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AC 10758
English Grammar (Eng101)
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A. No. 10758 December 05, 2017 CBD Case No. 11-3215 is a complaint for gross immorality, malpractice and gross misconduct filed against Atty. Dalangin by the following complainants: (1) Atty. Torres (2) Felicidad O. Samatra (Samatra); (3) Alvaro; (4) Mary DF. Noveras (Noveras); and (5) Generosa S. Camacho (Camacho) Facts: Issue: RULING: Procedure from Resolutionsof the IBP Board of Governors The Court finds it appropriate to first address the matter of Atty. Dalangin's immediate recourse to the Court via a petition for review that questioned the IBP Board of Governors' resolve to affirm the Investigating Commissioner's recommendation on his administrative liability, notwithstanding the fact that the Court had not yet taken a final action on the complaints. When the administrative complaints were resolved by the IBP and the instant petition for review was filed in Court, the procedure from resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors in administrative cases was as provided in the former Section 12 of Rule 139- B of the Rules of Court, prior to the amendments introduced by Bar Matter No. 1645 dated October 13, 2015. The old rule read: Section 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based. It shall be promulgated within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the submittal of the Investigator's report. b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.
c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed by it is less than suspension or disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a decision exonerating respondent or imposing such sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated unless upon petition of the complainant or other interested party filed with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Board's resolution, the Supreme Court orders otherwise. d) Notice of the resolution or decision of the Board shall be given to all parties through their counsel. A copy of the same shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court. (Emphases supplied) In B. No. 1755 captioned Re: Clarification of Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline, the Court applied this provision to address the issue therein involved, and explained its proper application in a Resolution dated June 17, 2008. The Court set the following guidelines: In case a decision is rendered by the [Board of Governors (BOG)] that exonerates the respondent or imposes a sanction less than suspension or disbarment, the aggrieved party can file a motion for reconsideration within the 15-day period from notice. If the motion is denied, said party can file a petition for a review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with this Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the resolution resolving the motion. If no motion for reconsideration is filed, the decision shall become final and executory and a copy of said decision shall be furnished this Court. If the imposable penalty is suspension from the practice of law or disbarment, the BOG shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations. The aggrieved party can file a motion for reconsideration of said resolution with the BOG within fifteen (15) days from notice. The BOG shall first resolve the incident and shall thereafter elevate the assailed resolution with the entire case records to this Court for final action. If the 15-day period lapses without any motion for reconsideration having been filed, then the BOG shall likewise transmit to this Court the resolution with the entire case records for appropriate action. (Emphases supplied) Nowhere in his petition did Atty. Dalangin attempt to justify his immediate filing of the petition for review questioning the IBP resolutions that recommended his suspension. It could nonetheless be inferred from the circumstances that Atty. Dalangin's chosen course of action was to preclude the forfeiture of his right to question the dismissal of the administrative cases where he served as complainant, given that Section 12(c) provides that where the respondent is exonerated, (t)he case shall be deemed terminated unless upon a petition of the complainant or other interested party filed with
The Board's resolution, together with the entire records and all evidence presented and submitted, shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action within ten (10) days from issuance of the resolution. d) Notice of the resolution shall be given to all parties through their counsel, if any. In Vasco-Tamaray v. Daquis,[49] the Court emphasized that the amendments reiterated the principle that only the Court has the power to impose disciplinary action on members of the bar. Factual findings and recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline and the Board of Governors of the IBP are recommendatory, subject to review by the Court.[50] As the Court now reviews the IBP's resolve to dismiss the complaints against Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres, it then also enters its final action on the IBP Board of Governors' recommendation to suspend Atty. Dalangin from the practice of law for three years, as the IBP cited gross misconduct, violations of the CPR and breach of the lawyer's oath as grounds. A. No. 10758 Gross Immorality Among several cited grounds, the IBP's recommendation to suspend Atty. Dalangin from the practice of law for three years was on the pretext that he publicly and openly maintained a romantic relationship with Pascual even when their marriages with their respective spouses subsisted. Allegedly, the affair further resulted in the birth of the child Julienne, who was believed to be Atty. Dalangin's daughter even when he turned down a challenge for a DNA test that could prove the child's true filiation.[51] In his report, the Investigative Commissioner specifically referred to the following evidence to support his finding of an immoral relationship between Atty. Dalangin and Pascual: 2. That Complainant Alvaro who executed an affidavit regarding the illicit and immoral relation of [Atty. Dalangin] with [Pascual] for the reason that she was formerly [close] to [Pascual] and the latter confided to her that she (Pascual) [did] not love her husband anymore and the child called [Atty. Dalangin] "Papa attorney" (Affidavit of Alvaro as Exh. "F"). 3. That Ligaya Agrave[,] a neighbor of [Pascual,] likewise executed an affidavit that the child ["Julienne''] is the daughter of [Atty. Dalangin and Pascual], that she used to see
[Atty. Dalangin] taking care of [Julienne] when she was still a baby and when she grew up already, [Atty. Dalangin] used to accompany the child in their school tour and also her graduation. That the child as she grew older is a look[-]alike of [Atty. Dalangin]. (Affidavit of Ligaya Agrave marked as Exh. "G"). 4. That the illicit affair of [Atty. Dalangin] with his former Clerk in the PAO, Talavera, Nueva Ecija was well known in Talavera, in the entire judiciary in Talavera, Nueva Ecija and even in the community of Sto. Domingo, Nueva [E]cija[.] [(L]etter to the Ombudsman dated Aug. 18, 2011 of Felicidad Sumatra is marked as Exh. "H"). 5. That [Atty. Dalangin] refused when challenged for a DNA test. 6. Complainants submitted xxx pictures of [Atty. Dalangin and Pascual] together with their daughter [Julienne] taken in far away Puerto Prinsesa marked as Ex h. I and I-1. 7. That [Atty. Dalangin] continued to publicly and openly cohabit with a woman who is not his legal wife shows his lack of good moral character.[52] Time and again, the Court has indeed regarded extramarital affairs of lawyers to offend the sanctity of marriage, the family, and the community. Illicit relationships likewise constitute a violation of Article XV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution which states that, "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State."[53] When lawyers are engaged in wrongful relationships that blemish their ethics and morality, the usual recourse is for the erring attorney's suspension from the practice of law, if not disbarment. Upon the Court's review, however, it finds no sufficient basis to suspend Atty. Dalangin for a supposed illicit affair with Pascual. That an amorous relationship actually existed between them was not adequately proved. The quantum of proof in administrative cases is substantial evidence. The Court explained in Saladaga v. Astorga:[54]
With careful consideration of the foregoing tenets, the Court's perusal of the records reveals an insufficiency of evidence that could warrant the recommended suspension from the practice of law. To begin with, the two affidavits considered by the IBP as bases for its finding of Atty. Dalangin's gross immorality harped only on general statements of a supposed personal and public knowledge on the wrongful relationship between Atty. Dalangin and Pascual. The circumstances that could have led them to their conclusion were scant and unsubstantiated. The most concrete proof that they could offer was the birth of Julienne, yet even the child's birth certificate, a public document, expressly indicated the girl's father to be Pascual's husband, and not Atty. Dalangin.[61] Julienne's baptismal certificate[62] also provided such fact, along with a confirmation of Atty. Dalangin's defense on his closeness to Julienne for being her godfather. It would be unfair to Atty. Dalangin, more so for the child whose filiation is in a way needlessly dragged into this case, for the Court to affirm the assertions in the complaint and the IBP's findings and conclusions on the basis of the available evidence. The alleged similarities in the physical appearances of Atty. Dalangin and Julienne were but lame and dismal validations of the complainants' vehement claim of paternity. Even the photographs[63] of Atty. Dalangin, Pascual and Julienne in what appeared to be a trip to Puerto Princesa, Palawan were insufficient to support a conclusion on the unlawful relations. The lone photo where Atty. Dalangin appeared with Pascual and Julienne, who were apparently merely waiting for boarding in an airport terminal, utterly failed to manifest any romantic or filial bond among them. It was also explained through an affidavit[64] executed by spouses Dante Capindian and Timotea Jamito that Atty. Dalangin was a principal sponsor, while Pascual's family were guests, in their wedding which was held on August 6, 2011 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. Apparently, the photos were taken during the said trip. Pascual's husband, Edgardo, was also present for the occasion. The Court, nonetheless, does not find Atty. Dalangin totally absolved of fault. While he vehemently denied any romantic relationship with Pascual, he admitted demonstrating closeness with the latter's family, including her children. It was such display of affection that could have sparked in the minds of observers the idea of a wrongful relationship and belief that Julienne was a product of the illicit affair. Atty. Dalangin should have been more prudent and mindful of his actions and the perception that his acts built upon the public, particularly because he and Pascual were both married. "As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be
seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community."[65] As keepers of public faith, lawyers are burdened with a high degree of social responsibility and, hence, must handle their personal affairs with great caution."[66] The fault, nonetheless, does not warrant Atty. Dalangin's suspension, much less disbarment. An admonition should suffice under the circumstances. The following pronouncement in Advincula v. Macabata[67] is pertinent: While it is discretionary upon the Court to impose a particular sanction that it may deem proper against an erring lawyer, it should neither be arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, but should ever be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and independence of the bar and to exact from the lawyer strict compliance with his duties to the court, to his client, to his brethren in the profession and to the public. x x x Only those acts which cause loss of moral character should merit disbarment or suspension, while those acts which neither affect nor erode the moral character of the lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless they are of such nature and to such extent as to clearly show the lawyer's unfitness to continue in the practice of law. x x x[68] Gross Misconduct and Malpractice Atty. Dalangin was also charged, and recommended for suspension from the practice of law, for several other acts involving use of misleading evidence in court and preparation of affidavits with perjured statements to support cases and complaints for disbarment. When he still served as a public attorney, he likewise allegedly demanded acceptance fees from indigent clients, and appeared in courts beyond his area of jurisdiction. Even these charges, however, were not supported by evidence that could warrant Atty. Dalangin's suspension. And while there were several other charges included in the complaint against Atty. Dalangin, the accusations were actually for actions that should be attributed not to him, but to other individuals like Pascual.
"If a court of competent jurisdiction annulled the foreclosure sale of the property in question, the issuance of a writ of possession ceases to be ministerial." 15. In the said case of BPI vs. Tampipi, there is nothing mentioned about the cessation of the ministerial function of the court but instead what is clearly stated in the decision are the following: "Until the foreclosure sale of the property in question is annulled by a court of competent jurisdiction, the issuance of a writ of possession remains the ministerial duty of the trial court."[73] Atty. Dalangin invoked adherence to the substance and spirit of the cited ruling.[74] As counsel and officer of the court, however, with the corresponding duty to aid the courts in the task of ascertaining the truth, Atty. Dalangin was remiss in the discharge of his duties under the CPR. Canon 10, Rule 10 thereof provides: "[a] lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of paper, the language or the argument of the opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved." The Court, nonetheless, still does not find suspension to be an appropriate penalty for the act. While the Court detests Atty. Dalangin's failure to properly indicate that the statement was not a verbatim reproduction of the cited jurisprudence and, accordingly, calls his attention on the matter, it finds the admonition to be adequate. A suspension for the lone incident would be too harsh a penalty. It appeared that the supposed quotation was Atty. Dalangin's own conclusion from the cited jurisprudence. There was no clear indication that the statement was intended to mislead the court or commit a falsehood; there was no brazen deviation from the principle or doctrine that was embodied in the jurisprudence's original text.
AC 10758
Course: English Grammar (Eng101)
University: University of Negros Occidental-Recoletos
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