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Raw intelligence - Appendix A - individual position

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Course

Organisational Analysis (BUSM2301)

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Academic year: 2023/2024
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Raw intelligence

Instructions

Assign a numerical probability to each of the nine statements on your list of raw intelligence. Each probability is to indicate the level of confidence a

statement gives you that Iraq has some form of WMD or WMD program. For example, if Statement 1 on the list makes you believe with absolute certainty

that Iraq has some form of WMD (nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological weapon) or WMD program, then you should assign a probability of 100% to

that statement. When reading the statements, ask your self, “How confident does this statement make me feel that Iraq has some form of WMD or WMD

program?” Or, “On the basis of this single statement, how certain am I that Iraq has some form of WMD or WMD program?

Statement to assess Probability (%) that Iraq has some form of WMD, or WMD program, based only on the single statement under consideration

  1. We judge that Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of United Nations (UN) resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical weapons (CW) and biological weapons (BW) as well as missiles with ranges in excess of 600km; it may have a nuclear weapon during this decade. (INR, the State Department’s intelligence office, does not concur with this assessment).

60

  1. We judge that we are seeing only a portion of Iraq’s WMD efforts, owing to its Baghdad’s vigorous denial and deception efforts.

35

  1. In the view of most agencies, Baghdad is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program (INR, the State Department’s intelligence office, does not concur with this assessment).

50

  1. Most analysts believe that Saddam’s personal interest in and Iraq’s aggressive attempts to obtain high-strength aluminium tubes for centrifuge rotors provide compelling evidence that Saddam is reconstituting a uranium enrichment effort for Baghdad’s nuclear weapons program. (The Department of Energy’s intelligence office assesses that the tubes are not part of the program).

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Appendix A

  1. We assess that Baghdad has begun renewed production of mustard, sarin, GG (cyclosarin), and VX (all types of chemical weapons).

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  1. We have little specific information on Iraq’s chemical weapon stockpile. Saddam possibly has stocked at least 100 metric tons (MT) and possibly as much as 500 metric tons of chemical weapon agents – much of it added in the last year.

30

  1. We judge that all key aspects – research and development (R&D), production, and weaponization – of Iraq’s offensive biological weapons program are active and that most elements are larger and more advanced than they were a decade ago.

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  1. We judge that Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating biological weapon agents and is capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives.

40

  1. Iraq maintains a small missile force and several developmental programs, including for an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) possible intended to deliver biological warfare agents. The United States Air Force (USAF) Intelligence believes the UAV’s primary role is reconnaissance.

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Single probability that summarizes your personal assessment that Iraq has some form of WMD or WMD program:  *Note: You should NOT simply average your nine probabilities to determine your single overall probability. Rather, you should consider the relative weights you attach to each of the nine pieces of raw intelligence. For example, you might assign low probabilities to seven of the nine pieces of intelligence and very high probabilities to the remaining two pieces. If you feel that the two items with high probabilities are particularly important indicators that Iraq has WMDs, then it is appropriate to assign an overall probability that is quite high.

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Appendix A

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Raw intelligence - Appendix A - individual position

Course: Organisational Analysis (BUSM2301)

278 Documents
Students shared 278 documents in this course

University: Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology University Vietnam

Was this document helpful?
Raw intelligence
Instructions
Assign a numerical probability to each of the nine statements on your list of raw intelligence. Each probability is to indicate the level of confidence a
statement gives you that Iraq has some form of WMD or WMD program. For example, if Statement 1 on the list makes you believe with absolute certainty
that Iraq has some form of WMD (nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological weapon) or WMD program, then you should assign a probability of 100% to
that statement. When reading the statements, ask your self, “How confident does this statement make me feel that Iraq has some form of WMD or WMD
program?” Or, “On the basis of this single statement, how certain am I that Iraq has some form of WMD or WMD program?
Statement to assess Probability (%) that Iraq has some
form of WMD, or WMD program,
based only on the single
statement under consideration
1. We judge that Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of United Nations
(UN) resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical weapons (CW) and biological weapons (BW) as well as
missiles with ranges in excess of 600km; it may have a nuclear weapon during this decade. (INR, the State
Department’s intelligence office, does not concur with this assessment).
60
2. We judge that we are seeing only a portion of Iraq’s WMD efforts, owing to its Baghdad’s vigorous denial and
deception efforts.
35
3. In the view of most agencies, Baghdad is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program (INR, the State Department’s
intelligence office, does not concur with this assessment).
50
4. Most analysts believe that Saddam’s personal interest in and Iraq’s aggressive attempts to obtain high-strength
aluminium tubes for centrifuge rotors provide compelling evidence that Saddam is reconstituting a uranium
enrichment effort for Baghdad’s nuclear weapons program. (The Department of Energy’s intelligence office
assesses that the tubes are not part of the program).
80
Appendix A