoflawunderour
Constitution.Thatcaseconcernedthequestionofwhether,wherethesentencingjurisdictionofacourthadbeenincreasedafteranaccused
hadpleaded,theaccusedcouldbesentencedintermsoftheincreasedjurisdiction.TheCourthelditcouldnot.TheCourtobservedthatonce
anaccusedI
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haspleaded,theconstitutionallyenshrinedprincipleoflegalityrequiresAthatthesentencingjurisdictionofacourtcannotbevariedtothe
detrimentoftheaccused,evenwhereitwasclearthattheincreasedsentencewasapermissiblesentenceforthechargeinvolved.TheCourt
heldthat:
'Toretrospectivelyapplyanewlaw,suchass92(1)(a),duringthecourseofBthetrial,andtherebytoexposeanaccusedpersontoamoreseveresentence,
underminestheruleoflawandviolatesanaccusedperson'srighttoafairtrialunders35(3)oftheConstitution.'
[56]ThestrongviewoflegalityadoptedinVeldman(supra)suggeststhatitwouldbeunfairtoconvictMrMasiyaofanoffencein
circumstancesCwheretheconductinquestiondidnotconstitutetheoffenceatthetimeofthecommission.Iconcludesodespitethefact
thathisconductisacrimethatevokesexceptionallystrongemotionsfrommanyquartersofsociety.However,adevelopmentthatisnecessary
toclarifythelawshouldnotbetothedetrimentoftheaccusedpersonconcernedunlesshewasawareofthenatureofthecriminalityofhis
act.Inthiscase,itcanDhardlybesaidthatMrMasiyawasindeedaware,foresaworoughtreasonablytohaveforeseenthathisactmight
constituterapeasthemagistrateappearstosuggest. TheparametersofthetrialwereknowntoallpartiesbeforetheCourtandthetrial
wasprosecuted,pleadedanddefendedonthosebases.ItfollowsthereforethathecannotandshouldEnotbearadverseconsequencesofthe
ambiguitycreatedbythelawasatthetimeofconviction.
[57]TheevidenceadducedatthetrialestablishedthatMrMasiyawasguiltyofindecentassault.Toconvicthimofrapewouldbeinviolationof
hisrightasenvisagedins35(3)(l)oftheConstitution.IconcludeFthereforethatthedevelopeddefinitionshouldnotapplytoMrMasiya.
[58]ThenextquestionthatcallsforconsiderationiswhetherthedeclarationofinvalidityreferredtothisCourtintermsofs172(2)(a)
shouldbeconfirmed.
Shouldthedeclarationofinvaliditybeconfirmed?G
[59]Ihaveindicatedthatthekeytothedevelopmentaldirectionofthecommonlawdefinitionofthecrimeofrapeliesinthefactsofthiscase
theallegedrapeofanineyearoldgirl.IndecidingwhethertodevelopthedefinitiontheCourtwasobligedtoconfineitselftothefactsHof
thecase.ItfollowsthereforethattheCourtcannotconfirmthedeclarationofinvaliditytotheextentthatitisbasedonconclusionsrelatingto
thegenderneutralnatureofthecrime,anissuethatdoesnotariseonthefactsofthiscase.
[60]TherelevantdeclarationofinvalidityconcernsstatutoryprovisionsIintheActandtheCPAaswellastheirrespectiveSchedulestothe
extentthattheyaregenderspecific.Havingdecidedtoextendthedefinitionof.
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rapetoincludeanalpenetrationofbothmalesandfemales,theHighACourtinconsequencemadeanorderreadingtheword'person'intothe
statutoryprovisionswhereverreferenceismadetoaspecificgender.
[61]Ihaveconcludedthatthedefinitionofrapeshouldbeextendedsoastoincludeanalpenetrationofafemale,butthatthequestionofB
nonconsensualpenetrationofthepenisintotheanusofanothermaleshouldbeleftopen.Thatbeingso,thereisnoneedforthisCourtto
addressthedeclarationofinvalidityofthestatutoryprovisionsmadebytheHighCourt.
[62]Inconclusion,IdeclinetoconfirmthedeclarationsofinvalidityinCpara3oftheorder.
Merits
[63]MrMasiyahaschallengedthedecisionoftheregionalcourtmostlyonvariousfactualgroundsandurgedthisCourttoconsiderthemerits
Doftheconviction.Ineffect,MrMasiyaisseekingleavetoappealtothisCourtonthemeritsofhisconviction.Evenifitcouldbesaidthatin
thisregardhisapplicationraisesaconstitutionalissue,whichisunlikelygiventhisCourt'sjudgmentinSvBoesak,itisnotintheinterests
ofjusticetogranthimleavetoappealdirectlytothisCourtonthisissue.EMrMasiyahasstillnotbeensentencedandoncehehasbeen,he
willhavetherighttoseekleavetoappealtotheappropriatecourtintheordinaryway.Inthatsense,hisapplicationforleavetoappealonthe
meritsispremature.Accordingly,theapplicationforleavetoappealonthemeritsofhisconvictionshouldberefused.F
[64]ImustdisposeofonefurthermatterbeforeIdealwiththerelief.Thatrelatestothequestionwhetherthemagistrates'courtshavethe
powertodevelopthecommonlaw.
Magistrates'powertodevelopthecommonlawinrespectofcrimesG
[65]Itisnecessarytoconsiderwhethermagistrates'courtshavethepowertodevelopthecommonlawtobringitinlinewiththeConstitution.
TheHighCourtheldthatthemagistrate'scourtisnotexplicitlyexcludedfrompronouncingupontheconstitutionalvalidityofcrimesatcommon
law.ItisnecessarytoconsidertheconstitutionalHjurisdictionofthesecourtsasthisCourthassofarnotconsideredthisquestion.
[66]Section8(3)oftheConstitutionobligesacourtwhenapplyingtheprovisionsoftheBillofRights,ifnecessary,todeveloprulesofthe
commonlawtolimittherights,providedthelimitationisinaccordanceIwiths36oftheConstitution.Section39(2)placesapositivedutyon
everycourttopromotethespirit,purportandobjectsoftheBillof
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NKABINDEJ
Rightswhendevelopingthecommonlaw. Intermsofs166 oftheAConstitutioncourtsinourjudicialsystemincludetheMagistrates'
Courts.However,s173explicitlyempowersonlytheConstitutionalCourt,theSupremeCourtofAppealandtheHighCourtstodevelopthe
commonlaw,takingintoaccountinterestsofjustice.Themagistrates'courtsareexcluded.B
[67]Thepowersofthemagistrates'courtsareregulatedbytheMagistrates'CourtsAct,1944. Section110ofthisActprevents
magistratesfrompronouncingonthevalidityofanylaw.Itprovidesasfollows:
'(1)AcourtshallnotbecompetenttopronounceonthevalidityofanylaworCconductofthePresident.
(2)Ifinanyproceedingsbeforeacourtitisallegedthat
(a)anylaworanyconductofthePresidentisinvalidonthegroundofitsinconsistencywithaprovisionoftheConstitution;or
(b)anylawisinvalidonanygroundotherthanitsconstitutionality,
thecourtshalldecidethematterontheassumptionthatsuchlaworconductisvalid:Dprovidedthatthepartywhichallegesthatalaworconductofthe
Presidentisinvalid,mayadduceevidenceregardingtheinvalidityofthelaworconductinquestion.'
(Emphasisadded.)E
[68]Thewordingofs110showsthatthemagistrates'courtsareunderanattenuateddutyinrelationtothedevelopmentofthecommonlaw.
Theyare,however,boundtogiveeffecttotheconstitutionalrightsasallothercourtsareboundtodointermsofs8(1)oftheConstitution.
Magistratespresidingovercriminaltrialsmust,forinstance,ensurethattheproceedingsareconductedinconformitywiththeConstitution,F
particularlythefairtrialrightsoftheaccused.
[69]Althoughmagistrates'courtsareattheheartoftheapplicationofthecommonlawonadailybasisand,inmostinstances,courtsoffirst
instanceincriminalcases,therearelegitimatereasonswhytheyarenotincludedunders173andwhytheirpowersareattenuated.
MagistratesGareconstrainedintheirabilitytodevelopcrimesatcommonlawbyvirtueofthedoctrineofprecedent.Theirpronouncementson
thevalidityofcommonlawcriminalprincipleswouldcreateafragmentedandpossiblyincoherentlegalorder.AneffectiveoperationoftheH
2007(2)SACRp464
NKABINDEJ
developmentofcommonlawcriminalprinciplesdependsonthemaintenanceAofaunifiedandcoherentlegalsystem,asystemmaintained
throughtherecogniseddoctrineofstaredecisis whichisaimedatavoidinguncertaintyandconfusion,protectingvestedrightsand
legitimateexpectationsofindividuals,andupholdingthedignityofthejudicialsystem. Moreover,andcontrarytotheviewheldbytheB
magistrateinhisjudgment, theredoesnotseemtobeanyconstitutionalorlegislativemandateforallcasesinwhichamagistratemightsee
fittodevelopthecommonlawinlinewiththeConstitutiontobereferredtohighercourtsforconfirmation.Suchareferralmightmitigatethe
disadvantageousfactorsdiscussedabove.ThesuggestionbytheCHighCourtthatmagistratesareempoweredtovarytheelementsofcrimes
inthelightoftheConstitutionwas,tomymind,incorrect.
Relief
[70]Section172(1)(b) oftheConstitutionconfersadiscretiononthisCourttomakeanyorderthatisjustandequitable.Havingfoundthat
theDcommonlawdefinitionofrapeisnotconstitutionallyinvalidbutmerelyfallsshortofthespirit,purportandobjectsoftheBillofRights,
thedeclarationofinvalidityofthedefinitionofrapeshouldthereforebesetasideandreplacedwithanappropriateorder.Assetoutearlier,the
developmentislimitedtoaninclusionofnonconsensualpenetrationofEthemalepenisintotheanusofafemalepersoninthedefinition.
Forthereasonssetoutabove,Ideclinetoconfirmthedeclarationofconstitutionalinvalidityofthestatutoryprovisionsandtherelevant
SchedulesoftheActandtheCPA.Thedeclarationofinvalidityshouldthereforebesetaside.Itfollowsthattheordersinparas[3]and[4]of
theHighCourtorder shouldalsobesetaside.F
[71]HavingfoundthatthedevelopeddefinitioncannotapplytoMrMasiya,itcannottherefore,onthefactsbeforeus,besaidthathis
convictionisinaccordancewithjustice.Theconvictionofrapeshould,onthefacts,bereplacedwithaconvictionofindecentassault.The
orderoftheHighCourtinpara[5]cannotthereforestand.TheappealagainstGtheconvictionofrapeshouldthereforebeupheld.
[72]Havingsubstitutedtheconvictionofrapewiththatofindecentassault,itisnecessarytoremitthemattertotheregionalcourttoimpose
appropriatepunishment.ItneedsbesaidthattheoffenceofindecentHassaultisegregious.MrMasiyaassaultedanineyearoldchild.The
offencearousespublicindignation.Theregionalcourtisobliged,whenconsideringanappropriatepunishment,toapplyitsmindtothenature
2007(2)SACRp465
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andgravityoftheoffenceofwhichMrMasiyahasbeenconvictedandAnotmerelylookatthelegaldefinitionthereof.Thefactthathehas
beenconvictedofindecentassaultdoesnotautomaticallymeanthatthesentencetobeimposeduponhimshouldbemorelenientthanifhe
hadbeenconvictedofrape.
[73]TheassistancetheCourthasreceivedfromallcounselinthismatterBisappreciated.
Order
[74]Intheresult,thefollowingorderismade:
1.TheapplicationforleavetoappealagainstthedeclarationsofCinvalidityandtheorderandjudgmentoftheHighCourtconfirmingthe
convictionofMrMasiyaofrapeisgranted.
2.Theapplicationforleavetoappealagainsttheconvictiononthemeritsisdismissed.
3.TheorderoftheHighCourtissetasideinitsentirety.D
4.TheorderoftheregionalcourtreferringthecriminalproceedingstotheHighCourtforpurposesofsentenceintermsofs52(1)(b)(i)ofthe
CriminalLawAmendmentAct105of1997,issetaside.
5.Thecommonlawdefinitionofrapeisextendedtoincludeactsofnonconsensualpenetrationofapenisintotheanusofafemale.E
6.Thedevelopmentofthecommonlawreferredtoinpara5aboveshallbeapplicableonlytoconductwhichtakesplaceafterthedateof
judgmentinthismatter.
7.TheconvictionofMrMasiyabytheregionalcourtofrapeissetasideandreplacedwithaconvictionofindecentassault.
8.ThecaseisremittedtotheregionalcourtforMrMasiyatobeFsentencedinthelightofthisjudgment.
MosenekeDCJ,KondileJ,MadalaJ,MokgoroJ,O'ReganJ,VanderWesthuizenJ,YacoobJandVanHeerdenAJconcurred.G
Judgment
LangaCJ:
Introduction
[75]IhavehadtheopportunityofreadingandreflectingontheHjudgmentofNkabindeJ.Iagreewithherthatthedefinitionfallsshortofthe
spirit,purportandobjectsenshrinedintheBillofRights.Iassociatemyselfparticularlywithhereloquentexpositionofthepatriarchaloriginof
thedefinitionaswellasforplacingitintheparticularcontextofSouthAfricatoday.Ialsoagreewithherfindingsonlegalityandtheroleofthe
magistrates'courts.However,IbelievethatthedevelopmentsheproposesImustbetakenfurthersothatitincludestheanalrapeofmen.
[76]BeforeIaddressthatpoint,Iwouldliketoaddthat,whilethereisforcetoNkabindeJ'sviewthatthedefinitionofrapedoesnotdirectly
violatetheConstitution,Iprefernottoexpressanopiniononthematter,as,ontheapproachItake,itisunnecessarytodoso.J
2007(2)SACRp466
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WhatiswrongwiththecommonlawA
[77]Inordertodeterminehowthecommonlawshouldbedeveloped,itisnecessarytodeterminepreciselywhatiswrongwiththecurrent
position.Tomymindtheproblemisnotaboutmalesandfemales;itisaboutalteringourunderstandingofwhyrapeisprohibited.Therearetwo
elementstothis:firstthatrapeisaboutdignityandpowerBandsecond,thatanalrapeisequivalenttovaginalrape.
[78]AsexpressedinthejudgmentofNkabindeJ,thehistoricalreasonwhyrapewascriminalisedwastoprotecttheproprietaryrightsofmenin
women.However,overtheyearsthecourtshavegraduallyfocusedlessontheproprietaryinterestsandmoreonthesexualnatureofthe
crime.CTodayrapeisrecognisedasbeinglessaboutsexandmoreabouttheexpressionofpowerthroughdegradationandtheconcurrent
violationofthevictim'sdignity,bodilyintegrityandprivacy.InthewordsoftheInternationalCriminalTribunalforRwanda the'essenceofrape
isnottheparticulardetailsofthebodypartsandobjectsinvolved,butratherDtheaggressionthatisexpressedinasexualmannerunder
conditionsofcoercion'.
[79]Coupledwiththisapproachtorapeistherecognitionthatanalpenetrationisassevereanattackonaperson'sdignity,bodilyintegrityand
privacyasvaginalpenetration.Thereisalineofcaselaw thatEequates'thegrosshumiliationandindignity' ofanalrapeandvaginalrape.
TousethewordsofNkabindeJ:
'Itcanhardlybesaidthatnonconsensualanalpenetrationofmalesislessdegrading,humiliatingandtraumaticand,toborrowthephrasebyBrownmiller,''a
lesserviolationofthepersonalprivateinnerspace,alesserinjurytomind,Fspiritandsenseofself''.'
(Footnoteomitted.)
[80]NkabindeJ'sdecisiontoextendthedefinitionofrapeisbasedonpreciselythesetwoimperatives.MyonlypointofdisagreementisthatI
findthattheinescapableconclusionoftheseimperativesisthattheanalGpenetrationofamaleshouldbetreatedinthesamemannerasthat
ofafemale.Inmyview,todootherwisefailstogivefulleffecttotheconstitutionalvaluesofdignity,equalityandfreedom:dignitythrough
recognitionofaviolation;equalitythroughequalrecognitionofthatviolation;andfreedomasrapenegatesnotonlydignity,but
bodilyautonomy.AlltheseconcernsapplyequallytomenandwomenandHnecessitateadefinitionthatisgenderneutralconcerningvictims.
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LANGACJ
[81]NkabindeJgivesthreereasonswhythisCourtshouldnotextendAthedefinitiontomalesurvivorsinthisparticularcase.First,courts
shouldbewarytoextendthereachofcrimes.Second,womenremaintheprimaryvictimsofrapewhichentailsthatraperemains,andmustbe
identifiedas,anexerciseofmalesupremacy.Third,sheholdsthatthisCourtshouldrestrictitselftothefactsbeforeit,namelytheanalB
penetrationofafemale.TotreadbeyondthiswouldexceedtheJudiciary'slimitedconstitutionalrole.Whilethereismuchtobesaidforthese
concerns,Iremainunconvincedthatinthiscasesuchrestraintiswarranted.
ExtendingthereachofcrimesC
[82]AswasnotedinSvJordan,courtsshouldnotlightlycriminaliseconductthatwasnotpreviouslycriminal.But,asisclearfromthe
majority'sextensionofthedefinitiontofemaleanalpenetration,thatconcernshouldnotpreventcourtsfromgivingeffecttotherightsand
valuesoftheConstitution.TheonlydifferencebetweenmyjudgmentDandthatofthemajorityiswhatthoserightsandvaluesdemand.
[83]Inaddition,thisisnottrulyanextension.Nonconsensualanalpenetrationofmenalreadyconstitutesthecriminaloffenceofindecent
assault.Thereisnoquestion,astheremayhavebeeninJordan(supra),ofcriminalisationordecriminalisation;theactwasalready,andwillE
remaincriminalised.Thisjudgmentsimplyrecategorisesit.
Womenastheprimarytargetofrape
[84]Womenhavealwaysbeenandremaintheprimarytargetofrape.ThatisnotafactthatthisCourtcanorshouldignore.Norcanwedeny
Fthatmaledominationofwomenisanunderlyingcauseofrape.Buttomymindthatdoesnotmeanthatmenmustbeexcludedfromthe
definition.Firstly,aswasnotedabove,thiscasegoestotheveryreasonfortheexistenceofrapeasacrime.TotheextentthatNkabindeJ
concludesthatthe'objectofthecriminalisationof[rape]istoprotectthedignity,sexualautonomyandprivacyofwomenandyounggirlsas
being Ggenerallythemostvulnerablegroup', Ipartways.Tomymindthecriminalisationofrapeisaboutprotectingthe'dignity,sexual
autonomyandprivacy'ofallpeople,irrespectiveoftheirsexorgender.Whenconsideringtheboundariesofthedefinitionofrape,theICTYheld
that'(t)heessenceofthewholecorpusof...humanrightslawliesintheHprotectionofthehumandignityofeveryperson,whateverhisor
hergender.' Iagree.
[85]Secondly,thereisnoreasontobelievethatincludingmeninthedefinitionwillinanywaydecreasetheprotectionaffordedtowomen.I
2007(2)SACRp468
LANGACJ
Indeed,limitingthedefinitiontofemalesurvivorsmightwellentrenchAthevulnerablepositionofwomeninsocietybyperpetuatingthe
stereotypethatwomenarevulnerable,whichinturnenforcesthedangerouscycleofabuseanddegradationthathashistoricallyledtoplacing
womeninthisintolerableposition.Theunintendedeffectistoenforcethesubordinatesocialpositionofwomenwhichinformedthevery
patriarchyBwearecommittedtouproot.Thesocialrealityofwomencannotbeignored,butweshouldbewarynottoworsenit.
[86]Thirdly,thegroupsofmenwhoaremostoftenthesurvivorsofrape,youngboys,prisonersandhomosexuals,are,likewomen,alsoC
vulnerablegroupsinoursociety.Moreover,they,andmostothermalevictims,arerapedpreciselybecauseofthegenderednatureofthecrime.
Theyaredominatedinthesamemannerandforthesamereasonthatwomenaredominated;becauseofaneedformalegendersupremacy.
ThattheylackavaginadoesnotmakethecrimeofmalerapeanyDlessgenderbased.Thegenderedbasisofrape,rightlyidentifiedby
NkabindeJ,requiresthatmalevictimsaregivenequalratherthanlesserprotection.
[87]Finally,theextensiontomalesurvivorsisinlinewithbothrecentforeignexperience,asNkabindeJnotes, andinternationalcriminaland
Ehumanitarianlaw.TheInternationalCriminalTribunalforRwanda (ICTR)andtheInternationalCriminalTribunalfortheFormerYugoslavia
(ICTY)havebothdefinedrapeasincludingmaleanalpenetration.TheElementsofCrimesoftheInternationalCriminalCourt(ICC) also
includemaleanalpenetrationunderthedefinitionofFrape. Indeed,theseinternationalbodieshaveextendedthedefinitionofrapefar
beyondwhatissuggestedinthisjudgment. G
2007(2)SACRp469
LANGACJ
[88]ForallthesereasonsIdonotbelievethatlimitingtheextensionofArapetotheanalpenetrationofwomenisinlinewiththespirit,
purportandobjectsoftheBillofRights.
Judicialrestraintandtheseparationofpowers
[89]TherecanbenodoubtthattheseparationofpowersisavitalBprincipleofdemocracyandthatunduejudicialactivismthreatensthe
separationofpowers.However,inthiscasetheseparationofpowersdoesnotseemrelevantforanumberofreasons.
[90]Firstly,althoughtheparticularsurvivorinthiscasewasafemale,thecaseisnotaboutthesexofthevictimbutaboutgenderandhow
weCunderstandrape.ExtendingthedefinitiontomalesurvivorsthereforegoesnofurtherthanisabsolutelynecessarytocurethedefectI
havefoundinthecommonlaw.Evenifthismaybeaslightdeparturefromthefactsofthecase,itisnotunusualforthisCourttogiveorders,
eitherwhendevelopingthecommonlaw ordeterminingthevalidityofDstatutes, thatgobeyondtheexactfactsbutarenecessitatedby
theunderlyingconstitutionalprinciplesinvolved.
[91]Secondly,whileithasonlylimitedrelevance,theoriginalCriminalLaw(SexualOffences)AmendmentBill andtheRevisedBill currently
beforetheLegislaturearealsoneutralastothevictimofthecrime.EInaddition,nothingpreventstheLegislaturefromenactinganew
definitionofrapesubsequenttothisextension. AnyinfringementontheterrainoftheLegislatureisthusminimal.
[92]Finally,IcanseenoreasonwhythegeneralprincipleofourlawthatFconstitutionalremediesshouldgivereliefnotonlytotheparticular
2007(2)SACRp470
LANGACJ
litigantbuttoallthosesimilarlysituated, shouldnotapplyequallytoAthedevelopmentofthecommonlaw.Thedevelopmentacourt
selectsmustgiverelieftoallthosewhofindthemselvesinasimilarposition.Inmymind,aboywhoisrapedunderthesamecircumstancesas
thesurvivorinthiscaseisinthesamepositionandisentitledtothesamerelief.Thatcannothappenunlessthedefinitionisextendedto
includeBmaleanalpenetration.
[93]ItfollowsthatIwouldconfirmthedecisionoftheHighCourttodevelopthecommonlawdefinitionofrapetoincludethenonconsensual
sexualpenetrationofthemalepenisintothevaginaoranusofanotherperson.C
SachsJconcurredinthejudgmentofLangaCJ.
SecondRespondent'sAttorneys:StateAttorney,Pretoria.D
1Section172(2)(a)provides:
'TheSupremeCourtofAppeal,aHighCourtoracourtofsimilarstatusmaymakeanorderconcerningtheconstitutionalvalidityofanActofParliament,a
provincialActoranyconductofthePresident,butanorderofconstitutionalinvalidityhasnoforceunlessitisconfirmedbytheConstitutionalCourt.'Seealsos
167(5)oftheConstitutionwhichprovides:
'TheConstitutionalCourtmakesthefinaldecisionwhetheranActofParliament,aprovincialActorconductofthePresidentisconstitutional,andmustconfirm
anyorderofinvaliditymadebytheSupremeCourtofAppeal,aHighCourt,oracourtofsimilarstatus,beforethatorderhasanyforce.'
2Intermsofs172(2)(d)oftheConstitution.Thesectionreads:
'Anyperson...withasufficientinterestmayappeal,orapply,directlytotheConstitutionalCourttoconfirmorvaryanorderofconstitutionalinvaliditybya
courtintermsofthissubsection.'
3SvMasiya(MinisterofJusticeandConstitutionalDevelopmentIntervening)2006(2)SACR357(T)(2006(11)BCLR1377).
4SvMasiyacaseNoSHG94/04,11July2005,unreported.
*SvMasiya(MinisterofJusticeandConstitutionalDevelopmentIntervening)2006(2)SACR357(T)(2006(11)BCLR1377)at380j381d(SACR)Eds.
**TheCriminalLawAmendmentAct105of1997Eds.
5Act51of1977.
6Act105of1977.
7Section261oftheCPAprovides:
'(1)Iftheevidenceonachargeofrapeorattemptedrapedoesnotprovetheoffenceofrapeor,asthecasemaybe,attemptedrape,but
...
(b)theoffenceofindecentassault;...theaccusedmaybefoundguiltyoftheoffencesoproved.'
8Aboven4atpara[43].
9Section8(3)provides:
'WhenapplyingaprovisionoftheBillofRightstoanaturalorjuristicpersonintermsofss(2),acourt
(a)inordertogiveeffecttoarightintheBill,mustapply,orifnecessarydevelop,thecommonlawtotheextentthatlegislationdoesnotgiveeffecttothat
right;and
(b)maydeveloprulesofcommonlawtolimittheright,providedthatthelimitationisinaccordancewiths36(1).'
10Section39(2)provides:
'Wheninterpretinganylegislation,andwhendevelopingthecommonlaworcustomarylaw,everycourt,tribunalorforummustpromotethespirit,purportand
objectsoftheBillofRights.'
11Aboven4atpara[17].
12BillB502003.
13Section35(3)(n)provides:
'Everyaccusedpersonhasarighttoafairtrial,whichincludestheright
...
14Aboven4atpara[45].
15Section52oftheActprovides:
'(1)Ifaregionalcourt,followingon
(a)apleaofguilty;or
(b)apleaofnotguilty,
hasconvictedanaccusedofanoffencereferredtoin
(i)PartIofSchedule2;or
(ii)PartII,IIIorIVofSchedule2andthecourtisoftheopinionthattheoffenceconcernedmeritspunishmentinexcessofthejurisdictionofaregionalcourt
intermsofs51(2),
thecourtshallstoptheproceedingsandcommittheaccusedforsentenceascontemplatedins51(1)or(2),asthecasemaybe,byaHighCourthaving
jurisdiction.
(2)(a)Whereanaccusediscommittedunderss(1)(a)forsentencebyaHighCourt,therecordoftheproceedingsintheregionalcourtshalluponproof
thereofintheHighCourtbereceivedbytheHighCourtandformpartoftherecordofthatCourt,andthepleaofguiltyandanyadmissionbytheaccusedshall
standunlesstheaccusedsatisfiestheCourtthatsuchpleaorsuchadmissionwasincorrectlyrecorded.
(b)UnlesstheHighCourtinquestion
(i)issatisfiedthatapleaofguiltyoranadmissionbytheaccusedwhichismaterialtohisorherguiltwasincorrectlyrecorded;or
(ii)isnotsatisfiedthattheaccusedisguiltyoftheoffenceofwhichheorshehasbeenconvictedandinrespectofwhichheorshehasbeencommittedfor
sentence,
theCourtshallmakeaformalfindingofguiltyandsentencetheaccusedascontemplatedins51(1)or(2),asthecasemaybe.
(c)IftheCourt
(i)issatisfiedthatapleaofguiltyoranyadmissionbytheaccusedwhichismaterialtohisorherguiltwasincorrectlyrecorded;or
(ii)isnotsatisfiedthattheaccusedisguiltyoftheoffenceofwhichheorshehasbeenconvictedandinrespectofwhichheorshehasbeencommittedfor
sentenceorthatheorshehasnovaliddefencetothecharge,
theCourtshallenterapleaofnotguiltyandproceedwiththetrialasasummarytrialinthatCourt:Providedthatanyadmissionbytheaccusedtherecording
ofwhichisnotdisputedbytheaccused,shallstandasproofofthefactthusadmitted.
(d)Theprovisionsofs112(3)oftheCriminalProcedureAct51of1977,shallapplywithreferencetotheproceedingsunderthissubsection.
(3)(a)Whereanaccusediscommittedunderss(1)(b)forsentencebyaHighCourt,therecordoftheproceedingsintheregionalcourtshalluponproof
thereofintheHighCourtbereceivedbytheHighCourtandformpartoftherecordofthatCourt.
(b)TheHighCourtshall,afterconsideringtherecordoftheproceedingsintheregionalcourt,sentencetheaccusedascontemplatedins51(1)or(2),asthe
casemaybe,andthejudgmentoftheregionalcourtshallstandforthispurposeandbesufficientfortheHighCourttopasssuchsentence:providedthatifthe
judgeisoftheopinionthattheproceedingsarenotinaccordancewithjusticeordoubtexistswhethertheproceedingsareinaccordancewithjustice,heorshe
shall,withoutsentencingtheaccused,obtainfromtheregionalmagistratewhopresidedatthetrialastatementsettingforthhisorherreasonsforconvictingthe
accused.
...
(d)TheCourtinquestionmayatanysittingthereofhearanyevidenceandforthatpurposesummonanypersontoappeartogiveevidenceortoproduce
anydocumentorotherarticle.
(e)SuchCourt,whetherornotithasheardevidenceandafterithasobtainedandconsideredastatementreferredtoinpara(b),may
(i)confirmtheconvictionandthereuponimposeasentenceascontemplatedins51(1)or(2),asthecasemaybe;
(ii)altertheconvictiontoaconvictionofanotheroffencereferredtoinSchedule2andthereuponimposeasentenceascontemplatedins51(1)or(2),as
thecasemaybe;
(iii)altertheconvictiontoaconvictionofanoffenceotherthananoffencereferredtoinSchedule2andthereuponimposethesentencetheCourtmaydeem
fit;
(iv)setasidetheconviction;
(v)remitthecasetotheregionalcourtwithinstructiontodealwithanymatterinsuchmannerastheHighCourtmaydeemfit;or
(vi)makeanysuchorderinregardtoanymatterorthingconnectedwithsuchpersonortheproceedingsinregardtosuchpersonastheHighCourtdeems
likelytopromotetheendsofjustice.'
16PartIofSchedule2states:
'Rape
...
(b)wherethevictim
(i)isagirlundertheageof16years;
(ii)isaphysicallydisabledwomanwho,duetoherphysicaldisability,isrenderedparticularlyvulnerable;or
(iii)isamentallyillwomanascontemplatedins1oftheMentalHealthAct18of1973
....'
17Aboven3atpara[55].
18Section8(1)providesthat'(t)heBillofRightsappliestoalllaw,andbindstheLegislature,theExecutive,theJudiciaryandallorgansofState'.
19Aboven10.
20Belown31.
21Section170provides:
'Magistrates'courtsandallothercourtsmaydecideanymatterdeterminedbyanActofParliament,butacourtofastatuslowerthanaHighCourtmaynot
enquireintoorruleontheconstitutionalityofanylegislationoranyconductofthePresident.'
22Section172(1)provides:
'Whendecidingaconstitutionalmatterwithinitspower,acourt
(a)mustdeclarethatanylaworconductthatisinconsistentwiththeConstitutionisinvalidtotheextentofitsinconsistency;and
(b)maymakeanyorderthatisjustandequitable,including
(i)anorderlimitingtheretrospectiveeffectofthedeclarationofinvalidity;and
(ii)anordersuspendingthedeclarationofinvalidityforanyperiodandonanyconditions,toallowthecompetentauthoritytocorrectthedefect.'
23Aboven1.
24Section173provides:
'TheConstitutionalCourt,SupremeCourtofAppealandHighCourtshavetheinherentpowertoprotectandregulatetheirownprocess,andtodevelopthe
commonlaw,takingintoaccounttheinterestsofjustice.'
25Aboven3atpara[60].(At375bdEds.).
26 Idatpara[71].(At378hEds.).
27 Idatpara[73].(At379efEds.).
28Abven1.
29SeeAmodvMultilateralMotorVehicleAccidentsFund1998(4)SA753(CC)(1998(10)BCLR1207)atpara[33].SeealsoFourieandAnothervMinisterof
HomeAffairsandAnother2003(5)SA301(CC)(2003(10)BCLR1092)atpara[12].
30Astheultimatecompetentauthorityinmattersofcommonlawdevelopmentandprecedentwhereconstitutionalmattersarenotraised.
31Section10providesthat'(e)veryonehasinherentdignityandtherighttohavetheirdignityrespectedandprotected'.
32Section9(1)providesthat'(e)veryoneisequalbeforethelawandhastherighttoequalprotectionandbenefitofthelaw'.
33Section12provides:
'(1)Everyonehastherighttofreedomandsecurityofperson,whichincludestheright
(a)nottobedeprivedoffreedomarbitrarilyorwithoutjustcause;
...
(c)tobefreefromallformsofviolencefromeitherthepublicorprivatesources;
....
(2)Everyonehastherighttobodilyandpsychologicalintegrity,whichincludestheright
...
(b)tosecurityinandcontrolovertheirbody.'
34Section28(1)(d)provides:
'Everychildhastheright
...
tobeprotectedfrom...abuseordegradation.'
35Section35(3)provides:
'Everyaccusedpersonhasarighttoafairtrial,whichincludestheright
...
(l)nottobeconvictedforanactoromissionthatwasnotanoffenceundereithernationalorinternationallawatthetimeitwascommittedoromitted;
...
(n)tothebenefitoftheleastsevereoftheprescribedpunishmentsiftheprescribedpunishmentfortheoffencehasbeenchangedbetweenthetimethatthe
offencewascommittedandthetimeofsentencing.'
36 NationalPoliceServiceUnionandOthersvMinisterofSafetyandSecurityandOthers2000(4)SA1110(CC)(2001(8)BCLR775)atpara[5];Ingledewv
FinancialServicesBoard:InreFinancialServicesBoardvVanderMerweandAnother2003(4)SA584(CC)(2003(8)BCLR825)atpara[31];SvBoesak2001
(1)SACR1(CC)(2001(1)SA912;2001(1)BCLR36)atpara[12].
37SeeSimpsonCassell'sNewCompactLatinEnglishEnglishLatinDictionary(Cassel&CoLtd,London1963)at18990.
38 SvNcanywa1992(1)SACR209(Ck)(1992(2)SA182)at185EG(SA)citingDeWetandSwanepoelStrafreg3ed(Butterworths,Durban1975)242and
VoetCommentariusadPandectas48.6.4,VanderKeesselPraelectionesadJusCriminale(1809)46.6.7(BeinartandVanWarmelo'stranslation(1972)883).Voet
andVanderKeesseltreatedrapeasaspeciesofpublicviolence(vispublicae).
39SeeHiemstra&ConinTrilingualLegalDictionary2ed(Juta,CapeTown1986).
40Kaganas&Murray'RapeinmarriageConjugalRightsorCriminalWrong?'1983ActaJuridica125at126.
41 Id.
42IntermsofSouthAfricanlawviolenceisnotanelementofthecrimeofrape.
43 Ncanywaaboven38at185GI.Stuprumviolentum,translatedasmeaning'rape'byHiemstra&Coninaboven39,wasdistinguishedasaformofseduction
againstthewillofawoman.Itwasregardedascloselyrelatedtoviolentraptusandpunishedassuch.ItwouldseemthattheRomanDutchauthoritiestreated
theactusreusofrapeasaformofstuprumbeingoneofawholegroupofoffencesbasedonillicitsexualintercourse.Stuprumwasregardedasseductionor
coitionwithwomenofcertainclassesbutmarriedwomenandprostituteswereexcluded.SeealsoBurchell&MiltonPrinciplesofCriminalLaw3ed(Juta,Cape
Town2000)702.
44 Burchell&Miltonaboven43at703.
45TheConstitutionrecognisescustomarylawandenjoinsthecourts,ins211(3)to'applycustomarylawwhenthatlawisapplicable,subjecttotheConstitution
andanylegislationthatspecificallydealswithcustomarylaw'.
46MönnigThePedi(JLvanSchaikLtd,Pretoria1967)320suggeststhatawomanwouldhaveanactionforrapeifassistedbyherhusband.Eventhoughone
cannotassumethatallthesystemsofindigenouslawinSouthAfricaareuniform,seduction,accordingtoSeymour,istheprimaryoffencedealingwithsexual
violence.SeymourNativeLawinSouthAfrica(JutaandCoLtd,CapeTownandJohannesburg1960)at228.
47MyburghandPrinslooIndigenousPublicLawinKwaNdebele(JLvanSchaik(Pty)Ltd,Pretoria1985)at1012.
48Milton'Redefiningthecrimeofrape:TheLawCommission'sproposals'(1999)12SACJ364at366.
49SeeDawoodandAnothervMinisterofHomeAffairsandOthers;ShalabiandAnothervMinisterofHomeAffairsandOthers;ThomasandAnothervMinisterof
HomeAffairsandOthers2000(3)SA936(CC)(2000(8)BCLR837)atpara[35].(At962C(SA)Eds.)Someprotagonistsofwomen'srights,however,argue
thatthefocusonthewomanonlyasthevictimofrapestillperpetuatespatriarchalinterestsincontrollingawoman'ssexuality.Itisnotnecessarytoconsider
thatargumentforthepurposeofthepresentcase.
50Aboven38.(At186AB(SA)Eds.).
51 Idat186AB.SeealsoRvK1958(3)SA420(A)at423BCandtheremarksbyWesselsCJregardingtheelementofconsentinRvMosagoand
Another1935AD32at34.
522006(2)SACR191(W)(2006(7)BCLR790)at828E(BCLR).
53 Id828FG.(At205ef(SACR)Eds.)TheCourtstatedthat'(t)heelementofintentionisvitalbecauserapecanonlybecommittedintentionally.Aprinciple
ofourcriminaljusticesystemisexpressedinthemaximactusnonfacitreumnisimenssitreatheactisnotwrongfulunlessthemindisguilty.'
54Aboven43at699and705.
55SnymanCriminalLaw4ed(Butterworths,Durban2002)at445.
56 Idat446.SeealsoBurchellandMiltonaboven43at706.
57 NationalCoalitionforGayandLesbianEqualityandAnothervMinisterofJusticeandOthers1998(2)SACR556(CC)(1999(1)SA6;1998(12)BCLR1517).
58Aboven33.
59Aboven31.
60Aboven32.
61Section5ofthePreventionofFamilyViolenceAct133of1993.
62Section1oftheLawofEvidenceandtheCriminalProcedureAmendmentAct103of1987.
63Abolitionofthecautionaryrule.SeeSvJackson1998(1)SACR470(SCA)(1998(2)SA984;1998(4)BCLR424;[1998]2AllSA267)at476ef(SACR).
64 CarmichelevMinisterofSafetyandSecurityandAnother(CentreforAppliedLegalStudiesIntervening)2002(1)SACR79(CC)(2001(4)SA938;2001(10)
BCLR995)atpara[81].
65Albertynetal'Women'sfreedomandsecurityoftheperson'inAlbertynandBonthuysGender,JusticeandEquality(Juta,CapeTown1996)ch9at26quoting
BrownmillerAgainstOurWill:Men,WomenandRape(1975)at378.
66 DuPlessisandOthersvDeKlerkandAnother1996(3)SA850(CC)(1996(5)BCLR658)atpara[61].
671996(1)SA984(CC)(1996(1)BCLR1)atpara[183].
68CasesinwhichthisCourthasdecidedonthevalidityoflegislativeprovisionsandthereforebeenatlibertytoprovidereliefbeyondthefactsofthecase
include:MabasovLawSociety,NorthernProvinces,andAnother2005(2)SA117(CC)(2005(2)BCLR129)andMohlomivMinisterofDefence1997(1)SA124
(CC)(1996(12)BCLR1559).
69Aboven64.
70 Idatpara[36].
71(1992)8CRR(2d)173([1991]3SCR654),ascitedbyKentridgeAJinDuPlessisaboven66.
72 Carmicheleaboven64atpara[36]citingDuPlessisaboven66atpara[61](at886CD(SA)Eds).
73 Id.(At955ABEds.).
74OnthedevelopmentofthecommonlawseeSvThebusandAnother2003(2)SACR319(CC)(2003(6)SA505;2003(10)BCLR1100)atparas[28][31].
75Aboven3atpara[71].
761995(2)SACR277(CC)(1995(3)SA867;1995(7)BCLR793)atpara[59]inwhichKentridgeAJstatedthat'Iwouldlayitdownasageneralprinciplethat
whereitispossibletodecideanycase,civilorcriminal,withoutreachingaconstitutionalissue,thatisthecoursewhichshouldbefollowed'.
77SeeinthisregardSvJordanandOthers(SexWorkersEducationandAdvocacyTaskForceandOthersasAmiciCuriae)2002(2)SACR499(CC)(2002(6)
SA642;2002(11)BCLR1117)atpara[45].TheremarksareechoedbySnymanaboven55at48:
'Acourtisnotfreetoextendthedefinitionorfieldofapplicationofacommonlawcrimebymeansofawideinterpretationoftherequirementsforthecrime.'
78SeeSvChapman1997(2)SACR3(A)(1997(3)SA341)at344I345B(SA).ThisCourthassaidinSvBaloyi(MinisterofJusticeandAnotherIntervening)
2000(1)SACR81(CC)(2000(2)SA425;2000(1)BCLR86)atpara[12]thatrape,likedomesticviolence,is'systemic,pervasiveandoverwhelminglygender
specific...[and]reflectsandreinforcespatriarchaldomination,anddoessoinaparticularlybrutalform'.
79UnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyResolution48/104of1993,20December1993.
80Aboven12.
81Forinstance,intheUnitedKingdom,theCriminalJusticeandPublicOrderAct1994acknowledgedthatamancouldbeavictimofrapeandthedefinitionof
theactusreuswasamendedtocovervaginaloranalintercourseagainstawomanoranothermanwithouthisorherconsent.In2003acompleteoverhaulof
therapelegislationresultedintheSexualOffencesAct2003whichdefinestheactusreusofrapeaspenilepenetrationofthevagina,anus,ormouthofanother
personwithouthisorherconsent.InCanadarapewashistoricallydefinedintheCriminalCodeofCanadaaswhenamalehassexualintercoursewithafemale
whoisnothiswifewithoutherconsent,orwhenherconsentisexhortedbythreatorfearofbodilyharm,byimpersonatingherhusbandorbyfalseand
fraudulentrepresentationsastothenatureoftheact.In1983theoffencesofrapeandindecentassaultwereconflatedandredefinedassexualassaults.The
offencesaregenderneutralandaconsentprovisionappliestoallsexualandnonsexualtypesofassaults.'Sexualassault'wasdefinedbytheSupremeCourtof
Canadaas'anassault...whichiscommittedincircumstancesofasexualnature,suchthatthesexualintegrityofthevictimisviolated'.RvChase[1987]2
SCR293atpara[11].Thetesttobeappliedindeterminingwhethertheimpugnedconducthastherequisitesexualnatureisanobjectiveoneviewedinthe
lightofallcircumstances,isthesexualorcarnalcontextoftheassaultvisibletoareasonableobserver?InAustralia,muchlikeintheUnitedKingdom,the
definitionofrapehasevolvedsignificantlyoverthepastcoupleofdecades.Oral,vaginalandanalintercoursesarealldeemedbytheCrimesActtobesexual
intercourse.
82FormerlyreferredtoastheSouthAfricanLawCommission.
83SouthAfricanLawCommissionProject108:SexualOffencesAgainstChildrenIssuePaper10(1997);Project107:SexualOffences:TheSubstantiveLaw
DiscussionPaper85(1999);Project107:ProcessandProcedureDiscussionPaper102(2002),Project107:SexualOffencesReport(2002).
84Aboven12.
85Dated10October2006.
86 Ncanywaaboven38at186A.
87Aboven66atpara[65].
88 Id,citingJonesvSecretaryofStateforSocialServices;HudsonvSecretaryofStateforSocialServices[1972]AC944(HL)at1015(perLordDiplock)and
1026(perLordSimon).SeealsothelaterdecisionofRvGovernorofBrockhillPrison,ExparteEvans(No2)[2001]2AC19(HL(E)).
89 Id.
90 Idat26.SeealsoLordSteynat29,LordHopeat3537andLordHobhouseat4748.SeealsoRoyalBankofScotlandplcvEtridge(No2)[2002]2AC773
(HL(E)).
91Aboven22.
92Section39(2)oftheConstitution.
93 Snymanaboven55at41.
94 SWvUnitedKingdom;CRvUnitedKingdom(1995)21EHRR363atpara[36/34]at399.TheapplicantinSW,aUnitedKingdomcitizen,waschargedand
convictedwiththeoffenceofrapinghiswife.HisconvictionwasconfirmedbytheHouseofLords.HesubsequentlyreferredacomplainttotheEuropean
CommissionofHumanRights,wherehecomplainedthatinbreachofArticle7(1)oftheEuropeanConventionfortheProtectionofHumanRightsand
FundamentalFreedomshewasconvictedinrespectofconductwhichattherelevanttimedidnotconstituteanoffence,breachingtheprincipleoflegality.The
casewasultimatelydecideduponbytheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsinfavouroftheUnitedKingdom,unanimouslyholdingthattherehadbeennoviolation
ofArticle7(1)oftheConvention.ThefactualcircumstancesinCR(supra)concernedacaseofmaritalrape,wherethewifehadleftthehusbandandhad
returnedtoherparents'home.Thehusbandforcedhiswayintothehome,assaultedandattemptedtohavesexualintercoursewithheragainstherwill.Hewas
chargedwithattemptedrapeandassaultoccasioningactualbodilyharm.HepleadedguiltyandsubsequentlyunsuccessfullyappealedtotheHouseofLords.The
applicantthenreferredacomplainttotheEuropeanCommissionofHumanRights.TheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsdecidedthiscasesimilarlytoSW
(supra).
95Article17states:
'NothinginthisConventionmaybeinterpretedasimplyingforanyState,grouporpersonanyrighttoengageinanyactivityorperformanyactaimedatthe
destructionofanyoftherightsandfreedomssetforthhereinorattheirlimitationtoagreaterextentthanisprovidedforintheConvention.'
96Article7(1)states:
'Nooneshallbeheldguiltyofanycriminaloffenceonaccountofanyactoromissionwhichdidnotconstituteacriminaloffenceundernationalorinternational
lawatthetimewhenitwascommitted.Norshallaheavierpenaltybeimposedthantheonethatwasapplicableatthetimethecriminaloffencewascommitted.'
97Aboven94.
98 Idatparas[58][60].
99Aboven35.
1002006(2)SACR319(CC)(2007(3)SA210).
101 Idatpara[37].
102Seeabovepara[10].
103Aboven1.
104Aboven36atpara[23].
105SeeCarmicheleaboven64.
106 Idatpara[34].
107Section166statesthat:
'Thecourtsare
(a)theConstitutionalCourt;
(b)theSupremeCourtofAppeal;
(c)theHighCourts,includinganyHighCourtofAppealthatmaybeestablishedbyanActofParliamenttohearappealsfromHighCourts;
(d)themagistrates'courts;and
(e)anyothercourtestablishedorrecognisedintermsofanActofParliament,includinganycourtofastatussimilartoeithertheHighCourtsorthe
magistrates'courts.'
108Act32of1944asamendedbytheMagistrates'CourtsSecondAmendmentAct80of1997.
109AnabbreviationofaLatinmaxim,staredecisisetnonquietamovere,whichmeansthatonestandsbydecisionsanddoesnotdisturbsettledpoints.
110SeeExparteMinisterofSafetyandSecurityandOthers:InreSvWaltersandAnother2002(2)SACR105(CC)(2002(4)SA613;2002(7)BCLR663).
111Aboven4.
112Aboven22.
113Abovepara[45].
114Abovepara[6].
1TheProsecutorvAlfredMusemacaseNoICTR9613A(27January2000).
2Idatpara[226].SeealsoTheProsecutorvJeanPaulAkayesucaseNoICTR964T(2September1998);(1998)37ILM1401atpara[597].
3DirectorofPublicProsecutionsvTshabalalacaseNoA1955/04(TPD)7February2005,unreportedasreferredtoinSvMasiya(MinisterofJusticeand
ConstitutionalDevelopmentIntervening)2006(2)SACR357(T)(2006(11)BCLR1377)atpara[67];SvPieters1987(3)SA717(A)at721FH;SvM(2)
1990(1)SACR456(N)at4578.
4Maboven3at458b.
5NkabindeJaboveatpara[30].
6SvJordanandOthers(SexWorkersEducationandAdvocacyTaskForceandOthersasAmiciCuriae)2002(2)SACR499(CC)(2002(6)SA642;2002(11)
BCLR1117)atpara[45].
7Atpara[37].(Emphasisadded.).
8ProsecutorvAntoFurundzijacaseNoIT9517/1T(10December1998);(1999)38ILM317atpara[183].
9NkabindeJaboveatn71.
10 Akayesuaboven2atpara[598];Musemaaboven1atparas[225][226];TheProsecutorvLaurentSemanzacaseNoICTR9720T(15May2003)atparas
[344][345].
11 ProsecutorvDragoljubKunaracRadomirKovacandZoranVukovic(IT9623andIT9623/1A,12June2002)atparas[127][128].
12AdoptedbytheAssemblyofStatesParties,1stsessionNewYork(310September2002)ICCASP/1/3.TheElementsofCrimeswereadoptedbytheState
partiestotheICCStatuteandwillassisttheICCininterpretingthecrimescreatedbystatute.
13Theelementsbothofthecrimeagainsthumanityofrape(art7(1)(g))andthewarcrimeofrapeinbothinternational(art8(2)(b)(xxii))andnoninternational
(art8(2)(e)(vi))armedconflictsinclude:
'Theperpetratorinvadedthebodyofapersonbyconductresultinginpenetration,howeverslight,ofanypartofthebodyofthevictimoroftheperpetrator
withasexualorgan,oroftheanalorgenitalopeningofthevictimwithanyobjectoranyotherpartofthebody.'
(Footnoteomitted.).
14TheICTY,ICTRandICCincludeoralpenetrationbyasexualorganandvaginaloranalpenetrationbyanyobjectintheirunderstandingsofrape.Seenn10,
11and13above.
15SeeMinisterofHomeAffairsandAnothervFourieandAnother(DoctorsforLifeInternationalandOthers,AmiciCuriae);LesbianandGayEqualityProjectand
OthersvMinisterofHomeAffairsandOthers2006(1)SA524(CC)(2006(3)BCLR355)(Courtdevelopedthecommonlawtoallowforbothmaleandfemale
homosexualstomarryalthoughtheonlypartiesbeforeitwerefemale).
16See,forexample,SvShinga;SvO'ConnellandOthersCCT56/06andCCT80/06,asyetunreportedjudgmentof8March2007(theCourtinvalidated
provisionsrelatingtotheprovisionoftherecordincriminalappealsclearlynotatissueonthefactsofthecase)[nowreportedasShingavTheStateand
Another(SocietyofAdvocates,PietermaritzburgBar,asAmicusCuriae);O'ConnellandOthersvTheState2007(2)SACR28(CC)(2007(4)SA611;2007(5)
BCLR474)];MabasovLawSociety,NorthernProvinces,andAnother2005(2)SA117(CC)(2005(2)BCLR129)(althoughapplicantwasfromBophuthatswana,
theCourtreadinwordstocurediscriminationagainstattorneysfromallformerhomelands);MohlomivMinisterofDefence1997(1)SA124(CC)(1996(12)
BCLR1559)(theCourtinvalidatedthewholeofaprovisionrequiringthatsummonsbeissuedwithinsixmonthsofthecauseofactionarisingandthatthe
DefenceForcebegivenonemonth'snoticeeventhoughtheapplicantonlyfailedtocomplywiththesecondrequirement).
17B502003s2(1).
18Dated10October2006,s3,readwiththedefinitionof'sexualpenetration'ins1.
19See,forexample,JandAnothervDirectorGeneral,DepartmentofHomeAffairs,andOthers2003(5)SA621(CC)(2003(5)BCLR463)inpara[26].
20See,forexample,VanderMerwevRoadAccidentFundandAnother(Women'sLegalCentreTrustasAmicusCuriae)2006(4)SA230(CC)(2006(6)BCLR
682)inpara[77];MinisterofHomeAffairsvNationalInstituteforCrimePreventionandtheReintegrationofOffenders(NICRO)andOthers2005(3)SA280
(CC)(2004(5)BCLR445)inpara[74];SvBhulwana,SvGwadiso1995(2)SACR748(CC)(1996(1)SA388;1995(12)BCLR1579)inpara[32].
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