Information
AI Chat

Minister VAN Polisie v Ewels 1975 (3) SA 590 (A)

Case on legal convictions

Course

Criminal law (LAWS 2014)

941 Documents

Students shared 941 documents in this course

University

University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg

Academic year: 2020/2021

Uploaded by:

Thabo Mhlanga

University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg

0followers

2Uploads

49upvotes

Recommended for you

Comments

Please sign in or register to post comments.

Related Studylists

Criminal law 1 Criminal law

Preview text

South African Law Reports, The (1947 to date)/CHRONOLOGICAL LISTING OF CASES – January 1947 to February 2020/1975/Volume 3: 385 (August)/MINISTER VAN POLISIE v EWELS 1975 (3) SA 590 (A)

URL: jutastat.juta.co/nxt/gateway.dll/salr/3/16513/16894/16927?f=templates$fn=default

MINISTER VAN POLISIE v EWELS 1975 (3) SA 590 (A) 1975 (3) SA p

Citation 1975 (3) SA 590 (A)

Court Appèlafdeling

Judge Rumpff HR, Jansen AR, Trollip AR, Muller AR en Van Zijl Wn AR

Heard March 17,

Judgment May 23,

Annotations Link to Case Annotations

Flynote : Sleutelwoorde Delik Wat uitmaak Wanneer 'n late as onregmatige gedrag beskou word Staat Verantwoordelikheid van Staat vir dade van sy werkers Gewone burger deur 'n B polisieman wat nie op diens was nie in polisiekantoor aangerand Aanranding in aanskou van ander polisiemanne Plig op hulle om aanranding te verhoed Versuim om die plig na te kom Minister van Polisie aanspreeklik vir skadevergoeding wat van hom geëis is. Headnote : Kopnota Die stadium van ontwikkeling in ons reg is bereik waarin 'n late as onregmatige gedrag beskou word ook wanneer die C omstandighede van die geval van so 'n aard is dat die late nie alleen morele verontwaardiging ontlok nie maar ook dat die regsoortuiging van die gemeenskap verlang dat die late as onregmatig beskou behoort te word en dat die gelede skade vergoed behoort te word deur die persoon wat nagelaat het om daadwerklik op te tree. Om te bepaal of daar onregmatigheid is, gaan dit, in 'n gegewe geval van late, dus nie oor die gebruiklike "nalatigheid" van die bonus paterfamilias nie, maar D oor die vraag of, na aanleiding van al die feite, daar 'n regsplig was om redelik op te tree. Waar die respondent, 'n gewone burger, deur 'n sersant van die polisie wat nie op diens was nie in die polisiekantoor onder die beheer van die polisie aangerand was en ten aanskoue van 'n aantal polisiemanne van wie gesamentlik redelik moontlik, selfs maklik, was om die aanval op die respondent te verhoed of te beëinding, Beslis, dat die plig wat op die polisiemanne gerus het om die respondent te hulp te kom 'n regsplig was en dat omdat dit 'n E versuim was wat plassgevind in die loop van die diens van die polisiemanne dat die appellant aanspreeklik is vir die skadevergoeding wat deur die respondent geëis is. Die beslissing in die OosKaapse Afdeling in Minister of Police v Ewels, bevestig.

Flynote : Sleutelwoorde Delict What constitutes When an omission is to be F regarded as unlawful conduct State Liability of State for acts of servants Ordinary citizen assaulted in police station by a policeman not on duty Assault taking place in presence of other policemen Duty on them to have prevented assault Failure to perform such duty Minister of Police liable for damages claimed from him. Headnote : Kopnota Our law has developed to the stage wherein an omission is G regarded as unlawful conduct when the circumstances of the case are of such a nature that the omission not only incites moral indignation but also that the legal convictions of the community demand that the omission ought to be regarded as unlawful and that the damage suffered ought to be made good by the person who neglected to do a positive act. In order to determine whether there is unlawfulness the question, in a given case of an omission, is thus not whether there was the usual "negligence" of the bonus paterfamilias but whether, H regard being had to all the fact, there was a duty in law to act reasonably. Where the respondent, an ordinary citizen, had been assaulted by a sergeant of police, who was not on duty, in a police station under the control of the police and in the presence of several members of the police from who it was jointly reasonably possible, even easily, to have prevented or to have put an end to the attack, Held, that the duty which rested on the policemen to have come to the assistance of the respondent was a legal duty and as it was a failure which had taken place in the course of the policemen's duty that the appellant was liable for the damages claimed by the respondent. The decision in the Eastern Cape Division in Minister of Police v Ewels, confirmed.

1975 (3) SA p Case Information Appèl teen 'n beslissing in die OosKaapse Afdeling (MUNNIK, R., en EKSTEEN, R.), wat 'n eksepsie teen 'n eis van die respondent van die hand gewys het. Die aard van die pleitstukke blyk uit die uitspraak van RUMPFF, H.

T. Stewart, S. (bygestaan deur F. Kroon ), namens die A appellant: The respondent is not alleging any positive act on the part of the policemen in so far as the actual infliction of injury on the respondent is concerned; he is founding his case on inaction on their part. For the contention that this inaction is actionable the respondent alleges that there was a legal duty on the policemen to intervene in the assault and he B relies in this regard on: (i) the provisions of the Police Act, 7 of 1958; (ii) certain alleged prior conduct. The alleged prior conduct, however, consisted of no more than a failure to prevent Barnard from entering and/or remaining in the police station. It is clear from the respondent's pleadings that his case is that in assaulting the respondent Barnard (who was also a policeman) was on a frolic of his own and that there was no C connection between Barnard and the other policemen in the normal sense of the word. The exception is based on the contention that there was no legal duty on the policemen in question to intervene in the circumstances whether by virtue of the provisions of the Police Act or by virtue of the alleged prior conduct and, in the alternative, in so far as the Police Act is concerned, even if there was a legal duty which was not D heeded by the policemen, this did not give rise to any civil liability to the respondent. The judgment of the Court a quo proceeded on a very narrow basis which may be summed up as follows: (a) if a person is in control of another and fails to prevent that other from committing a delict that person is guilty of actionable culpa; (b ) the policemen in question were E in control of Barnard because: (i) one of them enjoyed a higher rank in the police force than Barnard; and (ii) the provisions of the Police Act confer an implied control in favour of Policemen over any other person who commits a crime in their presence in that the Police Act lays down that it is the function of the police to prevent crime and to maintain law and order. In any event the Court a quo erred in finding that, F in relation to the assault on the respondent, Barnard was under the control of the policemen whether by reason of the fact that one of the policemen held a higher rank than Barnard or by reason of the provisions of the Police Act. In relation to the question whether Sgt. Wood's higher rank conferred on him any control over Barnard visàvis the assault Philpott v Whittal, Elston & Crosby, 1907 E.D. 193, relied upon by the G Court a quo, is distinguishable.

It is well established in our law that generally speaking liability in delict does not arise solely from an omission stricto sensu. See Regal v African Super Slate, 1963 (1) SA at p. 109E; Silva's Fishing Corporation v Maweza, 1957 (2) SA at pp. 260H, 261F; PeriUrban Areas Health Board v Munarin, 1965 (3) SA at p. 373E. There will be liability, H however, in respect of an omission where there is a legal duty in the circumstances to act. Munarin's case, supra at p. 373E G; Silva's case, supra at pp. 264H 265A. The respondent seeks to found his case on the alleged existence of such a legal duty in the present matter. He contends that the policemen were in law obliged to act, firstly, by reason of statutory provisions and, secondly, by reason of alleged prior conduct. On a nice analysis of the respondent's pleadings there was in fact no prior conduct such as is required before any liability for an omission may arise. To use the words in Silva's

1975 (3) SA p case: the policemen had nothing to do with creating the situation they merely happened to be there. Silva's case, supra at p. 260H. Any conduct on their part, therefore, did not create a legal duty to act and their failure to act cannot found any liability on the part of the appellant. In regard to A the provisions of the Police Act, no duty in the sense of an obligation to the respondent is imposed. Although sec. provides that the functions of the police force are, inter alia, the prevention of crime and the maintenance of law and order, this does not mean that the police are obliged visàvis a member of the public in fact to perform these functions when B the circumstances are such that the functions can be performed. An analysis of the import of such a contention would show that it carries its own refutation. Cf. Dease v Minister van Justisie, 1962 (3) SA at pp. 217 8; Wolpe v Officer Commanding, SA Police Johannesburg, 1955 (2) SA at p. 93A. Alternatively, even were the Act to impose a duty on the police C force to carry out the functions laid down in the Act, the failure to carry out the duty would not give rise to any civil liability. The general principle applicable here is that the question whether a civil action should lie in respect of a failure to heed the duty depends on whether the Legislature in enacting the provision in question intended that such an action should lie. Hall and Another v Edward Snell & Co. Ltd., 1940 D N.P. at p. 329. The Legislature did not intend that the respondent should have a civil action against a policeman if the latter should fail to carry out any duty imposed upon him under the Act. Cutler v Wandsworth Stadium Ltd., (1949) 1 All E. at p. 552A; Halsbury, (Simonds ed.), vol. 36, p. 453, footnote G; The Liquidator, Cape Central Railways v Nothlin, 8 E S. at pp. 28 30. The general rule that where an Act itself provides a remedy for the breach, there is not also an additional remedy of a civil action for damages, would apply a fortiori where the remedy provided is a criminal sanction. This feature emphasises that the obligation is imposed for the public benefit and that the breach is a public and not a private wrong. See Cutler's case, supra at p. 548H.

C. F. Howie, namens die respondent: The functions of the F Police, as laid down in the Act and the regulations, are synonymous with their duties: cf. Dease v Minister of Justice, 1962 (3) SA at p. 218A, and, therefore, it is the duty of the Police to prevent crime and to maintain law and order. Respondent sues on the basis of negligent performance of a statutory duty not on the basis of breach of a statutory duty G per se, as argued. An action based on the latter kind of breach, whilst conceivably requiring proof of fault as an element of the cause of action, does not always necessarily require proof of negligence: Da Silva v Coutinho, 1971 (3) SA at pp. 140E 141C, p. 144A D. It has patently been respondent's case that appellant's servants acted negligently in breaching the duty imposed on them by the Police Act. Therefore the issue is not, whether a breach per se of the H Police Act is actionable at civil law but whether the facts disclosed by respondent's pleadings permit of an action for damages based on negligence. Accordingly it was permissible and, indeed, required of the Court a quo to consider, inter alia, the question whether appellant's servants had authority and control over Barnard and to have regard to the fact that Barnard was himself member of the Force. It is clear that if a duty to act existed then appellant's servants did nothing to fulfil such duty. The crucial issue is, therefore, whether a duty to act existed in the circumstances alleged by respondent. The omission to act where there is a duty to act to avoid reasonably

1975 (3) SA p foreseeable loss to another is actionable irrespective of the absence of prior conduct related to such omission: Minister of Forestry v Quathlamba (Pty.) Ltd., 1973 (3) SA at p. 82A F. The duty to act to avoid such loss may be imposed by statute or by the common law: Van den Heever, Aquilian Damages in SA A Law, p. 42; R. G. McKerron, "Liability for Omissions", SA Law Journal, 1961 at pp. 389, 390; Silva's Fishing Corporation (Pty.) Ltd. v Maweza, 1957 (2) SA at pp. 265C 266G. In the circumstances of the present case there was a duty on appellant's servants to prevent the assault. This duty arose by reason of: (a) their relationship to, and therefore their control over, Barnard; alternatively (b) their control over the B premises wherein the assault occurred, the control in both instances being derived from the terms of the Police Act read with the regulations. Sergeant Wood was Barnard's senior and Wood had at least four subordinates at his disposal through whom to restrain Barnard. There existed not only authority and control by virtue of senior rank but also such authority as was conveyed by the terms of sec. 5 of the Police Act, 7 of 1958, C which obliged and authorised the said servants of appellant to intervene in order to maintain law and order and prevent crime. Dig. 9.2.44 and 9.2 (preamble) (translated in Van den Heever, Aquilian Damages, supra ) constitute clear common law authority for holding a master liable for failure to restrain his subordinate from wrong where the former knows of the D wrongdoing and can prevent it. Those texts were specifically relied on in Philpott v Whittal and Others, 1907 E.D. at p. 207; see also Silva's case, supra at p. 266; Mtati v Minister of Justice, 1958 (1) SA 221 Ellis v Home Office, (1953) 2 All E. 149; D'Arcy v Prison Commissioners, (1955) The Times, 15, 16, 17 November (both referred to with approval in Home E Office v Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd., (1970) 2 All E. at pp. 302B 309D); Minister of Police v Van Aswegen, 1974 (2) SA 101; American Restatement of the Law (Second) (1965), Torts (Negligence ), vol. 2, sec. W. 315, pp. 122, 123; sec. 319, p. 129; sec. 322, p. 133. As to control over the premises: An owner or occupier of land has a duty to see that reasonably foreseeable and avoidable F harm is not caused to others by a source of danger on his land, e. a fire: Quathlamba's case, supra. He is similarly charged with such duty where he has on his land a vicious animal, cf. Moubray v Syfret, 1935 AD at pp. 203, 210. There is no reason why in principle he should not bear a like duty where the source of danger is a person with overtly dangerous G propensities or intentions. Van Aswegen's case, supra, recognises the need properly to control such a person where he is not on the premises of the custodian. There would be just as much need to restrain him where he is upon such premises. This case is analogous to the Quathlamba type of case. This line of argument is supported by the American Restatement, supra, sec. 314A, pp. 118, 119 and 120; sec. 317, p. 125. As to a duty H arising on the basis that a reasonable man would have foreseen and avoided harm (assuming for the sake of argument that the control contended for above is either not per se a decisive enough factor to create the duty or not adequate enough control for the aforegoing contentions to prevail), the question arises as to when a duty will exist if the law has not already, in the past, labelled a given situation as demanding a duty to act. Each new situation will be considered on its merits on its own particular facts seen against the background of the needs of the community at the relevant time: see Winfield and Jolowicz, on Tort, 9th ed., (1971), at pp.

1975 (3) SA p RUMPFF HR

last para 47 first para.; pp. 47 last para 48 first para., pp. 57 second para 58 first para.; Clark and Lindsell, Tort, 13th ed., pp. 474, 475; Silva's case, supra at pp. 263D E, 265. A reasonable man in the position of appellant's servants would have foreseen the probability (not A merely the reasonable possibility) of harm or further harm to respondent if Barnard were not restrained and such reasonable man would have acted to effect the necessary restraint. The test of the foresight of the reasonable man is sufficient whereon to determine the existence or not of the duty to avoid omission: Price, Acta Juridica, 1962, at pp. 78 80; Dorset Yacht case, supra. Stewart, S., in repliek.

B Cur. adv. vult. Postea (Mei 23).

Judgment RUMPFF, H.: In die pleitstukke van 'n verhoorsaak in die C OosKaapse Afdeling het die eiser (die respondent in hierdie Hof) skadevergoeding van 'n sekere Barnard en van die verweerder (die appellant in hierdie Hof) geëis. Hy het beweer dat hy op 20 Desember 1971 deur Barnard, wat 'n polisieman was, op twee geleenthede aangerand is en daardeur skade gely het. Die eerste geleentheid was by 'n kafee in Umtata en daarna by D die polisiestasie aldaar. Ten opsigte van die eerste geleentheid het hy 'n bedrag geëis van Barnard alleen terwyl hy ten opsigte van die tweede geleentheid 'n bedrag geëis het van Barnard en van verweerder gesamentlik en afsonderlik. Sy eis teen verweerder is gebaseer op sekere feitlike bewerings in die besonderhede van sy eis. Hy het beweer dat Barnard hom in die portaal van die polisiestasie voor die oop deur van die E klagtekantoor asook op die trappe voor die polisiestasie aangerand het. Hy het verder beweer dat ten tyde van die aanranding sekere lede van die polisiemag diens gedoen het in die polisiekantoor en dit beheer het. Hulle was 'n sersant Wood, twee blanke konstabels, Nel en Hattingh, en verskeie swart konstabels. Hy het verder beweer dat tydens die F aanranding hierdie polisiemanne in diens was van die verweerder en opgetree het in die loop van hul werk en dit is die kern van sy saak dat hulle nalatiglik versuim het om Barnard te verhinder om hom aan te rand of hom teen aanranding deur Barnard te beskerm. In nadere besonderhede wat hy verskaf het, het eiser beweer dat tydens die aanranding sersant Wood deur die portaal in die klagtekantoor geloop het G en dat Hattingh uit die kantoor gestap het. Al die polisiemanne was bewus van die aanranding. Op 'n vraag van verweerder op welke gronde eiser die aanspreeklikheid van die verweerder baseer, het eiser geantwoord dat dit die plig van die polisiemanne was om eiser te beskerm luidens die bepalings van art. 5 van die Polisiewet, 7 van 1958, en op grond van sekere voorafgaande gedrag van hierdie polisiemanne. Hierdie H voorafgaande gedrag sou bestaan het uit die feit dat hulle Barnard in die polisiestasie toegelaat het of dat hulle toegelaat het dat hy daar bly terwyl hy klaarblyklik daar was met 'n onwettige doel. Die verweerder het eksepsie aangeteken teen eiser se vordering, soos aangevul deur die nadere besonderhede, op grond daarvan dat die Polisiewet, 7 van 1958, nie 'n regsplig op die polisiemanne gelê het om eiser te beskerm nie of 'n siviele aanspreeklikheid geskep het nie en dat die gedrag van die polisiemanne nie van so 'n aard was dat 'n regsplig om eiser te beskerm ontstaan het nie. Die Hof a quo het die eksepsie van die hand gewys met koste en verlof tot

1975 (3) SA p RUMPFF HR

appèl verleen. In sy uitspraak het die Hof a quo hom wesenlik uitsluitlik beroep op die beslissing in Philpott v Whittal, Elston and Crosoy & Co., 1907 E.D. 193. Philpott, 'n landdros, het skadevergoeding geëis weens laster in 'n artikel in 'n koerant. Die artikel het o. 'n verslag bevat van 'n vergadering van die Bolo Farmers Association waarvan Whittal A die voorsitter was. Die verslag het verwys na 'n besluit wat op die vergadering geneem is en waarin 'n aantyging gemaak is dat die landdros ten opsigte van oortredings van die Location Act van bevooroordeeld was. Die Hof het bevind dat Whittal as voorsitter gehelp het met die opstel van die besluit met die bedoeling en geloof dat dit gepubliseer sal word. Die Hof het B verder gegaan en gesê dat as voorsitter hy kon verhinder het dat die sekretaris die besluit laat publiseer het. Met verwysing o. na Dig. 9.2.44, waarvolgens die eienaar van 'n slaaf verantwoordelik is vir besering of dood deur die slaaf veroorsaak indien die handelinge van die slaaf met kennis van die eienaar plaasvind, is daar opgemerk dat kennis as C toestemming geag word en dat hy wat 'n aantasting van 'n ander kan verhinder en dit nie doen nie, aanspreeklik is. Dit is duidelik dat dit hier gaan om die aanspreeklikheid van 'n persoon ten opsigte van die handelinge van 'n ander persoon waaroor eersgenoemde beheer het. Die Hof a quo het dan ook bevind dat die rang van sersant Wood visàvis Barnard die nodige beheervermoë aandui en dat die eksepsie op daardie grond D afgewys behoort te word, m.a., omdat sersant Wood die nodige gesag gehad het oor Barnard en Wood versuim het om teenoor Barnard op te tree, word die verweerder aanspreeklik geag. Die Hof a quo het egter verder gegaan en bevind dat al die polisiemanne in die polisiekantoor in 'n posisie van gesag was, soos deur die Philpott saak bedoel, weens die bepalings van art. 5 van die Polisiewet, 7 van 1958. In hierdie verband was E die Hof a quo van mening dat dit die funksie van die polisie is om o. misdaad te voorkom en dat die woord "werksaamhede" in art. 5 (op Engels "functions") sinoniem is met pligte.

Wat die uitspraak in die Hof a quo betref, is dit nodig om te verwys na 'n bewering in die eiser se nadere besonderhede, nl. dat Barnard vir 'n onwettige doel in die polisiestasie was. Na F aanleiding hiervan is dit gemene saak dat dit implisiet aanvaar moet word dat Barnard ook tydens die voorval in die polisiestasie nie diens gedoen het nie. Omdat die Hof a quo hom klaarblyklik in die eerste plek gestel het op die gesag van Wood oor Barnard, is ons verwys na sekere regulasies uitgevaardig onder art. 33 van die Polisiewet. Hiervolgens word G o. die range aangedui (sersant, bv., bo konstabel (reg. 8)), word die versuim om 'n wettige bevel te gehoorsaam 'n oortreding geag (reg. 58 (4)) en moet 'n lid aan wie 'n wettige bevel gegee word dit onvoorwaardelik gehoorsaam (reg. 73 (1)). Weens my benadering van die feite van die saak vind ek dit onnodig om te beslis of 'n polisieman wat nie diens doen nie, altyd en oral onderhewig is aan die gesag van 'n meerdere, maar H ek sal aanvaar dat hierdie gesag, in die omstandighede van hierdie saak, wel bestaan het. Gesien die feite van die saak, soos beweer in die pleitstukke, is die vraag van gesag in hierdie saak myns insiens nie van deurslaggewende belang nie en gevolglik die beslissing in die Philpott saak ook nie. In die uitspraak van die Hof a quo is verder verwys na die sogenaamde "voorafgaande gedrag" en ten slotte is gesê dat die versuim om aan die regsplig te voldoen nalatigheid skep aan die kant van die polisiemanne omdat hull deur die uitoefening van redelike sorg die aanranding kon verhoed het.

1975 (3) SA p RUMPFF HR

In hierdie Hof is namens respondent uitdruklik aangevoer dat die verweerder se saak, onder andere, gebaseer is op die nalatige nienakoming van 'n statutêre plig en nie op die versuim, per se, om 'n statutêre plig na te kom nie. A Weens die bevinding van die Hof a quo is dit nodig om 'n opinie uit te spreek oor die uitwerking van art. 5 van die Polisiewet. Art. 5 lees soos volg: "5. Werksaamhede van SuidAfrikaanse Polisie Die werksaamhede van die SuidAfrikaanse Polisie is, onder meer (a) die bewaring van die binnelandse veiligheid van die Republiek; B (b) die handhawing van wet en orde; (c) die ondersoek van enige misdryf of beweerde misdryf; en (d) die voorkoming van misdaad." Indien die doel van die Wetgewer, soos blyk uit hierdie Wet, in aanmerking geneem word, kan dit, myns insiens, nie gesê word C nie dat 'n nienakoming van 'n polisieman van die bepalings van art. 5 noodwendig 'n statutêre siviele aanspreeklikheid in die lewe roep. Die bedoeling van art. 5 is om in breë trekke die aard van die werksaamhede van die polisie aan te dui en nêrens uit die Wet blyk dit dat dit ooit die bedoeling was dat die blote nienakoming deur 'n polisieman om 'n bepaalde misdaad te voorkom of te ondersoek 'n statutêre deliktuele onregmatigheid D skep nie. 'n Teenbedoeling skyn te blyk uit art. 32 wat handel oor verjaring en wat bepaal dat "enige siviele geding teen die Staat of 'n persoon ten opsigte van enigiets uit hoofde van hierdie Wet gedoen " ingestel moet word binne ses maande nadat die eisoorsaak ontstaan het. Desnietemin is die statutêre plig wat uit art. 5 E blyk te bestaan, 'n faktor wat in die feitekompleks van hierdie saak wel in aanmerking geneem behoort te word en sal word, soos later sal blyk.

Die feite wat op hierdie stadium aanvaar moet word is dat, nadat eiser deur Barnard in 'n kafee aangerand is, hy sy verskyning by the klagkantoor gemaak het. Barnard het nie diens gedoen nie en het eiser weer o. in the portaal van die F polisiekantoor voor die deur van die klagtekantoor toegetakel sonder dat 'n Blanke sersant, twee Blanke konstabels en verskeie swart konstabels, wat daar diens gedoen het, enige poging aangewend het om hom te hulp te kom. Hierdie polisiemanne was bewus van die aanranding op eiser. Die vraag is of die versuim van hierdie polisiemanne om in hierdie omstandighede op te tree en eiser te help as 'n onregmatige G daad teenoor eiser beskou moet word waarvoor die verweerder aanspreeklik is. Dit wil voorkom of the vraagstuk van 'n late, as deliktuele onregmatige gedrag, tot 'n mate van klaarheid ontwikkel het, vgl. Silva's Fishing Corporation (Pty.) Ltd. v Maweza, 1957 (2) SA 256 (AA); Regal v African Superslate (Pty.) Ltd., 1963 (1) SA 102 (AA); Minister of Forestry v Quathlamba (Pty.) Ltd., 1973 (3) SA 69 (AA). As H uitgangspunt word aanvaar dat daar in die algemeen geen regsplig op 'n persoon rus om te verhinder dat iemand anders skade ly nie, al sou so 'n persoon maklik kon verhinder dat die skade gely word en al sou van so 'n persoon verwag kon word, op suiwer morele gronde, dat hy daadwerklik optree om die skade te verhinder. Ook word egter aanvaar dat in sekere omstandighede daar 'n regsplig op 'n persoon rus om te verhinder dat iemand anders skade ly. Versuim hy om daardie plig uit te voer, ontstaan daar 'n onregmatige late wat aanleiding kan gee tot 'n eis om skadevergoeding. Hierdie gevalle is nie beperk tot 'n eienaar van grond wat deur sy late veroorsaak dat iemand anders deur iets wat in verband staan

1975 (3) SA p RUMPFF F HR met sy grond skade ly nie of, in die algemeen, tot gevalle waar daar 'n sekere voorafgaande gedrag ("prior conduct") was nie. 'n Sekere voorafgaande gedrag of die beheer oor eiendom mag 'n faktor wees in die totaal van omstandighede van 'n bepaalde geval waarvan onregmatigheid afgelei word, maar is nie 'n A noodwendige onregmatigheidsvereiste nie. Dit skyn of dié stadium van ontwikkeling bereik is waarin 'n late as onregmatige gedrag beskou word ook wanneer die omstandighede van die geval van so 'n aard is dat die late nie alleen morele verontwaardiging ontlok nie maar ook dat die regsoortuiging van die gemeenskap verlang dat die late as onregmatig beskou behoort te word en dat die gelede skade vergoed behoort te word B deur die persoon wat nagelaat het om daadwerklik op te tree. Om te bepaal of daar onregmatigheid is, gaan dit, in 'n gegewe geval van late, dus nie oor die gebruiklike "nalatigheid" van die bonus paterfamilias nie, maar oor die vraag of, na aanleiding van al die feite, daar 'n regsplig was om redelik op te tree. In die meerderheidsuitspraak in die C Silva's saak (waarin 'n vorm van "prior conduct" aanvaar is) is daar aangevoer dat daar nie 'n algemene reddingsplig is nie ('n plig wat in daardie saak ter sprake gekom het). "A legal duty to rescue, it was contended, is special and requires a special prescription; it cannot arise out of circumstances such as the known dangers of the operations, the joint interest of the parties in their success or the like," so word hierdie betoog weergegee in die uitspraak op bl. 263. D Later word hierteenoor die volgende gestel: "In my view this argument cannot be supported. A duty to rescue is not special or subject to peculiarly restricted rules. It is simply a duty to act reasonably and such a duty may arise out of the circumstances of the case. It will be for the Court to decide in each case whether the circumstances in each case whether the circumstances are such as to give rise to a legal duty (cf. Lord WRIGHT in Bourhill v Young, 1943 A. 92 at p. 110)." Net so goed as wat 'n reddingsplig in sekere omstandighede 'n E regsplig mag wees, sou 'n beskermingsplig 'n regsplig kan wees. En dit sou van al die feite afhang of so 'n plig 'n regsplig sou wees of nie. Klaarblyklik is dit onmoontlik om in die algemeen vas te stel wanneer so 'n regsplig sou ontstaan. In die onderhawige geval het ons te doen met 'n aantal polisiemanne wat diens doen in 'n polisiekantoor, 'n gebou F waaroor die Polisie beheer het en waarheen 'n gewone burger, onder ander, kan en moet gaan om 'n klagte te lê. Luidens die bepalings van art. 5 van die Polisiewet is een van die werksaamhede van die polisie die voorkoming van misdaad. Vir sover dit 'n gewone burger betref, sou daar dus tussen hom en 'n polisieman, wat diens doen, 'n ander verhouding kon ontstaan G as dié tussen hom en 'n belanglose vreemdeling. Wat misdaad betref, is die polisieman nie net afskrikker of opspoorder nie, maar ook beskermer. Die eiser is aangerand in die polisiekantoor onder beheer van die Polisie en ten aanskoue van 'n aantal polisiemanne van wie dit gesamentlik redelik moontlik, selfs maklik, was om die aanval op eiser te verhoed of te beëindig. Ook is dit in hierdie saak 'n bykomende faktor H dat Wood, in die besondere omstandighede, as sersant gesag kon uitoefen oor Barnard. Dit dien egter opgemerk te word dat die posisie van die polisiemanne teenoor eiser in die onderhawige saak, in beginsel, dieselfde sou gewees het indien die aanrander van eiser nie 'n polisieman was nie. Wanneer al die omstandighede in aanmerking geneem word, meen ek dat die plig wat op die polisiemanne gerus het om eiser te hulp te kom 'n regsplig was en dat, omdat dit 'n versuim was wat plaasgevind het in die loop van die diens van die polisiemanne, verweerder aanspreeklik is.

1975 (3) SA p RUMPFF HR Volgens die pleitstukke was die polisiemanne nalatig, en in die samehang van die eisoorsaak moet dit verstaan word as 'n bewering dat hulle behoort te voorsien het dat hul late die eiser skade sou laat ly en dat hulle versuim het om deur A redelike optrede die skade te verhoed. Die eisoorsaak bevat dus die bewering van 'n onregmatige late en skuld en die eksepsie is tereg afgewys.

Die appèl word afgewys met koste. JANSEN, A., TROLLIP, A., MULLER, A., en VAN ZIJL, WN. A., het saamgestem.

B Appellant se Prokureurs: Whiteside, Smit en Almon, Grahamstad; Adjunk Staatsprokureur, Bloemfontein. Respondent se Prokureurs: Wheeldon, Rushmere en Cole, Grahamstad; Webber en Newdigate, Bloemfontein.

South African Law Reports, The (1947 to date)/CHRONOLOGICAL LISTING OF CASES – January 1947 to February 2020/1975/Volume 3: 385 (August)/MINISTER VAN POLISIE v EWELS 1975 (3) SA 590 (A)

URL: jutastat.juta.co/nxt/gateway.dll/salr/3/16513/16894/16927?f=templates$fn=default

MINISTER VAN POLISIE v EWELS 1975 (3) SA 590 (A) 1975 (3) SA p

Citation 1975 (3) SA 590 (A)

Court Appèlafdeling

Judge Rumpff HR, Jansen AR, Trollip AR, Muller AR en Van Zijl Wn AR

Heard March 17,

Judgment May 23,

Annotations Link to Case Annotations

1975 (3) SA p RUMPFF HR

B Cur. adv. vult. Postea (Mei 23).

1975 (3) SA p RUMPFF HR

Multiple Choice

Multiple Choice

Was this document helpful?

Minister VAN Polisie v Ewels 1975 (3) SA 590 (A)

Course: Criminal law (LAWS 2014)

941 Documents

Students shared 941 documents in this course

University: University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg

Multiple Choice

Multiple Choice

Was this document helpful?

Source:

SouthAfricanLawReports,The(1947todate)/CHRONOLOGICALLISTINGOFCASES–January1947toFebruary2020/1975/Volume3:385756

(August)/MINISTERVANPOLISIEvEWELS1975(3)SA590(A)

URL:

http://jutastat.juta.co.za/nxt/gateway.dll/salr/3/16513/16894/16927?f=templates$fn=default.htm

MINISTERVANPOLISIEvEWELS1975(3)SA590(A)

1975(3)SAp590

Citation 1975(3)SA590(A)

Court Appèlafdeling

Judge RumpffHR,JansenAR,TrollipAR,MullerARenVanZijlWnAR

Heard March17,1975

Judgment May23,1975

Annotations LinktoCaseAnnotations

Flynote:Sleutelwoorde

DelikWatuitmaakWanneer'nlateasonregmatigegedragbeskouwordStaatVerantwoordelikheidvanStaatvirdadevansywerkers

Gewoneburgerdeur'nBpolisiemanwatnieopdienswasnieinpolisiekantooraangerandAanrandinginaanskouvananderpolisiemannePlig

ophulleomaanrandingteverhoedVersuimomdieplignatekomMinistervanPolisieaanspreeklikvirskadevergoedingwatvanhomgeëisis.

Headnote:Kopnota

Diestadiumvanontwikkelinginonsregisbereikwaarin'nlateasonregmatigegedragbeskouwordookwanneerdieComstandighedevandie

gevalvanso'naardisdatdielateniealleenmoreleverontwaardigingontlokniemaarookdatdieregsoortuigingvandiegemeenskapverlang

datdielateasonregmatigbeskoubehoorttewordendatdiegeledeskadevergoedbehoortteworddeurdiepersoonwatnagelaathetom

daadwerklikoptetree.Omtebepaalofdaaronregmatigheidis,gaandit,in'ngegewegevalvanlate,dusnieoordiegebruiklike"nalatigheid"

vandiebonuspaterfamiliasnie,maarDoordievraagof,naaanleidingvanaldiefeite,daar'nregspligwasomredelikoptetree.

Waardierespondent,'ngewoneburger,deur'nsersantvandiepolisiewatnieopdienswasnieindiepolisiekantooronderdiebeheervandie

polisieaangerandwasentenaanskouevan'naantalpolisiemannevanwiegesamentlikredelikmoontlik,selfsmaklik,wasomdieaanvalopdie

respondentteverhoedoftebeëinding,

Beslis,datdiepligwatopdiepolisiemannegerushetomdierespondenttehulptekom'nregspligwasendatomdatdit'nEversuimwaswat

plassgevindindieloopvandiediensvandiepolisiemannedatdieappellantaanspreeklikisvirdieskadevergoedingwatdeurdierespondentgeëis

is.

DiebeslissingindieOosKaapseAfdelinginMinisterofPolicevEwels,bevestig.

Flynote:Sleutelwoorde

DelictWhatconstitutesWhenanomissionistobeFregardedasunlawfulconductStateLiabilityofStateforactsofservantsOrdinary

citizenassaultedinpolicestationbyapolicemannotondutyAssaulttakingplaceinpresenceofotherpolicemenDutyonthemtohave

preventedassaultFailuretoperformsuchdutyMinisterofPoliceliablefordamagesclaimedfromhim.

Headnote:Kopnota

OurlawhasdevelopedtothestagewhereinanomissionisGregardedasunlawfulconductwhenthecircumstancesofthecaseareofsucha

naturethattheomissionnotonlyincitesmoralindignationbutalsothatthelegalconvictionsofthecommunitydemandthattheomissionought

toberegardedasunlawfulandthatthedamagesufferedoughttobemadegoodbythepersonwhoneglectedtodoapositiveact.Inorderto

determinewhetherthereisunlawfulnessthequestion,inagivencaseofanomission,isthusnotwhethertherewastheusual"negligence"of

thebonuspaterfamiliasbutwhether,Hregardbeinghadtoallthefact,therewasadutyinlawtoactreasonably.

Wheretherespondent,anordinarycitizen,hadbeenassaultedbyasergeantofpolice,whowasnotonduty,inapolicestationunderthe

controlofthepoliceandinthepresenceofseveralmembersofthepolicefromwhoitwasjointlyreasonablypossible,eveneasily,tohave

preventedortohaveputanendtotheattack,

Held,thatthedutywhichrestedonthepolicementohavecometotheassistanceoftherespondentwasalegaldutyandasitwasafailure

whichhadtakenplaceinthecourseofthepolicemen'sdutythattheappellantwasliableforthedamagesclaimedbytherespondent.

ThedecisionintheEasternCapeDivisioninMinisterofPolicevEwels,confirmed.

1975(3)SAp591

CaseInformation

Appèlteen'nbeslissingindieOosKaapseAfdeling(MUNNIK,R.,enEKSTEEN,R.),wat'neksepsieteen'neisvandierespondentvandiehand

gewyshet.DieaardvandiepleitstukkeblykuitdieuitspraakvanRUMPFF,H.R.

T.Stewart,S.C.(bygestaandeurF.Kroon),namensdieAappellant:Therespondentisnotalleginganypositiveactonthepartofthe

policemeninsofarastheactualinflictionofinjuryontherespondentisconcerned;heisfoundinghiscaseoninactionontheirpart.Forthe

contentionthatthisinactionisactionabletherespondentallegesthattherewasalegaldutyonthepolicementointerveneintheassaultand

heB reliesinthisregardon:(i)theprovisionsofthePoliceAct,7of1958;(ii)certainallegedpriorconduct.Theallegedpriorconduct,

however,consistedofnomorethanafailuretopreventBarnardfromenteringand/orremaininginthepolicestation.Itisclearfromthe

respondent'spleadingsthathiscaseisthatinassaultingtherespondentBarnard(whowasalsoapoliceman)wasonafrolicofhisownandthat

therewasno C connectionbetweenBarnardandtheotherpolicemeninthenormalsenseoftheword.Theexceptionisbasedonthe

contentionthattherewasnolegaldutyonthepolicemeninquestiontointerveneinthecircumstanceswhetherbyvirtueoftheprovisionsof

thePoliceActorbyvirtueoftheallegedpriorconductand,inthealternative,insofarasthePoliceActisconcerned,eveniftherewasalegal

dutywhichwasnotDheededbythepolicemen,thisdidnotgiverisetoanycivilliabilitytotherespondent.ThejudgmentoftheCourtaquo

proceededonaverynarrowbasiswhichmaybesummedupasfollows:(a)ifapersonisincontrolofanotherandfailstopreventthatother

fromcommittingadelictthatpersonisguiltyofactionableculpa;(b)thepolicemeninquestionwereEincontrolofBarnardbecause:(i)oneof

themenjoyedahigherrankinthepoliceforcethanBarnard;and(ii)theprovisionsofthePoliceActconferanimpliedcontrolinfavourof

PolicemenoveranyotherpersonwhocommitsacrimeintheirpresenceinthatthePoliceActlaysdownthatitisthefunctionofthepoliceto

preventcrimeandtomaintainlawandorder.InanyeventtheCourtaquoerredinfindingthat,Finrelationtotheassaultontherespondent,

BarnardwasunderthecontrolofthepolicemenwhetherbyreasonofthefactthatoneofthepolicemenheldahigherrankthanBarnardorby

reasonoftheprovisionsofthePoliceAct.InrelationtothequestionwhetherSgt.Wood'shigherrankconferredonhimanycontrolover

BarnardvisàvistheassaultPhilpottvWhittal,Elston&Crosby,1907E.D.C.193,relieduponbytheGCourtaquo,isdistinguishable.

Itiswellestablishedinourlawthatgenerallyspeakingliabilityindelictdoesnotarisesolelyfromanomissionstrictosensu.SeeRegalvAfrican

SuperSlate,1963(1)SAatp.109E;Silva'sFishingCorporationvMaweza,1957(2)SAatpp.260H,261F;PeriUrbanAreasHealthBoardv

Munarin,1965(3)SAatp.373E.Therewillbeliability,Hhowever,inrespectofanomissionwherethereisalegaldutyinthecircumstancesto

act.Munarin'scase,supraatp.373EG;Silva'scase,supraatpp.264H265A.Therespondentseekstofoundhiscaseonthealleged

existenceofsuchalegaldutyinthepresentmatter.Hecontendsthatthepolicemenwereinlawobligedtoact,firstly,byreasonofstatutory

provisionsand,secondly,byreasonofallegedpriorconduct.Onaniceanalysisoftherespondent'spleadingstherewasinfactnopriorconduct

suchasisrequiredbeforeanyliabilityforanomissionmayarise.TousethewordsinSilva's

1975(3)SAp592

case:thepolicemenhadnothingtodowithcreatingthesituationtheymerelyhappenedtobethere. Silva'scase,supraatp.260H.Any

conductontheirpart,therefore,didnotcreatealegaldutytoactandtheirfailuretoactcannotfoundanyliabilityonthepartofthe

appellant.InregardtoAtheprovisionsofthePoliceAct,nodutyinthesenseofanobligationtotherespondentisimposed.Althoughsec.5

providesthatthefunctionsofthepoliceforceare,interalia,thepreventionofcrimeandthemaintenanceoflawandorder,thisdoesnotmean

thatthepoliceareobligedvisàvisamemberofthepublicinfacttoperformthesefunctionswhenBthecircumstancesaresuchthatthe

functionscanbeperformed.Ananalysisoftheimportofsuchacontentionwouldshowthatitcarriesitsownrefutation.Cf.DeasevMinister

vanJustisie,1962(3)SAatpp.2178;WolpevOfficerCommanding,SAPoliceJohannesburg,1955(2)SAatp.93A.Alternatively,evenwere

theActtoimposeadutyonthepoliceCforcetocarryoutthefunctionslaiddownintheAct,thefailuretocarryoutthedutywouldnotgive

risetoanycivilliability.Thegeneralprincipleapplicablehereisthatthequestionwhetheracivilactionshouldlieinrespectofafailuretoheed

thedutydependsonwhethertheLegislatureinenactingtheprovisioninquestionintendedthatsuchanactionshouldlie.HallandAnotherv

EdwardSnell&Co.Ltd.,1940DN.P.D.atp.329.TheLegislaturedidnotintendthattherespondentshouldhaveacivilactionagainsta

policemanifthelattershouldfailtocarryoutanydutyimposeduponhimundertheAct.CutlervWandsworthStadiumLtd.,(1949)1AllE.R.at

p.552A;Halsbury,(Simondsed.),vol.36,p.453,footnoteG;TheLiquidator,CapeCentralRailwaysvNothlin,8ES.C.atpp.2830.The

generalrulethatwhereanActitselfprovidesaremedyforthebreach,thereisnotalsoanadditionalremedyofacivilactionfordamages,

wouldapplyafortioriwheretheremedyprovidedisacriminalsanction.Thisfeatureemphasisesthattheobligationisimposedforthepublic

benefitandthatthebreachisapublicandnotaprivatewrong.SeeCutler'scase,supraatp.548H.

C.F.Howie,namensdierespondent:ThefunctionsoftheFPolice,aslaiddownintheActandtheregulations,aresynonymouswiththeir

duties:cf.DeasevMinisterofJustice,1962(3)SAatp.218A,and,therefore,itisthedutyofthePolicetopreventcrimeandtomaintainlaw

andorder.RespondentsuesonthebasisofnegligentperformanceofastatutorydutynotonthebasisofbreachofastatutorydutyGperse,

asargued.Anactionbasedonthelatterkindofbreach,whilstconceivablyrequiringproofoffaultasanelementofthecauseofaction,does

notalwaysnecessarilyrequireproofofnegligence:DaSilvavCoutinho,1971(3)SAatpp.140E141C,p.144AD.Ithaspatentlybeen

respondent'scasethatappellant'sservantsactednegligentlyinbreachingthedutyimposedonthembythePoliceAct.Thereforetheissueis

not,whetherabreachperseoftheHPoliceActisactionableatcivillawbutwhetherthefactsdisclosedbyrespondent'spleadingspermitof

anactionfordamagesbasedonnegligence.Accordinglyitwaspermissibleand,indeed,requiredoftheCourtaquotoconsider,interalia,the

questionwhetherappellant'sservantshadauthorityandcontroloverBarnardandtohaveregardtothefactthatBarnardwashimselfmember

oftheForce.Itisclearthatifadutytoactexistedthenappellant'sservantsdidnothingtofulfilsuchduty.Thecrucialissueis,therefore,

whetheradutytoactexistedinthecircumstancesallegedbyrespondent.Theomissiontoactwherethereisadutytoacttoavoidreasonably

1975(3)SAp593

foreseeablelosstoanotherisactionableirrespectiveoftheabsenceofpriorconductrelatedtosuchomission: MinisterofForestryv

Quathlamba(Pty.)Ltd.,1973(3)SAatp.82AF.Thedutytoacttoavoidsuchlossmaybeimposedbystatuteorbythecommonlaw:Van

denHeever,AquilianDamagesinSAALaw,p.42;R.G.McKerron,"LiabilityforOmissions",SALawJournal,1961atpp.389,390;Silva'sFishing

Corporation(Pty.)Ltd.vMaweza,1957(2)SAatpp.265C266G.Inthecircumstancesofthepresentcasetherewasadutyonappellant's

servantstopreventtheassault.Thisdutyarosebyreasonof:(a)theirrelationshipto,andthereforetheircontrolover,Barnard;alternatively

(b)theircontrolovertheBpremiseswhereintheassaultoccurred,thecontrolinbothinstancesbeingderivedfromthetermsofthePoliceAct

readwiththeregulations.SergeantWoodwasBarnard'sseniorandWoodhadatleastfoursubordinatesathisdisposalthroughwhomtorestrain

Barnard.Thereexistednotonlyauthorityandcontrolbyvirtueofseniorrankbutalsosuchauthorityaswasconveyedbythetermsofsec.5of

thePoliceAct,7of1958,Cwhichobligedandauthorisedthesaidservantsofappellanttointerveneinordertomaintainlawandorderand

preventcrime. Dig.9.2.44.1and9.2.45(preamble)(translatedinVandenHeever, AquilianDamages,supra)constituteclearcommonlaw

authorityforholdingamasterliableforfailuretorestrainhissubordinatefromwrongwheretheformerknowsofthe Dwrongdoingandcan

preventit.ThosetextswerespecificallyreliedoninPhilpottvWhittalandOthers,1907E.D.C.atp.207;seealsoSilva'scase,supraatp.266;

MtativMinisterofJustice,1958(1)SA221EllisvHomeOffice,(1953)2AllE.R.149;D'ArcyvPrisonCommissioners,(1955)TheTimes,15,

16,17November(bothreferredtowithapprovalinHomeEOfficevDorsetYachtCo.Ltd.,(1970)2AllE.R.atpp.302B309D);Ministerof

PolicevVanAswegen,1974(2)SA101;AmericanRestatementoftheLaw(Second)(1965),Torts(Negligence),vol.2,sec.W.315,pp.122,

123;sec.319,p.129;sec.322,p.133.

Astocontroloverthepremises:Anowneroroccupieroflandhasadutytoseethatreasonablyforeseeableandavoidable F harmisnot

causedtoothersbyasourceofdangeronhisland,e.g.afire:Quathlamba'scase,supra.Heissimilarlychargedwithsuchdutywherehehas

onhislandaviciousanimal,cf.MoubrayvSyfret,1935ADatpp.203,210.Thereisnoreasonwhyinprincipleheshouldnotbearalikeduty

wherethesourceofdangerisapersonwithovertlydangerousGpropensitiesorintentions.VanAswegen'scase,supra,recognisestheneed

properlytocontrolsuchapersonwhereheisnotonthepremisesofthecustodian.Therewouldbejustasmuchneedtorestrainhimwherehe

isuponsuchpremises.Thiscaseisanalogoustothe Quathlambatypeofcase.Thislineofargumentissupportedbythe American

Restatement,supra,sec.314A,pp.118,119and120;sec.317,p.125.AstoadutyHarisingonthebasisthatareasonablemanwouldhave

foreseenandavoidedharm(assumingforthesakeofargumentthatthecontrolcontendedforaboveiseithernotperseadecisiveenough

factortocreatethedutyornotadequateenoughcontrolfortheaforegoingcontentionstoprevail),thequestionarisesastowhenadutywill

existifthelawhasnotalready,inthepast,labelledagivensituationasdemandingadutytoact.Eachnewsituationwillbeconsideredonits

meritsonitsownparticularfactsseenagainstthebackgroundoftheneedsofthecommunityattherelevanttime:seeWinfieldandJolowicz,

onTort,9thed.,(1971),atpp.46

1975(3)SAp594

RUMPFFHR

lastpara47firstpara.;pp.47lastpara48firstpara.,pp.57secondpara58firstpara.;ClarkandLindsell,Tort,13thed.,pp.474,475;

Silva'scase,supraatpp.263DE,265.Areasonablemaninthepositionofappellant'sservantswouldhaveforeseentheprobability(notA

merelythereasonablepossibility)ofharmorfurtherharmtorespondentifBarnardwerenotrestrainedandsuchreasonablemanwouldhave

actedtoeffectthenecessaryrestraint.Thetestoftheforesightofthereasonablemanissufficientwhereontodeterminetheexistenceornot

ofthedutytoavoidomission:Price,ActaJuridica,1962,atpp.7880;DorsetYachtcase,supra.

Stewart,S.C.,inrepliek.

BCur.adv.vult.

Postea(Mei23).

Judgment

RUMPFF,H.R.:Indiepleitstukkevan'nverhoorsaakindieCOosKaapseAfdelinghetdieeiser(dierespondentinhierdieHof)skadevergoeding

van'nsekereBarnardenvandieverweerder(dieappellantinhierdieHof)geëis.Hyhetbeweerdathyop20Desember1971deurBarnard,wat

'npolisiemanwas,optweegeleenthedeaangerandisendaardeurskadegelyhet.Dieeerstegeleentheidwasby'nkafeeinUmtataendaarna

byDdiepolisiestasiealdaar.Tenopsigtevandieeerstegeleentheidhethy'nbedraggeëisvanBarnardalleenterwylhytenopsigtevandie

tweedegeleentheid'nbedraggeëishetvanBarnardenvanverweerdergesamentlikenafsonderlik.Syeisteenverweerderisgebaseerop

sekerefeitlikebeweringsindiebesonderhedevansyeis.HyhetbeweerdatBarnardhomindieportaalvandiepolisiestasievoordieoopdeur

vandieEklagtekantoorasookopdietrappevoordiepolisiestasieaangerandhet.Hyhetverderbeweerdattentydevandieaanrandingsekere

ledevandiepolisiemagdiensgedoenhetindiepolisiekantoorenditbeheerhet.Hullewas'nsersantWood,tweeblankekonstabels,Nelen

Hattingh,enverskeieswartkonstabels.HyhetverderbeweerdattydensdieFaanrandinghierdiepolisiemanneindienswasvandieverweerder

enopgetreehetindieloopvanhulwerkenditisdiekernvansysaakdathullenalatiglikversuimhetomBarnardteverhinderomhomaan

terandofhomteenaanrandingdeurBarnardtebeskerm.Innaderebesonderhedewathyverskafhet,heteiserbeweerdattydensdie

aanrandingsersantWooddeurdieportaalindieklagtekantoorgeloophetGendatHattinghuitdiekantoorgestaphet.Aldiepolisiemannewas

bewusvandieaanranding.Op'nvraagvanverweerderopwelkegrondeeiserdieaanspreeklikheidvandieverweerderbaseer,heteiser

geantwoorddatditdiepligvandiepolisiemannewasomeisertebeskermluidensdiebepalingsvanart.5vandiePolisiewet,7van1958,enop

grondvansekerevoorafgaandegedragvanhierdiepolisiemanne.HierdieHvoorafgaandegedragsoubestaanhetuitdiefeitdathulleBarnardin

diepolisiestasietoegelaathetofdathulletoegelaathetdathydaarblyterwylhyklaarblyklikdaarwasmet'nonwettigedoel.Dieverweerder

heteksepsieaangetekenteeneisersevordering,soosaangevuldeurdienaderebesonderhede,opgronddaarvandatdiePolisiewet,7van

1958,nie'nregspligopdiepolisiemannegelêhetomeisertebeskermnieof'nsivieleaanspreeklikheidgeskephetnieendatdiegedragvandie

polisiemannenievanso'naardwasdat'nregspligomeisertebeskermontstaanhetnie.

DieHofaquohetdieeksepsievandiehandgewysmetkosteenverloftot

1975(3)SAp595

RUMPFFHR

appèlverleen.InsyuitspraakhetdieHofaquohomwesenlikuitsluitlikberoepopdiebeslissinginPhilpottvWhittal,ElstonandCrosoy&Co.,

1907E.D.C.193.Philpott,'nlanddros,hetskadevergoedinggeëisweenslasterin'nartikelin'nkoerant.Dieartikelheto.a.'nverslagbevatvan

'nvergaderingvandieBoloFarmersAssociationwaarvanWhittal A dievoorsitterwas.Dieverslaghetverwysna'nbesluitwatopdie

vergaderinggeneemisenwaarin'naantyginggemaakisdatdielanddrostenopsigtevanoortredingsvandieLocationActvan1899

bevooroordeeldwas.DieHofhetbevinddatWhittalasvoorsittergehelphetmetdieopstelvandiebesluitmetdiebedoelingengeloofdatdit

gepubliseersalword.DieHofhetBverdergegaanengesêdatasvoorsitterhykonverhinderhetdatdiesekretarisdiebesluitlaatpubliseer

het.Metverwysingo.a.naDig.9.2.44.1,waarvolgensdieeienaarvan'nslaafverantwoordelikisvirbeseringofdooddeurdieslaafveroorsaak

indiendiehandelingevandieslaafmetkennisvandieeienaarplaasvind,isdaaropgemerkdatkennisasCtoestemminggeagwordendathy

wat'naantastingvan'nanderkanverhinderenditniedoennie,aanspreeklikis.Ditisduidelikdatdithiergaanomdieaanspreeklikheidvan'n

persoontenopsigtevandiehandelingevan'nanderpersoonwaarooreersgenoemdebeheerhet.DieHofaquohetdanookbevinddatdierang

vansersantWoodvisàvisBarnarddienodigebeheervermoëaanduiendatdieeksepsieopdaardiegrondDafgewysbehoortteword,m.a.w.,

omdatsersantWooddienodigegesaggehadhetoorBarnardenWoodversuimhetomteenoorBarnardoptetree,worddieverweerder

aanspreeklikgeag.DieHofaquohetegterverdergegaanenbevinddataldiepolisiemanneindiepolisiekantoorin'nposisievangesagwas,

soosdeurdiePhilpottsaakbedoel,weensdiebepalingsvanart.5vandiePolisiewet,7van1958.InhierdieverbandwasEdieHofaquovan

meningdatditdiefunksievandiepolisieisomo.a.misdaadtevoorkomendatdiewoord"werksaamhede"inart.5(opEngels"functions")

sinoniemismetpligte.

WatdieuitspraakindieHofaquobetref,isditnodigomteverwysna'nbeweringindieeisersenaderebesonderhede,nl.datBarnardvir'n

onwettigedoelindiepolisiestasiewas.NaFaanleidinghiervanisditgemenesaakdatditimplisietaanvaarmoetworddatBarnardooktydens

dievoorvalindiepolisiestasieniediensgedoenhetnie.OmdatdieHof aquohomklaarblyklikindieeersteplekgestelhetopdiegesagvan

WoodoorBarnard,isonsverwysnasekereregulasiesuitgevaardigonderart.33vandiePolisiewet.HiervolgenswordGo.a.dierangeaangedui

(sersant,bv.,bokonstabel(reg.8)),worddieversuimom'nwettigebeveltegehoorsaam'noortredinggeag(reg.58(4))enmoet'nlidaanwie

'nwettigebevelgegeewordditonvoorwaardelikgehoorsaam(reg.73(1)).Weensmybenaderingvandiefeitevandiesaakvindekditonnodig

omtebeslisof'npolisiemanwatniediensdoennie,altydenoralonderhewigisaandiegesagvan'nmeerdere,maarHeksalaanvaardat

hierdiegesag,indieomstandighedevanhierdiesaak,welbestaanhet.Gesiendiefeitevandiesaak,soosbeweerindiepleitstukke,isdievraag

vangesaginhierdiesaakmynsinsiensnievandeurslaggewendebelangnieengevolglikdiebeslissingindiePhilpottsaakooknie.Indie

uitspraakvandieHofaquoisverderverwysnadiesogenaamde"voorafgaandegedrag"entenslotteisgesêdatdieversuimomaandieregsplig

tevoldoennalatigheidskepaandiekantvandiepolisiemanneomdathulldeurdieuitoefeningvanredelikesorgdieaanrandingkonverhoedhet.

1975(3)SAp596

RUMPFFHR

InhierdieHofisnamensrespondentuitdruklikaangevoerdatdieverweerdersesaak,onderandere,gebaseerisopdienalatigenienakomingvan

'nstatutêrepligennieopdieversuim,perse,om'nstatutêreplignatekomnie.

AWeensdiebevindingvandieHofaquoisditnodigom'nopinieuittespreekoordieuitwerkingvanart.5vandiePolisiewet.Art.5leessoos

volg:

"5.WerksaamhedevanSuidAfrikaansePolisieDiewerksaamhedevandieSuidAfrikaansePolisieis,ondermeer

(a)diebewaringvandiebinnelandseveiligheidvandieRepubliek;

B (b)diehandhawingvanwetenorde;

(c)dieondersoekvanenigemisdryfofbeweerdemisdryf;en

(d)dievoorkomingvanmisdaad."

IndiendiedoelvandieWetgewer,soosblykuithierdieWet,inaanmerkinggeneemword,kandit,mynsinsiens,niegesêword Cniedat'n

nienakomingvan'npolisiemanvandiebepalingsvanart.5noodwendig'nstatutêresivieleaanspreeklikheidindieleweroep.Diebedoelingvan

art.5isominbreëtrekkedieaardvandiewerksaamhedevandiepolisieaanteduiennêrensuitdieWetblykditdatditooitdiebedoelingwas

datdieblotenienakomingdeur'npolisiemanom'nbepaaldemisdaadtevoorkomofteondersoek'nstatutêredeliktueleonregmatigheidDskep

nie.'nTeenbedoelingskynteblykuitart.32wathandeloorverjaringenwatbepaaldat

"enigesivielegedingteendieStaatof'npersoontenopsigtevanenigietsuithoofdevanhierdieWetgedoen"

ingestelmoetwordbinnesesmaandenadatdieeisoorsaakontstaanhet.Desnieteminisdiestatutêrepligwatuitart.5Eblyktebestaan,'n

faktorwatindiefeitekompleksvanhierdiesaakwelinaanmerkinggeneembehoorttewordensalword,sooslatersalblyk.

Diefeitewatophierdiestadiumaanvaarmoetwordisdat,nadateiserdeurBarnardin'nkafeeaangerandis,hysyverskyningbythe

klagkantoorgemaakhet.Barnardhetniediensgedoennieenheteiserweero.a.intheportaalvandieFpolisiekantoorvoordiedeurvandie

klagtekantoortoegetakelsonderdat'nBlankesersant,tweeBlankekonstabelsenverskeieswartkonstabels,watdaardiensgedoenhet,enige

pogingaangewendhetomhomtehulptekom.Hierdiepolisiemannewasbewusvandieaanrandingopeiser.Dievraagisofdieversuimvan

hierdiepolisiemanneominhierdieomstandighedeoptetreeeneisertehelpas'nonregmatigeGdaadteenooreiserbeskoumoetwordwaarvoor

dieverweerderaanspreeklikis.Ditwilvoorkomofthevraagstukvan'nlate,asdeliktueleonregmatigegedrag,tot'nmatevanklaarheid

ontwikkelhet,vgl.Silva'sFishingCorporation(Pty.)Ltd.vMaweza,1957(2)SA256(AA);RegalvAfricanSuperslate(Pty.)Ltd.,1963(1)SA

102(AA);MinisterofForestryvQuathlamba(Pty.)Ltd.,1973(3)SA69(AA).AsHuitgangspuntwordaanvaardatdaarindiealgemeengeen

regspligop'npersoonrusomteverhinderdatiemandandersskadelynie,alsouso'npersoonmaklikkonverhinderdatdieskadegelyworden

alsouvanso'npersoonverwagkonword,opsuiwermorelegronde,dathydaadwerklikoptreeomdieskadeteverhinder.Ookwordegter

aanvaardatinsekereomstandighededaar'nregspligop'npersoonrusomteverhinderdatiemandandersskadely.Versuimhyomdaardieplig

uittevoer,ontstaandaar'nonregmatigelatewataanleidingkangeetot'neisomskadevergoeding.Hierdiegevalleisniebeperktot'neienaar

vangrondwatdeursylateveroorsaakdatiemandandersdeurietswatinverbandstaan

1975(3)SAp597

RUMPFFFHR

metsygrondskadelynieof,indiealgemeen,totgevallewaardaar'nsekerevoorafgaandegedrag("priorconduct")wasnie.'nSekere

voorafgaandegedragofdiebeheerooreiendommag'nfaktorweesindietotaalvanomstandighedevan'nbepaaldegevalwaarvan

onregmatigheidafgeleiword,maarisnie'nAnoodwendigeonregmatigheidsvereistenie.Ditskynofdiéstadiumvanontwikkelingbereikiswaarin

'nlateasonregmatigegedragbeskouwordookwanneerdieomstandighedevandiegevalvanso'naardisdatdielateniealleenmorele

verontwaardigingontlokniemaarookdatdieregsoortuigingvandiegemeenskapverlangdatdielateasonregmatigbeskoubehoortteworden

datdiegeledeskadevergoedbehoortteword B deurdiepersoonwatnagelaathetomdaadwerklikoptetree.Omtebepaalofdaar

onregmatigheidis,gaandit,in'ngegewegevalvanlate,dusnieoordiegebruiklike"nalatigheid"vandiebonuspaterfamiliasnie,maaroordie

vraagof,naaanleidingvanaldiefeite,daar'nregspligwasomredelikoptetree.IndiemeerderheidsuitspraakindieCSilva'ssaak(waarin'n

vormvan"priorconduct"aanvaaris)isdaaraangevoerdatdaarnie'nalgemenereddingspligisnie('npligwatindaardiesaaktersprakegekom

het).

"Alegaldutytorescue,itwascontended,isspecialandrequiresaspecialprescription;itcannotariseoutofcircumstancessuchastheknowndangersofthe

operations,thejointinterestofthepartiesintheirsuccessorthelike,"

sowordhierdiebetoogweergegeeindieuitspraakopbl.263.DLaterwordhierteenoordievolgendegestel:

"Inmyviewthisargumentcannotbesupported.Adutytorescueisnotspecialorsubjecttopeculiarlyrestrictedrules.Itissimplyadutytoactreasonablyand

suchadutymayariseoutofthecircumstancesofthecase.ItwillbefortheCourttodecideineachcasewhetherthecircumstancesineachcasewhetherthe

circumstancesaresuchastogiverisetoalegalduty(cf.LordWRIGHTinBourhillvYoung,1943A.C.92atp.110)."

Netsogoedaswat'nreddingspliginsekereomstandighede'nEregspligmagwees,sou'nbeskermingsplig'nregspligkanwees.Enditsouvan

aldiefeiteafhangofso'nplig'nregspligsouweesofnie.Klaarblyklikisditonmoontlikomindiealgemeenvastestelwanneerso'nregspligsou

ontstaan.Indieonderhawigegevalhetonstedoenmet'naantalpolisiemannewatdiensdoenin'npolisiekantoor,'ngebouFwaaroordiePolisie

beheerhetenwaarheen'ngewoneburger,onderander,kanenmoetgaanom'nklagtetelê.Luidensdiebepalingsvanart.5vandiePolisiewet

iseenvandiewerksaamhedevandiepolisiedievoorkomingvanmisdaad.Virsoverdit'ngewoneburgerbetref,soudaardustussenhomen'n

polisieman,watdiensdoen,'nanderverhoudingkonontstaan Gasdiétussenhomen'nbelanglosevreemdeling.Watmisdaadbetref,isdie

polisiemannienetafskrikkerofopspoordernie,maarookbeskermer.DieeiserisaangerandindiepolisiekantooronderbeheervandiePolisieen

tenaanskouevan'naantalpolisiemannevanwieditgesamentlikredelikmoontlik,selfsmaklik,wasomdieaanvalopeiserteverhoedofte

beëindig.Ookisditinhierdiesaak'nbykomendefaktor HdatWood,indiebesondereomstandighede,assersantgesagkonuitoefenoor

Barnard.Ditdienegteropgemerkteworddatdieposisievandiepolisiemanneteenooreiserindieonderhawigesaak,inbeginsel,dieselfdesou

geweeshetindiendieaanrandervaneisernie'npolisiemanwasnie.

Wanneeraldieomstandighedeinaanmerkinggeneemword,meenekdatdiepligwatopdiepolisiemannegerushetomeisertehulptekom'n

regspligwasendat,omdatdit'nversuimwaswatplaasgevindhetindieloopvandiediensvandiepolisiemanne,verweerderaanspreeklikis.

1975(3)SAp598

RUMPFFHR

Volgensdiepleitstukkewasdiepolisiemannenalatig,enindiesamehangvandieeisoorsaakmoetditverstaanwordas'nbeweringdathulle

behoorttevoorsienhetdathullatedieeiserskadesoulaatlyendathulleversuimhetomdeurAredelikeoptrededieskadeteverhoed.Die

eisoorsaakbevatdusdiebeweringvan'nonregmatigelateenskuldendieeksepsieisteregafgewys.

Dieappèlwordafgewysmetkoste.

JANSEN,A.R.,TROLLIP,A.R.,MULLER,A.R.,enVANZIJL,WN.A.R.,hetsaamgestem.

BAppellantseProkureurs:Whiteside,SmitenAlmon,Grahamstad;AdjunkStaatsprokureur,Bloemfontein.RespondentseProkureurs:Wheeldon,

RushmereenCole,Grahamstad;WebberenNewdigate,Bloemfontein.

Minister VAN Polisie v Ewels 1975 (3) SA 590 (A)

Criminal law (LAWS 2014)

University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg

Recommended for you

Comments

Students also viewed

Related documents

Related Studylists

Preview text

Minister VAN Polisie v Ewels 1975 (3) SA 590 (A)

Course: Criminal law (LAWS 2014)

University: University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg

Recommended for you

Students also viewed

Related documents