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Merrit v. Government, 34 Phil 311
Facts:
It is a fact not disputed by counsel for the defendant that when the plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, was going toward the western part of Calle Padre Faura, passing along the west side thereof at a speed of ten to twelve miles an hour, upon crossing Taft Avenue and when he was ten feet from the southwestern intersection of said streets, the General Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said avenue, instead of turning toward the south, after passing the center thereof, so that it would be on the left side of said avenue, as is prescribed by the ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act, turned suddenly and unexpectedly and long before reaching the center of the street, into the right side of Taft Avenue, without having sounded any whistle or horn, by which movement it struck the plaintiff, who was already six feet from the southwestern point or from the post place there.
By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely injured that, according to Dr. Saleeby, who examined him on the very same day that he was taken to the General Hospital, he was suffering from a depression in the left parietal region, a would in the same place and in the back part of his head, while blood issued from his nose and he was entirely unconscious.
Issue:
As the negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed by an agent or employee of the Government, the inquiry at once arises whether the Government is legally-liable for the damages resulting therefrom.
Ruling:
All admit that the Insular Government (the defendant) cannot be sued by an individual without its consent. It is also admitted that the instant case is one against the Government. As the consent of the Government to be sued by the plaintiff was entirely voluntary on its part, it is our duty to look carefully into the terms of the consent, and render judgment accordingly.
The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action against the Government "in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision,... ." These were the two questions submitted to the court for determination. The Act was passed "in order that said questions may be decided." We have "decided" that the accident was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur, who was at the time an employee of the defendant, and we have also fixed the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision. Does the Act authorize us to hold that the Government is legally liable for that amount? If not, we must look elsewhere for such authority, if it exists.
It is, therefore, evidence that the State (the Government of the Philippine Islands) is only liable, according to the above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed, without costs in this instance. Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, by legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds therefor, we are not called upon to determine. This matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the courts.
In the United States the rule that the state is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it employs, except when expressly made so by legislative enactment, is well settled. "The Government," says Justice Story, "does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public interest."
It being quite clear that Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the Government's liability to any cause not previously recognized, we will now examine the substantive law touching the defendant's liability for the negligent acts of its officers, agents, and employees. Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads:
The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.
Indubitably, the NIA is a government corporation with juridical personality and not a mere agency of the government. Since it is a corporate body performing non-governmental functions, it now becomes liable for the damage caused by the accident resulting from the tortious act of its driver- employee. In this particular case, the NIA assumes the responsibility of an ordinary employer and as such, it becomes answerable for damages.
This assumption of liability, however, is predicated upon the existence of negligence on the part of respondent NIA. The negligence referred to here is the negligence of supervision.
At this juncture, the matter of due diligence on the part of respondent NIA becomes a crucial issue in determining its liability since it has been established that respondent is a government agency performing proprietary functions and as such, it assumes the posture of an ordinary employer which, under Par. 5 of Art. 2180, is responsible for the damages caused by its employees provided that it has failed to observe or exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of the driver.
It should be emphasized that the accident happened along the Maharlika National Road within the city limits of San Jose City, an urban area. Considering the fact that the victim was thrown 50 meters away from the point of impact, there is a strong indication that driver Garcia was driving at a high speed. This is confirmed by the fact that the pick-up suffered substantial and heavy damage as above-described and the fact that the NIA group was then "in a hurry to reach the campsite as early as possible", as shown by their not stopping to find out what they bumped as would have been their normal and initial reaction.
Evidently, there was negligence in the supervision of the driver for the reason that they were travelling at a high speed within the city limits and yet the supervisor of the group, Ely Salonga, failed to caution and make the driver observe the proper and allowed speed limit within the city. Under the situation, such negligence is further aggravated by their desire to reach their destination without even checking whether or not the vehicle suffered damage from the object it bumped, thus showing imprudence and reckelessness on the part of both the driver and the supervisor in the group.
City of Manila v. Teotico, 22 SCRA 267
Facts:
On January 27, 1958, at about 8:00 p., Genaro N. Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney to take him down town. After waiting for about five minutes, he managed to hail a jeepney that came along to a stop. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney, and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. As blood flowed therefrom, impairing his vision, several persons came to his assistance and pulled him out of the manhole. One of them brought Teotico to the Philippine General Hospital, where his injuries were treated, after which he was taken home. In addition to the lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid, Teotico suffered contusions on the left thigh, the left upper arm, the right leg and the upper lip apart from an abrasion on the right infra-patella region. These injuries and the allergic eruption caused by anti-tetanus injections administered to him in the hospital, required further medical treatment by a private practitioner who charged therefor P1,400.
Issue:
Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter, because Republic Act 409, is a special law, intended exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a general law, applicable to the entire Philippines.
Ruling:
The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code, and, we think, correctly. It is true that, insofar as its territorial application is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code a general legislation; but, as regards the subject-matter of the provisions above quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for: "damages or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of" city officers "to enforce the provisions of" said Act "or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence" of the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions." Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces, cities and municipalities... liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any person by reason" — specifically — "of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public works under their control or supervision ." In other words, said section 4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective streets," in particular. Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.
It is urged that the City of Manila cannot be held liable to Teotico for damages: 1) because the accident involving him took place in a national highway; and 2) because the City of Manila has not been negligent in connection therewith.
Republic v. Palacio, 23 SCRA 899
Facts:
On April 2, 1960, Ildefonso Ortiz instituted in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur Civil Case No. 4886, against the Handong Irrigation Association, Inc., a corporation with principal place of business in Libmanan, Camarines Sur, and the Irrigation Service Unit, an office or agency under the Department of Public Works and Communications, to recover possession, with damages, of a 958 square meter-lot located in Handong, San Juan, Libmanan, Camarines Sur, which the Irrigation Association allegedly entered and occupied, at the instance of its co- defendant. For failure to appear and answer the complaint, therein defendant Irrigation Service Unit was declared in default.
Issue:
The issue presented by this case is whether or not the pump irrigation trust fund, deposited with the Philippine National Bank in the account of the Irrigation Service Unit, may be garnished to satisfy a money-judgment against the latter. This issue in turn calls for a determination of the nature of said trust fund, i., whether it is a fund belonging to the National Government (which was not a party to Civil Case No. 4886), as maintained by herein petitioner, or purely the proceeds of a private venture by the government, as claimed by the respondents.
Ruling:
For a better understanding of the nature, function and operation of the Irrigation Service Unit (ISU) which is necessary for the proper resolution of the issue herein involved, it is worthwhile to recall that this office was originally created under the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources by virtue of a Memorandum Agreement between the governments of the Philippines and the United States, dated August 13, 1952. It was later transferred to the Department of Public Works and Communications as an office directly under the Office of the Secretary, "to prosecute to completion the rehabilitation of pump systems transferred from the former Irrigation Pump Administration of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 2 including the settlement of the obligations of said administration." The budgetary requirements to carry out the objectives of the project were to be financed by withdrawals from the Counterpart Fund-Special Account. (Memorandum Agreement of June, 1954.)
This Counterpart Fund-Special Account referred to above was established in the Central Bank by the Government of the Philippines and made up of deposits in pesos commensurate with the indicated dollar cost to the Government of the United States of economic and technical assistance made available to the Philippines, pursuant to the Bilateral Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of April 27, 1951; of deposits accruing to it (Philippine government) from the sale of commodities or services supplied under the Agreement or otherwise accruing to it as a result of the import of such commodities or service; and of any advance deposits which the Philippine government may make in the Special Account (Sec. 1, paragraphs 2[a], [b] and [c], Annex to Memo. Agreement of April 27, 1951). Later, on the basis of a supplemental agreement (No. 2, Counterpart Project No. 409 — Pump Irrigation), the Pump Irrigation Trust Fund was established in the Philippine National Bank, to which all authorized releases to the ISU 3 from the Counterpart Fund — Special Account, to finance the peso-cost of the Irrigation Pump Project, were transferred. This is the fund on which the disputed writ of execution for money judgment rendered against the ISU, is being enforced.
It is clear from the foregoing that the ISU is not only an office in the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, created to promote a specific economic policy of said government, but also that its activity (of selling irrigation pumps to farmers on installment basis) is not intended to earn profit or financial gain to its operator. The mere fact that interests are being collected on the balance of the unpaid cost of the purchased pumps does not convert this economic project of the government into a corporate activity. As previously pointed out, the installment payments and interests receivable from the farmers are to be used to replenish the counterpart funds utilized in furtherance of the operation of the project.
Although evidently acknowledging the nature of the Pump Irrigation Trust Fund as a public fund, the Court of Appeals nevertheless sustained the garnishment order, on the ground that the ISU, by engaging in the private business of purchasing and selling irrigation pumps on installment basis, has waived its governmental immunity and, by implication, consented to the suit.
It is apparent that this decision of the Court of Appeals suffers from the erroneous assumption that because the State has waived its immunity, its property and funds become liable to seizure under the legal process. This emphatically is not the law
It needs no stressing that to allow the levying under execution of the ISU funds would amount to diverting them from the purpose originally contemplated by the P.I.U. Bilateral Agreement, and would amount to a disbursement without any proper appropriation as required by law.
A second infirmity of the decision under appeal originates from its ignoring the fact that the initial complaint against the Irrigation Service Unit was that it had induced the Handong Irrigation Association, Inc., to invade and occupy the land of the plaintiff Ildefonso Ortiz. The ISU liability thus arose from tort and not from contract; and it is a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction, embodied in Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that the State is liable only for torts caused by its special agents, specially commissioned to carry out the acts complained of outside of such agent's regular duties (Merritt vs. Insular Government, supra ; Rosete vs. Auditor General, 81 Phil. 453). There being no proof that the making of the tortious inducement was authorized, neither the State nor its funds can be made liable therefor.
Lanuzo v. Ping and Mendoza, 100 SCRA 205
Facts:
On November 25, 1969, a Complaint for damages was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur (Civil Case No. 6847) by plaintiff Felix Lanuzo against Sy Bon Ping, the owner and operator of a freight truck bearing Plate No. T-57266, and his driver, Salvador Mendoza. As alleged therein, at about five o'clock in the afternoon of July 24, 1969, while Salvador Mendoza was driving the truck along the national highway in the Barrio of San Ramon, Nabua, Camarines Sur, and because of his reckless negligence, we rammed into the residential house and store of plaintiff. As a result, the house and store were completely razed to the ground causing damage to plaintiff in the total amount of P13,000. Plaintiff averred that by reason thereof he became destitute as he lost his means of livelihood from the store which used to give him a monthly income of P300.
Ruling:
We come now to the subject of liability of the appellants herein. For his own negligence in recklessly driving the truck owned and operated by his employer, the driver, Salvador Mendoza, is primarily liable under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. On the other hand, the liability of his employer, Sy Bon Ping, is also primary and direct under Article 2180 of the same Code, which explicitly provides:
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
For failure of the appellant Sy Bon Ping to rebut the legal presumption of his negligence in the selection and supervision of this employee, 8 he is likewise responsible for the damages caused by the negligent act of his employee (driver) Salvador Mendoza, and his liability is primary and solidary.
... What needs only to be alleged under the aforequoted provision (Article 2180, Civil Code) is that the employee (driver) has, by his negligence (quasi-delict) caused damage to make the employer, likewise, responsible for the tortious act of the employee, and his liability is, as earlier observed, primary and solidary 9
But although the employer is solidarity liable with the employee for damages, the employer may demand reimbursement from his employee (driver) for whatever amount the employer will have to pay the offended party to satisfy the latter's claim.
Malipol v. Tan, 55 SCRA 202
Facts:
In the evening of February 6, 1965, at about 8:35 o'clock, Pantaleon Malijan, who was walking with his companion Leonardo Amante on the shoulder of the road in Barrio San Felix, Sto. Tomas, Batangas, was hit by a gasoline tanker and was thrown to the ground. While he was sprawling on the ground Malijan was run over by the tanker's right wheel that got detached from its axle. Malijan's companion, with the aid of the barrio captain, brought Malijan to the San Pablo City Hospital where he died that same night, the cause of death being "possible traumatic cerebral hemorrhage due to vehicular accident."
The gasoline tanker with Plate No. T-52573, series of 1964, driven at the time of the accident by herein appellant Ernesto Labsan, was being used in connection with the gasoline business of the owner, the herein appellant Lily Lim Tan.
Representations and demands for payment of damage having been ignored by appellants, appellees filed on May 18, 1966 a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Batangas praying that appellants be condemned to pay, jointly and severally, the damages as specified in said complaint. The appellees are the mother and the minor brothers and sisters of the deceased Pantaleon Malijan.
Issue:
(b) that appellant Ernesto Labsan was without fault in the accident that gave rise to the case; and (c) that appellant Lily Lim Tan had exercised the due diligence required of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Ruling: We must, however, point out a flaw in the decision of the lower court. It is stated in the decision appealed from that the driver, Ernesto Labsan, was primarily liable for the payment of damages adjudged therein, and the appellant Lily Lim Tan, being the owner and operator of the gasoline tanker that figured in the accident, is subsidiarily liable, that is, liable only in case Ernesto Labsan was not able to pay. This is not correct. The action in the instant case was brought not to demand civil liability arising from a crime. The complaint makes no mention of a crime having been committed, much less of the driver Ernesto Labsan having been convicted of a crime. But there is an allegation in the complaint that Ernesto Labsan was the authorized driver of the truck that figured in the accident, which truck was operated by appellant Lily Lim Tan in connection with her
gasoline business. The prayer in the complaint, furthermore, sought to hold appellants jointly and solidarily liable for damages. The instant action, therefore, was based, as the complaint shows, on quasi delict. 8 Under Article 218 of the Civil Code, which treats of quasi delicts , the liability of the owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise for damages caused by their employees is primary and direct, not subsidiary. 9 The employer, however, can demand from his employee reimbursement of the amount which he paid under his liability. 10 The employer, appellant Lily Lim Tan, must be held primarily and directly, not subsidiarily, liable for damages awarded in the decision of the lower court. This is, of course, without prejudice to the right of appellant Lily Lim Tan to demand from her co-appellant Ernesto Labsan reimbursement of the damages that she would have to pay to appellees.
his office was not vested with authority to order the seizure of a private
property; that said motor launch was purchased by Delfin Lim from Jikil
Taha in consideration of Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000), Two
Thousand Pesos (P2,000) of which has been given to Jikil Taha as
advance payment; that as a consequence of the unlawful seizure of the
motor launch, its sale did not materialize; and that since July 6, 1962,
the said motor launch had been moored at the Balabac Bay, Palawan and
because of exposure to the elements it had become worthless and beyond
repair. For the alleged violation of their constitutional rights, plaintiffs-
appellants prayed that defendants-appellees be ordered to pay jointly
and severally each of them the sum of P5,750 representing actual,
moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
Issue:
whether or not defendants-appellees are civilly liable to plaintiffs-
appellants for damages allegedly suffered by them granting that the
seizure of the motor launch was unlawful.
Ruling:
Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person whose constitutional
rights have been violated or impaired is entitled to actual and moral
damages from the public officer or employee responsible therefor. In
addition, exemplary damages may also be awarded. In the instant case,
plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim claimed that he purchased the motor
launch from Jikil Taha in consideration of P3,000, having given
P2,000 as advanced payment; that since its seizure on July 6, 1962
the motor launch had been moored at Balabac Bay and because of
exposure to the elements it has become worthless at the time of the filing
of the present action; that because of the illegality of the seizure of the
motor launch, he suffered moral damages in the sum of P1,000; and
that because of the violation of their constitutional rights they were
constrained to engage the services of a lawyer whom they have paid
P1,500 for attorney's fees. We find these claims of Delfin Lim amply
supported by the evidence and therefore should be awarded the sum of
P3,000 as actual damages; P1,000 as moral damages and
P750 for attorney's fees. However, with respect to plaintiff Jikil Taha,
he is not entitled to recover any damage which he alleged he had suffered
from the unlawful seizure of the motor launch inasmuch as he had
already transferred the ownership and possession of the motor launch to
Delfin Lim at the time it was seized and therefore, he has no legal
standing to question the validity of the seizure. Well-settled is the rule
that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose
rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful
search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third
parties.[17] Consequently, one who is not the owner, lessee, or lawful
occupant of the premises searched cannot raise the question of validity
of the search and seizure.
[18]
Jikil Taha is not without recourse though.
He can still collect from his co-plaintiff, Delfin Lim the unpaid balance of
P1,000.
Defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon wanted to wash his hands of
the incident by claiming that "he was in good faith, without malice and
without the slightest intention of inflicting injury to plaintiff-appellant,
Jikil Taha"
[19]
when he ordered the seizure of the motor launch. We are
not prepared to sustain his defense of good faith. To be liable under
Article 32 of the New Civil Code it is enough that there was a violation of
the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and it is not required that
defendants should have acted with malice or bad faith. Dr. Jorge
Bocobo, Chairman of the Code Commission, gave the following reasons
during the public hearings of the Joint Senate and House Committees,
why good faith on the part of the public officer or employee is
immaterial.
But defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela cannot be held accountable
because he impounded the motor launch upon the order of his superior
officer. While a subordinate officer may be held liable for executing
unlawful orders of his superior officer, there are certain circumstances
which would warrant Maddela's exculpation from liability. The records
show that after Fiscal Ponce de Leon made his first request to the
Provincial Commander on June 15, 1962 Maddela was reluctant to
impound the motor launch despite repeated orders from his superior
officer.[21] It was only after he was furnished a copy of the reply of Fiscal
Ponce de Leon, dated June 26, 1962, to the letter of the Provincial
Commander, justifying the necessity of the seizure of the motor launch
on the ground that the subsequent sale of the launch to Delfin Lim could
not prevent the court from taking custody of the same,[22] that he
impounded the motor launch on July 6, 1962. With said letter coming
from the legal officer of the province, Maddela was led to believe that
there was a legal basis and authority to impound the launch. Then came
the order of his superior officer to explain for the delay in the seizure of
xxx xxx xxx
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudged.
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(6) Illegal search;
(1) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32 , 34, and 35.
Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person whose constitutional rights have been violated or impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages from the public officer or employee responsible therefor. In addition, exemplary damages may also be awarded.
xxx xxx xxx
The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not necessary therefore that there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective protection of individual rights. Public officials in the past have abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their duties. Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an end to official abuse by plea of the good faith. In the United States this remedy is in the nature of a tort. (emphasis supplied)
Applying the aforecited provisions and leading cases, the respondent court correctly granted damages to private respondents. Petitioners were indirectly involved in transgressing the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. Firstly, they instigated the raid pursuant to their covenant in the Memorandum Agreement to undertake the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scouting supplies. 11 As correctly observed by respondent court:
Indeed, the acts committed by the PC soldiers of unlawfully seizing appellees' (respondents') merchandise and of filing the criminal complaint for unfair competition against appellees (respondents) were for the protection and benefit of appellant (petitioner) corporation. Such being the case, it is, thus, reasonably fair to infer from those acts that it was upon appellant (petitioner) corporation's instance that the PC soldiers conducted the raid and effected the illegal seizure. These circumstances should answer the trial court's query — posed in its decision now under consideration — as to why the PC soldiers immediately turned over the seized merchandise to appellant (petitioner) corporation. 12
The raid was conducted with the active participation of their employee. Larry de Guzman did not lift a finger to stop the seizure of the boy and girl scouts items. By standing by and apparently assenting thereto , he was liable to the same extent as the officers themselves. 13 So with the petitioner corporation which even received for safekeeping the goods unreasonably seized by the PC raiding team and de Guzman, and refused to surrender them for quite a time despite the dismissal of its complaint for unfair competition.
Under the above provision and as aforediscussed, petitioners miserably failed to report the unlawful peddling of scouting goods to the Boy Scouts of the Philippines for the proper application of a warrant. Private respondents' rights are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to transient needs. 15 Petitioners did not have the unbridled license to cause the seizure of respondents' goods without any warrant.
And thirdly, if petitioners did not have a hand in the raid, they should have filed a third-party complaint against the raiding team for contribution or any other relief, 16 in respect of respondents' claim for Recovery of Sum of Money with Damages. Again, they did not.
Marcia v. CA, 205 Phil 147
Facts:
On December 23, 1956, in the municipality of Lubao, Pampanga, a passenger bus operated by private respondent Victory Liner, Inc. and driven by its employee. private respondent Felardo Paje, collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latter's death and in physical injuries to herein petitioners, Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. Thereupon, an information for homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed against Felardo Paje in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (Criminal Case No. 2745).
On January 23, 1957, an action for damages (Civil Case No. 4425) was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap, together with their respective parents. against the Victory Liner, Inc. and Felardo Paje, alleging that, the mishap was due to the reckless imprudence and negligence of the latter in driving the passenger bus.
Issue:
I.
IN NOT HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS INSTANT CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES AGAINST
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FOR PHYSICAL INJURIES RESULTING FROM NEGLIGENCE IS
AN INDEPENDENT ONE, ENTIRELY SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM THE CRIMINAL
ACTION, UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLES 33, 2176 AND 2177 OF THE NEW (CIVIL
CODE AND SECTION 2 OF RULE 111 OF THE RULES OF COURT. AND IN INSTEAD
HOLDING THAT THE INSTANT ACTION IS NOT AMONG THE INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS
AUTHORIZED BY THE SAID PROVISIONS.
Ruling:
It is the stand of herein petitioners that Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, not Section 3 (c) thereof, should apply in the case at bar.
Sec. 2. Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
We do not agree, Section 2 of Rule 111 merely refers to the institution of an independent civil action without waiting for the filing or termination of the criminal action and requires only preponderance of evidence to prosper and not proof beyond reasonable doubt as required for conviction in criminal cases. However, an acquittal based on the finding that the facts upon which civil liability did not exist, bars the filing of an independent civil action if it is based on the crime. As early as 1952, We have held in the case of Tan vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Company 91 Phil.
Madeja v. Caro, 211 Phil 469
Facts:
In Criminal Case No. 75-88 of the defunct Court of First Instance of Eastern Samar,
DR. EVA A. JAPZON is accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy. The complaining witness is the widow
of the deceased, Carmen L. Madeja. The information states that: "The offended
party Carmen L. Madeja reserving her right to file a separate civil action for
damages." (Rollo, p. 36.)
The criminal case still pending, Carmen L. Madeja sued Dr. Eva A. Japzon for
damages in Civil Case No. 141 of the same court. She alleged that her husband died
because of the gross negligence of Dr. Japzon. The respondent judge granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss which motion invoked Section 3(a) of Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court which reads:
According to the respondent judge, "under the foregoing Sec. 3 (a), Rule 111, New Rules of Court, the instant civil action may be instituted only after final judgment
has been rendered in the criminal action." (Rollo, p. 33.)
Ruling:
The instant petition which seeks to set aside the order of the respondent judge
granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 141 is highly impressed
with merit.
Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of the Civil Code is
the applicable provision. The two enactments are quoted hereinbelow:jgc:chanrobles.com
"Sec. 2. Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33,
34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party
during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence." (Rule 111, Rules
of Court.)
"Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by
the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence." (Civil Code.)
There are at least two things about Art. 33 of the Civil Code which are worth noting,
namely:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
- The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is ex-delicto. This is
manifest from the provision which uses the expressions "criminal action" and "criminal prosecution." This conclusion is supported by the comment of the Code
Commission, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com
"The underlying purpose of the principle under consideration is to allow the citizen to enforce his rights in a private action brought by him, regardless of the action of the
State attorney. It is not conducive to civic spirit and to individual self-reliance and
initiative to habituate the citizens to depend upon the government for the vindication
of their own private rights. It is true that in many of the cases referred to in the provision cited, a criminal prosecution is proper, but it should be remembered that
while the State is the complainant in the criminal case, the injured individual is the
one most concerned because it is he who has suffered directly. He should be
permitted to demand reparation for the wrong which peculiarly affects him." (Report, p. 46.)
And Tolentino says:jgc:chanrobles.com
"The general rule is that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with
the criminal action, unless the offended party reserves his right to institute it
separately; and after a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted. The present articles creates an exception
to this rule when the offense is defamation, fraud, or physical injuries. In these
cases, a civil action may be filed independently of the criminal action, even if there
has been no reservation made by the injured party; the law itself in this article makes such reservation; but the claimant is not given the right to determine
whether the civil action should be scheduled or suspended until the criminal action
has been terminated. The result of the civil action is thus independent of the result
of the criminal action." (I Civil Code, p. 144 [1974].)
- The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. It is not the crime of
physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical
injuries by consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide.
"The Article in question uses the words defamation’, fraud’ and physical injuries.’
Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific
provisions in the Revise Penal Code using these terms as means of offenses defined therein, so that these two terms defamation and fraud must have been used not to
impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines, but in their
generic sense. With this apparent circumstance in mind, it is evident that the terms
physical injuries’ could not have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code Commission would
have used terms in the same article — some in their general and another in its
technical sense. In other words, the term physical injuries’ should be understood to
mean bodily injury not the crime of physical injuries, because the terms used with the latter are general terms. In any case the Code Commission recommended that
the civil action for physical injuries be similar to the civil action for assault and
battery in American Law, and this recommendation must have been accepted by the
Legislature when it approved the article intact as recommended. If the intent has been to establish a civil action for the bodily harm received by the complainant
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Course: Business Research (BBC 4980)
University: University of the East (Philippines)
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