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Waltz Neorealism Confusions and Criticisms
Course: political science hons
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Guest Essay
NEOREALISM: CONFUSIONS AND CRITICISMS
Kenneth Waltz
C
onfusion begins with misunderstanding how theories are made and
failure to comprehend what they can and cannot do. I define a theo-
ry as a mental picture of a domain – a picture showing how the
domain is organized and how its parts are connected. Theory isolates a realm
in order to deal with it intellectually. A mental picture, for example of a
national economy or of an international-political system, is a simplified rep-
resentation. To display important causes and effects, the picture has to omit
most everything that goes on in an economy or in an international-political
system. A theory is an instrument intended to be useful in explaining what
happens in a defined realm of activity. To criticize a theory for its omissions
is odd because theories are mostly omission. One is sometimes told that
something should be added to a theory in order to bring it closer to reality.
Yet the development of science, whether in physics or economics, has pro-
gressed by taking long steps away from direct experience of the world and
depicting it in highly abstract terms. Simplification often comes through
assumptions incorporated in a theory. That mass concentrates at a point is an
example of a simplifying assumption made in Newtonian physics. That peo-
ple are economic maximizers is a similar example in microeconomics and
that states act to ensure their survival is an example of structural theory.
The structure or international politics is sparsely defined by anarchy,
which is the ordering principle of the realm, and by the distribution of capa-
bilities across states. Should we not add something to the definition? Some
have complained that normative considerations are omitted. Should they be
added? To ask the questions is like asking whether we should add to a theo-
ry that explains gravity a warning that it is unwise to fall from high buildings.
Others have complained that such obviously important matters as economic
relations, technological change, and demographic patterns are omitted.
Many critics of structural theory seem to believe that if a variable is omitted
from a theory, adding it will make the theory stronger. A theory, however, is
not a collection of variables. To add to a theory something that one believes
has been unduly omitted requires showing how it can take its place as one
element of a coherent and effective theory. If that were easy to do we would
Waltz is an Adjunct Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University. This article is an
excerpt from his introduction to a new edition of The Theory of International Relations.
Journal of Politics & Society
be blessed with a wealth of strong and comprehensive theories.
The matters omitted are not neglected when a theory is used. Theories
are sparse in formulation and beautifully simple. Reality is complex and often
ugly. Predictions are not made, nor explanations contrived, by looking at a
theory and inferring something about particular behaviors and outcomes
from it. How could that be done when the empirical mater that must be con-
sidered in making predictions or fashioning explanations can not be includ-
ed in a theory? A theory is an instrument used to explain “the real world” and
perhaps to make some predictions about it. In using the instrument, all sorts
of information, along with a lot of good judgment, is needed. Theories don’t
predict, people do.
Another criticism claims that new realism is simply old realism made rig-
orous. The validity of that judgment depends on what one thinks old realists
were saying. Traditional realists are behavioralists; they believe that interna-
tional outcomes are determined by the decision of states, the behaving units.
Causations goes in one direction, from the internal composition of states to
the outcomes their behaviors supposedly produce. This has been the usual
way of thinking. Socialists as well as liberals are examples of this. Mao
Zedong like Woodrow Wilson believed that good states would live at peace
with one another, and bad states would make war. The communist and the
liberal democrat agreed on how to explain international events. They dis-
agreed merely on how to define good and bad. New realism turns old realism
upside down. The old realism is behavioral: good states produce good out-
comes; bad states, bad ones. The new realism is structural: outcomes depend
not only, and often not mainly, on the qualities of states, but also on varia-
tion of the structure within which their actions occur.
Perhaps the most common criticism of structural theory is that is fails to
include consideration of the effects of the policies and behaviors of states on
international politics. True, states are omitted from structural theory. It is,
after all, a theory about international politics and not a theory about foreign
policy. A neorealist theory of international politics explains how external
forces shape states’ behavior, but says nothing about the effects of internal
forces. Under most circumstances, a theory of international politics is not
sufficient, and cannot be made sufficient, for the explanation of foreign pol-
icy. An international political theory can explain states’ behavior only when
external pressures dominate the internal disposition of states, which seldom
happens. When they do not, a theory of international politics needs help.
The help is found outside the theory. Yet it is said that although neorealists
admit that unit-level causes are important, they refuse to include them in
their accounts. The peculiarity of this criticism is matched by the frequency
with which it is made. Obviously nobody, realist or otherwise, believes that
foreign policy and international politics can be understood without consid-