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Indian Feudalism Debate Essay
BA (Hons.) History
University of Delhi
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Q. Discuss the issues in the Indian Feudalism Debate.
Ans. The Early Medieval Period in Indian history is a relatively new concept in Indian historiography, and one that is the subject of intense debate, in terms of its chronology and nature. Different scholars have different views regarding its chronological bracket, but it is generally taken to be the period between c-1200. More difficult is the question of the theoretical framework within which to view this period and its changes, that make it distinct from the earlier ancient (early historical) period. One such theory is Indian Feudalism, mainly propounded by the Marxist historians, which has become the dominant way to identify this period, though it has been severely criticized by many in recent times.
Before we look into the Indian Feudalism Debate, let us first try and define the equally complex term, ‘feudalism’. Feudalism generally refers to the type of society that existed in Europe in the 5th-15th century A. It was based on a self-sufficient economy. It had a dominant class of landlords who extracted surplus product and labour services from peasants by extra-economic means. Peasants carried on the actual production, and also performed ‘forced labour’. They were attached to the soil held by these landed intermediaries.
Earlier the early medieval period in India was seen as a “Dark Age”, one of stagnation and decay. Marx’s concept of the Asiatic Mode of Production (AMP) depicted the India as an unchanging world of unstratified, communally landowning village societies and the absolute power of the ‘Oriental despot’. But this was contested for the first time in the 1950s by D. Kosambi, and later by other Indian historians. D. Jha and Irfan Habib have shown that the discussion on Indian feudalism began with the protracted Marxist debate on AMP. Today the notion of unchangeableness of Asiatic societies and ‘Oriental Despotism’ has been rejected. Instead, this is seen as a formative period, one of considerable change.
In the 1940s, writers like B. Datta and S. Dange spoke of the growth of feudalism in India. Early scholars however, simply transplanted an essentially European concept of feudalism onto Indian soil, and spoke of an Indian variant of feudalism. However, a new genre of empirical works emerged in the 1950s, when, through a reasoned argument, ‘feudal
polity’ was shown to be a stage which represented a structural change in the Indian social and economic order, characterized by a hierarchy of intermediaries between the state and the peasantry.
D. Kosambi was the first to give this conceptual definition of feudalism in India (1956). He spoke of “feudalism from above”, which was essentially political feudalism, when during the pre-4th century A. period, after conquest and political expansion, kings began to transfer their fiscal and administrative rights over land to subordinate autonomous chiefs, who recognized the suzerainty of the central authority and paid him tribute. It reached an advanced stage of development during the Gupta period and later, when “a class of landowners developed within the village between the state and the peasantry, gradually to wield armed power on the local population”, i., “feudalism from below”, essentially socio- economic in nature. Recent writings have largely bypassed Kosambi’s idea, although the essential variables of the Indian feudalism construct are also present in his formulation. Sharma suggests that we may look for “feudalism from below” in the initial stage also, as the grants from lower officials, village elders and heads of tribes, clans or families are not recorded.
Niharranjan Ray, a contemporary of Kosambi, in his book ‘Bāngālir Itihās’, pointed to the emergence of a new state structure in the regional context of Bengal, as part of a pan-Indian phenomenon from the Gupta and post-Gupta times. This was marked by a hierarchical political order represented by sāmantas and mahāsāmantas, and tenuous bonds with political allies. The new economic order was characterized by local agrarian economy. This entire complex was called “Medievalism”, which existed approximately between the 7th/8th-12th centuries. He also suggested the characteristics which, for him, define Indian medievalism - regional ruling dynasties; natural economy; crystallization of a regional character of script, language and literature; proliferation of sects and sub-sects in religion; and development of art in the regional context. He associated the advent of medievalism with feudalism.
It was R. Sharma who brought together all earlier attempts to give a new, original framework for Indian Feudalism, based on substantial empirical research (1958, 1965). He also gave a Theory of Causation and attributed Indian feudalism to the process of making land grants. He
power to the beneficiary. Administrative rights were perhaps given up for the first time in the grants made to Buddhist monks by the Sātavāhana ruler Gautamiputra Śātakarni in the 2nd century A. Buddhaghosa (5th century A.) states that the brahmadeya grant carries with it judicial administrative rights. From the 5th century onwards, such grants became very frequent and developed certain features, which led to political decentralization. These were – the right to collect taxes from the peasants and enjoy the revenue of the land (fiscal power) along with the immunity from payment of taxes to the king (akaradāyī); the right of land not to be encroached upon by royal officers or the army (apravesya), which gave them a great deal of autonomy; judicial rights to punish thieves, as well as all offences against family, property, person etc. (sacauradanda); transfer of rights over resources of the land (pastures, forests, wells etc.); and the right to enjoy the hidden treasures of the village, like mines etc. Sometimes, the right to govern the inhabitants of the village was also granted. E. The Nalanda land grant of Samudragupta specifically attaches tax-paying artisans and peasants living in the donated village to the beneficiaries. Thus the widespread practice of making land grants in the Gupta period paved the way for the rise of brāhmana feudatories, who became a new source of authority or state power. The functions which were hitherto performed by the state officials were now step by step abandoned first to the priestly class and later to the warrior class.
Grants were also given to merchant guilds (śrenis), who has their own rules and regulated their own affairs, without interference from the state. Their autonomy crystallized by the late Gupta period. A set of charters from western India, dated to the close of the 6th century, addressed a group of traders and granted them various immunities like exemption from various dues; and freedom to deal with their labourers and impose forced labour on certain artisans. They were also allowed immunity from the entry of royal officials in their area. Grants were also made to pay military generals and officers in lieu of their salaries in later times. This is suggested by the breakup of the army into small garrisons, and the emergence of virtually autonomous military officials.
Dilution of the state’s power led to the emergence of a political hierarchy. Rank becomes important. This is suggested by the presence a wide range of semi-autonomous rulers/chiefs, who had designations such as ksatrapa, mahāksatrapa, dandanāyaka, mahādandanāyaka, rājā,
mahārājā, mahārājādhirāja etc. These designations became much more elaborate in subsequent centuries, indicative of greater degree of political hierarchy. The Aparājitaprcchā of Bhatta Bhuvanadeva, written in Gujarat (12th century), specifies the size of residence for nobles of 9 categories including mahāmandaleśvara, māndalika, mahāsāmanta, sāmanta and laghusāmanta. Hierarchy is also indicated by the positioning of numerous rājapurusas employed by royal courts. The epigraphs suggest terms for various types of vassals, known as bhogī, bhogika, bhogapatika, mahābhogī, brhadbhogī, brhadbhogika, rājā, rājyanaka, thakkura, mahāsāmantādhipati, mahāsāmantarānaka etc. It speaks of 8 categories of feudal vassals when it describes a typical feudal court. Artisans and merchants were also given feudal titles indicating military and administrative ranks. The Deopara inscription of Vijayasena mentions that Śūlapānī, head of the artisans of Varendrī, held the title rānaka. The chief obligation of the vassal was to render military aid to their lords. Thus, it seems that multiple foci of political authority emerged in the Gupta and post-Gupta periods.
Economic Feudalism, the basis of Sharma’s conception of feudalism, is characterized by ruralization. Its main aspects are – the emergence of landed intermediaries; the presence of a closed, natural economy and the emergence of the village as a self-sufficient unit of production and distribution; and agrarian expansion on a substantially large scale. These structural changes in the economy are again traced to the growth of land grants, which granted extensive privileges to the donees. This disturbed and finally transformed the existing agrarian order. They gave the donee the right to enjoy different types of resources from the land, including its produce, cash and unpaid labour. The range of resources which donees received through land grants became wider in later times. Moreover, land grants were permanent or at least tended to become hereditary, reducing the original cultivators to the position of tenants who could even suffer eviction. They also stipulated non-interference from state officials, and granted legal and administrative immunities, making the donees autonomous of the authority of the state.
Ruralization led to rural stratification, i., the introduction of different tiers of rights on land in the countryside. A layer of intermediaries emerged between the state and the producing classes, and new groups of superior landed elements were created. Land grants gave
of untouchability. According to Sharma, in 600-1200 A., a process of ‘acculturation’ began. A number of social groups such as carmakara (leather worker), rajaka (washer-man), bamboo-worker and basket- marker came to be regarded as untouchables. They were called asat (impure), adharmasamkara (created by unholy mixture) and antyaja (the last).
Since the rise of feudalism is traced to land grants, there now arises the question of why such grants, which gave away the sovereignty of the state, were made. The charters say that the givers, mainly kings, wanted to acquire religious merit, and the receivers, mainly priests and monks, needed the means to perform religious rites. R. Sharma explains them using a Theory of Causation, citing two crises as the reason for the prevalence of land grants. The Economic Crisis started with the decline in India’s long-distance trade. Trade with the Roman empire ended in the 3 rd century A. due to its decline; and silk trade with Iran and the Byzantium stopped in the middle of the 6th century. The coastal areas of India continued some commerce with China and Southeast Asia, but this had little impact on the internal economy of the country. Decline in trade is demonstrated by the paucity of coins from the Gupta period onwards, both in North and South India. Fa-Xian stated that cowries formed the common medium of exchange. This factor can also be linked up to the weakening of the power of the centre, which gradually adopted the method of paying officials by grants of revenues or in kind. Shortage of coins implies that urban life began to disappear. Many old commercial towns decayed, and in many urban sites, habitation disappeared after the 6 th century A., e. Mathura, Vaiśālī, Champa etc. Xuan Tsang speaks of the decline of Buddhist towns. The urban commercial centers, nigamas, began to be interpreted as villages in some Post-Gupta texts and their seals also disappeared. So decommercialization, demonetization, and deurbanization made land grants a device for payment for services in lieu of cash salaries.
Sharma also considers the nature of internal social dynamics as responsible for land grants. He speaks of a Social Crisis , based on the accounts of the Kali Age (Yuga) in the Pūranas. It is attributed to natural calamities such as famine and drought; and more importantly, oppressive taxes. It affected the production relations on which the ancient social order was erected, where the production activities were carried on by
peasants (vaiśyas) and labourers (śūdras). But between the 3rd and 4th centuries A., Pūranic texts say that the lower varnas discarded the functions assigned to them and refused to pay taxes and render labour service. This led to varnasamkara or the intermixture of social classes. This made tax collection difficult and hence the state began to assign land revenues directly to officers through land grants, in lieu of salaries and remuneration. It helped the state get better control over the producing classes, because the burden of tax collection and law-keeping in the donated areas was passed to the beneficiaries.
R. Sharma’s theory is taken forward by the works of scholars like D. Jha and B.N. Yadava. Yadava elaborates the concept of the Kali Age as a period of allegedly sharp class antagonism, which led to the emergence of the feudal order. He provided evidence for an increasing practice of land grants to military officers during the post-Gupta period. However, Chattopadhyaya says that these post-dates the assumed genesis of feudal polity. Hence service land grants acted as a facet and not as a precondition to the emergence of the overall pattern of political dominance - a superior landed nobility.
The feudalism theory generated considerable debate among scholars about the nature of early medieval social formation. The most influential structural criticism comes from Harbans Mukhia. Mukhia says that applying feudalism to India is inapt, because its defining characteristic is absent, i., the structured dependence between the landlord and the peasant, where the landlord owns the land and the peasant is a mere tenant. This is because the land grants transferred only the right to enjoyment of the land, not its ownership. Moreover, there is free peasant production as the peasant controlled the process of production. He owned the means of production, e. tools, and controlled decisions such as what to sow and when. In addition, Mukhia says that the landlords didn't need to enserf the peasant because of the high soil fertility and the low subsistence needs of the Indian peasantry, which resulted in a high surplus.
R. Sharma responds to Mukhia’s criticism, saying that land does not mean anything without its products. The peasant may have possessed land, labour, cattle and agricultural implements but his ‘control’ over the means of production was not very effective as the fruits of production
place; in India the establishment of feudalism is attributed primarily to state action in granting land in lieu of salary or in charity, and the action of the grantees in subjecting the peasantry by means of legal rights assigned to them by the state. It is, indeed, a moot point whether such complex social structures can be established through administrative and legal procedures. Mukhia ends by saying that if feudalism ended in the 11 th-12th centuries as Sharma says, then it remains to characterize the 6 centuries falling between this decline and India’s colonization – “a sad comment on the lack of rigor in the concept of Indian feudalism”.
Questions about the methodology used by Sharma have been raised. D. Sircar questions the interpretation made by Sharma of certain terms used in the inscriptions. He says the key terms were misunderstood by Sharma, e. there is no transfer of ownership rights of the land but only the transfer of revenue. He also questions the assumption that the terms used actually imply a transfer of artisans and peasants with the land. Such controversies, to an extent, derive from the difficulty of finding appropriate English equivalents of the terms used, e. sāmanta. Along with others, Sircar also raises a very important point – the overwhelming majority of the land grants are made to the temples and brāhmanas. Service grants begin to be made only towards 1000-1200 A. onwards. So Kulke suggests that the purpose of the land grants was ritual legitimization, not reflecting a crisis. He says that they played an integrative role, not a fragmentary one. Another loophole in the theory is pointed out - why would the state unilaterally dilute its own authority? The majority of the charters give grants without stipulating any obligation of the donees to the donor. There seems to be no logical reason why the state would give the right to enjoy revenue to intermediaries who kept it themselves, and did not benefit the state.
B. Chattopadhyaya says the role of land grants as a mean of exploitation is over-emphasized, because one doesn’t even know the proportion of the total cultivable land that was being granted. If it was under 1% of the total land under the state, then it cannot be so important. Moreover, he says that subjection of peasantry as a blanket concept, implying the existence of peasantry as one category and land grantees as exploiters as another, which needs to be changed to examine the actual compositions of these groups within the frameworks of state structures.
Chattopadhyaya has raised conceptual and empirical arguments against de-urbanization and de-commercialization. He provides empirical evidence to show that foreign trade did not decline but continued, and the continued participation by Indians in this trade is attested to by a variety of sources. Foreign trade, however, is not central to the argument here, as even a decline in foreign trade may not necessarily imply a decline in internal trade. Similarly, he says that the economic basis of the urban centers was an agricultural surplus generated by expansion and new methods of cultivation. So cities could not decline due to trade decline because they were not dependent on it. He gives evidence to show a continuation of urbanization in early medieval India. Certain cities like Ahicchatrā, Kauśāmbī, Kapilavāstu etc. showed a continuation in occupation. Amita Ray has demonstrated that this was a period of urbanization in Bengal, while R. Champaklakshmi has similarly demonstrated this for Tamil Nadu. In fact, in Tamil Nadu, land grants were actually responsible for the spread of urbanization as they led to agrarian expansion, with led to growth of urban centers. Chattopadhyaya also says that even if some early medieval cities did decline, agrarian expansion led to trade and exchange, which led to the development of local exchange nodes from the 9th century onwards, providing the kernel of a new kind of urbanism in early medieval times. Markets called hatta became centers around which new towns developed. E. Tattānandapura, Sīyadoni, Gopagiri. This he regards as the third phase of urbanization in India. Such a developmental process of urban centers would not, however, preclude the possibility of long-distance contacts. E. at Sīyadoni, the presence of a mandapikā would imply outside trade contacts. In regions like Rajasthan and Gujarat, the proliferation of such nodes and linkages between them resulted in intra-regional and inter-regional movement of resources, leading to a growth in commerce. Also, the alleged decay of urban settlements coincides with, or sometimes even precedes, the period when land grants actually start proliferating. This may preclude any possible connection between them, as the full impact of a land grant economy, if there was any such impact, ought to have taken some more time to assert itself.
John Deyell has shown that demonetization of the economy, as suggested by R. Sharma, is not based on facts. By a study of the coin hoard finds, metrology and metal composition, he concludes that money production and money circulation in the area between Afghanistan and
of a strong, centralized state like that of the Mauryas. He suggests that one should not view the polity of this time in negative terms, as one of decentralization, fragmentation, disintegration etc. Instead it may be seen in terms of the scale of certain fundamental movements within the regional and local levels, and not in terms of the crisis of a pre-existent, pan-Indian social order. He identifies 3 major inter-related historical processes that help us understand the intense process of state formation; and examines their crystallization in their specific temporal and spatial contexts. The first is economic, i., agricultural expansion that intensified and widened its geographical horizons in this period. The social process was a consequence of the economic, as due to the spread of agriculture, the pre-existing indigenous tribes got incorporated into the caste system at lower levels, leading to a spurt in untouchability. This has been described as movement “from tribe to caste” (Kosambi), “acculturation” (Sharma), Peasantization of tribes and “Sanskritization” (Srinivas). The essence of the religious process was cult appropriation and integration of local cults to supra-local cult-heads. Tribal and lower order gods were absorbed into 3 principal cults of Viśnu, Śiva and Śakti. E. Balarāma, associated with the plough and the Nāga cult, was assimilated with Krsna, who was further incorporated into the Vaiśnava cult. Hanumān represented a totemic cult who came to be known as an avatāra of Śiva. Tantrism also provides an example of the integration of tribal cults into a pan-Indian brāhmanical cult based on the worship of the mother goddess.
Chattopadhyaya says that the political process drew on these three processes. Agrarian expansion into newer areas led to a surplus, which was a pre-requisite for the formation of state society. Tribes getting assimilated into the varna structure led to social stratification, another pre-condition for state formation. Also, these tribes also had their own chiefs and leaders. They entered the structure at a higher level, i., as ksatriyas, through various means that sanctified tribal non-Sanskritic leaders and validated them. The term samskāravarjitah (deprived of rituals) applied to these second-class ksatriyas (vrātya) was a euphemism for this admission into the brāhmanical social order through inferior rites. They became new contenders for power, leading to the emergence of new ruling lineages. These ruling lineages required ideological legitimization, before they could make a bid for power, which they got in three ways. First was the doctrine of bhakti, which was used to assimilate and justify the rise of certain groups in society, by integrating them with the existing
cults. One excellent example of this is the growth of the major state structure of the Coda-Gangas of Orissa in the 11th century and its linkage with the Jagannātha cult, which grew into a regional cult The grants of land to brāhmanas and temples can also be explained not in terms of the collapse of the state structure but in exactly the opposite way, i., the dimension of legitimation of state structure. Ruling families also established ancestral linkages with ancient mythical dynasties, propagating genealogical superiority. Early medieval rulers claimed descent from the solar and lunar dynasties in order to gain antiquity and respectability, to legitimize their position in the eyes of the people. A third way was what has been called “the construction of the royal mystique”, by as a network of inter-related symbols established through works of art such as courtly epics, royal biographies such as Mūsikavamśa and Vikramākadevacaritam, and ornate inscriptions such as those found in Cola and Pallava temples. An ideological aura was created around the king to justify his claims to kingship. This entire process has been termed as “Ksatriyization” (Kulke) or “Rajputization”.
The proliferation of ruling lineages and the formation of local and regional states is supported by evidence and one estimate says that in the 11 th century alone, there were about 40 states in the subcontinent. E. the Cahamanas ruled from different centers like Sakambhari, Broach, Dholpur, Pratapgarh, Ranthambore etc.; the Karnātas were a lineage from the Carnatic that branched to form ruling houses in Bengal and Bihar. Chattopadhyaya says that this process of Ksatriyization led to ‘Integrative State Formation’, when a local lineage expanded itself into a supra-local power, not only by eliminating the exiting bases of power, but also by integrating them. This was done by establishing kinship relations with other lineages, and pooling their military resources for expansion, spearheaded by the original lineage. All this was done within a monarchical framework, i., the local lineage recognized the king. Another characteristic was the emergence of a system of rank, defining the role, privileges and services of the junior lineages, allowing them to participate in power. Ranks as the basis of political organization also implies differential access to the centre. Thus, potential sources of tension were built into these structures Thus, the coming together of local processes led to expansion of state society through the processes of local state formation. An excellent example is the emergence of the Rajputs, who
- D. Jha (ed.) - Feudal Social Formation in Early India a. Introduction – D. Jha b. The Kali Age: A Period of Social Crisis – R. Sharma c. The Accounts of the Kali Age and the Social Transition from Antiquity to the Middle Ages – B.N. Yadava d. How Feudal was Indian Feudalism – R. Sharma e. Problem of the Interaction between Socio-Economic Classes in the Early Medieval Complex – B.N. Yadava f. Agrarian Growth and Social Conflicts on Early India – R. Nandi
- ARTICLE – Peasant Production and Medieval Indian Society – Harbans Mukhia
- The Indian Historical Review , Volume 1, Number 1 (March 1974) a. Methods and Problems of the Study of Feudalism in Early Medieval India – R. Sharma 10 Indian Historical Review , Volume 1, Number 2 (September 1974) a. Indian Feudalism Retouched – R. Sharma
Indian Feudalism Debate Essay
Course: BA (Hons.) History
University: University of Delhi
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